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Professional Issues Essay 
"What distinctive contribution can the profession of clinical 
psychology make in today's NHS? In what ways should the 
profession be concentrating its efforts in the future?" 
January 2012 
Year2 
5659 words 
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NOTE 
This essay is written in the third person with a first person reflections section at the 
end in order to address how the essay has influenced my development as a clinical 
psychologist. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2007 the Department of Health defined the role of applied psychologists as "To 
improve the psychological well-being of the population through working with individuals, 
families, teams, organisations and communities" (Department of Health, 2007, p9). However, 
this does not describe how clinical psychologists do this and what unique contributions they 
can make within NHS settings. In order to examine this it is first necessary to understand the 
context of the NHS today. 
There are a number of contextual factors within the NHS which are affecting the 
contribution clinical psychologists make and the focus of efforts for the future. With the 
introduction of "Payment by Results" (Department of Health, 2011) all professionals are 
being challenged to prove their worth in a system driven by outcomes and value for money. 
This has caused clinical psychology as a profession to need to justify the expense in 
employing and training clinical psychologists. Clearly it is not enough to deliver therapy such 
as CBT as the introduction of the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) 
programme has meant this can be delivered by cheaper practitioners who don't take so long 
to train. It is much easier to demonstrate the value of these practitioners as there is clear 
outcome data on the interventions they use. Clinical psychology has long advocated 
evidence-based practice but there is a great deal of variation in the collection of outcome data 
and of proving the effectiveness of clinical psychologists in practice. It is hoped the 
incorporation of outcome measures in electronic systems such as RiO will lead to 
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improvements in collecting such data and to the generation of practice-based evidence (Wolf, 
2007). 
Furthermore, many of the contributions made by clinical psychologists to teams 
cannot be demonstrated by simple outcome measures (for example, delivering supervision 
and consultation). Other ways of demonstrating worth need to be developed for use alongside 
more traditional outcome measures of symptom reduction. Otherwis~ in practice 
psychologists focus on activity such as therapy and not on other activity such as academic 
work, research and teaching (Wolf, 2007). If the profession is unable to demonstrate the 
unique and valuable contribution it can make, services will simply employ cheaper 
practitioners to do what they see as the same job for less money. The impact of the recent 
recession and budget cuts within the NHS has led to many psychologist posts being cut (see 
for example, Moloney, 2007). Clinical psychologists are often seen as a significant cost 
without the corresponding benefit and this needs to change if the profession is to survive 
(Mowbray, 2010). 
The probable introduction of GP (General Practitioner) commissioning and increased 
competition following the White Paper "Equity and Excellence; Liberating the NHS" 
(Department of Health, 2010) will mean clinical psychology will have to demonstrate to other 
professionals who are perhaps unaware of their role what unique contributions they can 
make. It is likely that services will be redesigned in order to try and improve efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness. Clinical psychologists need to demonstrate how they can add to this in 
order to ensure the future of the profession within the NHS. 
However, there is disagreement and variation amongst clinical psychologists about 
what unique contributions the profession can make and what the role is. Some psychologists 
believe their role is mainly to deliver therapy whereas many psychologists recognise the role 
encompasses more than this. A recent review of research promoting the scientist practitioner 
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model found 43.2% of articles focussed on the demand for researchers in order to ensure the 
future of the profession and 56.8% of articles focussed in the need for practitioners to 
demonstrate the applicability and value of the profession (Chang, Lee and Hargreaves, 2008). 
The scientist practitioner model (Raimy, 1950) has long been the main model used in 
training and practice. However, there are several flaws in this model and it needs to be 
adapted to suit today's NHS. This essay will address the flaws and future direction of the 
scientist practitioner model in more depth and then go on to discuss the further unique 
contributions clinical psychologists can make. These include the assessment and formulation 
of complex cases, consultation, supervision and reflective practice, training and 
dissemination of knowledge, leadership, research and audit. The essay will conclude that it is 
necessary for clinical psychology to adapt to meet the changing demands of the NHS and 
future efforts should focus on those aspects that are unique to the profession. 
THE SCIENTIST PRACTITIONER MODEL 
The integration of theory, research and practice in viewed as key to the role of clinical 
psychologists (British Psychological Society (BPS), 2010). This is known as the scientist-
practitioner model and has been the basis for clinical psychology for many years. This was 
first introduced in 1949 at the Boulder conference (Raimy, 1950). The model has changed 
very little in this time despite big changes in psychology as a profession and the wider social 
context of the NHS (Chang et al., 2008). It has been argued that the scientist-practitioner 
model does not accurately reflect the role of a clinical psychologist in NHS settings today as 
very few psychologists divide their time equally between research activity and clinical 
practice (Chang et al., 2008). There are many tensions which contribute to this. Firstly, as 
discussed in the introduction, the pressure on practitioners to account for the cost of 
employing them and to account for their time means focus is on clinical work which 
outcomes can easily be demonstrated for (Wolf, 2007). 
7 
Secondly, it can be very difficult to unite conceptual and practice-based knowledge in 
the ways advocated by the model. There is a gulf between the practices recommended by 
evidence from randomised controlled trials (RCTs) which use very narrow inclusion criteria 
and very specific interventions and practice in real-life settings with complex cases (Lane & 
Corrie, 2006; Wolf, 2007). Very little research describes interventions that resemble real-life 
practice (Wolf, 2007). There is also a gap between the ideals laid out in evidence-based 
guidelines (for example from NICE) and the reality of delivering these in practice, which is 
constrained by limited resources (Wolf, 2007). For example, NICE (2009) guidelines 
recommend all patients with schizophrenia are offered CBT for psychosis and family therapy 
but in practice this happens very little (see for example Berry & Haddock, 2008). This has 
caused practitioners to resent directives and targets derived from "evidence" if this does not 
easily apply to their experience in the real world (Lane & Corrie, 2006). This has been called 
"the unthinking application of scientism" (Salkovskis 2002; 4). This can be dangerous if 
psychologists are not allowed to think creatively about an individual problem drawing on 
their knowledge base and the many types of evidence available to them. 
Thirdly, there is disagreement in the application and focus of the scientist-practitioner 
model in practice. A recent review found no agreement on where clinical psychologists 
should base themselves and where their identity should lie (Chang et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
there is disagreement on whether the focus should currently be on research driving the 
development of the profession or on clinical practice as a way of demonstrating applicability 
and value (Chang et al., 2008). 
Fourthly, the model can be seen as over-simplistic as it ignores the many other skills 
psychologists have which are necessary and useful in making contributions to multi-
disciplinary teams. Scientific rigour is not enough in today's competition driven NHS. 
Additional skills in innovation and creativity are also necessary. The skill of formulation 
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requires psychologists to "think outside the box" and draw on the aspects unique to the 
individual concerned rather than focussing on prosaic, "one-size fits all" models. The 
scientist-practitioner model has traditionally failed to incorporate this creative aspect and 
should be widened to include this (Lane and Corrie, 2006). 
Finally, the traditional model focussed on science informing practice but has not also 
included how practice can inform scientific enquiry (Lane & Corrie, 2006). As researchers 
and practitioners, psychologists are in a unique position to contribute to improving the 
mutuality of this relationship. 
Despite the flaws and tensions within the scientist practitioner model described above, 
there are still benefits to using this model in describing and informing the contribution 
clinical psychologists play within the NHS. It is helpful to try and ensure rigour and scientific 
enquiry are incorporated into practice (Lane & Corrie, 2006). The ability to think 
analytically, define a problem in terms of questions to be answered, draw on many different 
sources of knowledge, and look at the wider factors involved in a person's difficulties means 
clinical psychologists are uniquely placed to assess and formulate complex cases. The ability 
to critique and evaluate the work they do means clinical psychologists aim to ensure people 
receive the most effective and cost-effective treatment and more people receive help (Lane & 
Corrie, 2006). This means clinical psychologists can make unique contributions to services 
and to service development as well as the individual clients they work with. For these 
reasons, it is suggested there should still be an emphasis on clinical psychologists operating 
as scientist-practitioners but this model should be widened to include the many other unique 
aspects and skills that clinical psychologists can offer (Lane &Corrie, 2006; Chang et al., 
2008). The unique contributions psychologists can make will be discussed in the following 
section. 
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UNIQUE SKILLS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The training and expertise clinical psychologists have makes them uniquely placed to 
offer several distinct contributions to NHS settings. Several of these will be discussed below. 
This is not an exhaustive list but these seem the most relevant in the current NHS climate. 
The British Psychological Society highlights these areas as the core competencies of clinical 
psychologists (BPS, 2010). Psychological intervention will not be discussed here although it 
is, of course, part of a clinical psychologist's role. It is the blend of all the aspects described 
below along with the delivery of clinical interventions with individuals, families and groups 
which means clinical psychologists can offer a unique contribution in NHS settings (BPS, 
2010). 
Formulation and Assessment of Complex Cases and Neuropsychological Assessment 
As discussed above, psychologists are uniquely placed to inform assessments and 
formulation especially of complex cases. This is because clinical psychologists have 
analytical skills and are encouraged to view the wider perspective. They have knowledge of 
several models and theories of psychological distress and the many factors which could be 
contributing to the problem. By viewing the problem in an analytical way clinical 
psychologists define the key question(s) to be answered and gather evidence in order to reach 
a conclusion. This will benefit the patient by developing an understanding of their difficulties 
and possible routes for change. 
Clinical psychologists are trained to use psychometric testing methods, structured 
behavioural methods and observational methods to inform their assessments of people's 
difficulties. This is a unique skill which requires training and expertise and can be highly 
valuable within multidisciplinary NHS settings. Psychologists can assimilate several sources 
of information into a cohesive assessment. This is especially true in the area of 
neuropsychological assessment where clinical psychologists can make an extremely valuable 
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contribution in informing diagnosis and treatment planning. Psychologists are also able to 
draw on their existing knowledge and experience to devise new assessment tools that are 
specific to the individual (BPS, 2010). 
Psychologists are able to think creatively and draw on several sources of knowledge 
in order to develop meaningful formulations which can then inform interventions to either be 
delivered by the psychologist themselves or other practitioners (Lane & Corrie, 2006; BPS, 
2010). The many sources include biological, psychological and social factors and 
psychologists aim to integrate all these into a formulation. This is often in the form of 
developing hypotheses from which actions can be taken. Psychologists are unique in their 
knowledge of psychological theory, the ability to apply it to practice, and to review, evaluate, 
analyse and synthesise, psychological data in order to create an understanding of people's 
difficulties. Psychologists are also highly skilled in the written and verbal dissemination of 
such theory to service users and carers as well as other professionals (BPS, 2010). 
Supervision 
There are a number of benefits to supervision of clinical practice and supervision is 
mandatory for most health care practitioners. Clinical psychologists are well placed to offer 
supervision to other psychologists, trainees and other practitioners. This is due to the 
extensive knowledge of different models and theories, the expertise clinical psychologists 
have gained through experience and the ability to integrate different ideas and think 
creatively around problems. Supervision can ensure less experienced practitioners work 
safely and within their skills and can aid in the development of practitioner's knowledge. 
Through supervision psychologists can ensure others learn in a personalised way and can 
enable others to apply psychological thinking to practice. Supervision can be viewed as a way 
of creating a successful, distinct knowledge culture and this can be a valuable contribution to 
the culture of the team (Lane & Corrie, 2006). Through supervision of other, less expensive, 
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practitioners, such as IAPT workers, trainees, assistant psychologists, and other therapists, 
clinical psychologists can ensure their valuable knowledge and expertise informs the care of a 
larger number of patients than they would be able to treat themselves. 
Clinical psychologists are also ideal to offer group supervision to teams of workers 
due to their knowledge of team processes and their skills in working with groups of people. A 
further aspect clinical psychologists can bring to supervision is the skill of being reflective 
which is discussed further below. 
Reflective Practice 
There has been increasing emphasis in recent years on clinical psychologists being 
reflective practitioners (BPS, 2005). Self-awareness is promoted and clinical psychologists 
are encouraged to reflect on their own personal and professional development both in training 
and when qualified. This ensures psychologists are accountable for their work and that they 
work ethically within the boundaries of their skills and knowledge (BPS, 2010). This includes 
reflecting on the impact of social and cultural factors and including these when thinking 
about individual cases and teams. 
Within busy NHS settings the ability and space to be reflective is often lost. Evidence 
from practice would suggest that many practitioners from many disciplines would value 
space to discuss and think about the complex issues facing them in their work. However this 
is not a priority of managers and commissioners who want the best value for money and want 
the maximum of time possible spent with patients achieving measurable outcomes. As 
professionals in high positions within teams, clinical psychologists are able to advocate and 
deliver reflective practice sessions to teams and are able to use the evidence available to them 
to demonstrate the value of this to managers. Time spent at meetings with psychologists 
working in hospital settings would suggest that many clinical psychologists view providing 
reflective practice as a crucial and unique part of their role. 
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Evaluation, Audit and Research 
An important part of a clinical psychologist's work is to evaluate the factors bringing 
about effective change. This can include the design, development, modification and 
implementation of strategies to improve clinical outcomes and to manage complex and 
demanding cases (BPS, 2010). Clinical psychologists are encouraged to evaluate their own 
individual work and also evaluate wider service-level provision. This can contribute to the 
improvement of services for service users and carers. 
Clinical psychologists have the ability to analyse and critically evaluate research and 
to use research to inform practice. With their skills in conducting, planning and organising 
research they can also ensure research is conducted which is clinically relevant and can 
guarantee research is based on questions derived from clinical practice (BPS, 2010). This 
ensures a process where there is a flow of information from research to practice to research. 
As well as evidence-based practice, clinical psychologists can contribute to practice-
based evidence through the use and development of reliable outcome measures (Wolf, 2007). 
Clinical psychologists are uniquely placed to bridge both the academic and clinical 
worlds through their training as scientist-practitioners. Many NHS trusts are focussing on the 
development of research within their organisations as a way of increasing funds coming in to 
the organisation and to improve the services they offer. Local trusts have recently set-up 
research departments and have employed clinical psychologists in roles leading these. 
Teaching, Training and Sharing Knowledge 
Clinical psychologists are a source of knowledge of psychological models and 
theories. They can contribute to a whole team's knowledge of such theory through formal 
teaching and training and more informal sharing of knowledge at team meetings and 
discussions. They are able to deliver teaching which takes into account the varying needs, 
goals and abilities of the different parties involved (BPS, 2010). Through creating a shared 
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psychological understanding within teams and advocating viewing a broader perspective than 
one model ( e.g. a medical model), clinical psychologists are able to ensure the whole case 
load of the team receives an individualised and effective treatment. This can lead to improved 
outcomes, increased effectiveness and cost efficiency within a whole team. This means the 
expense of employing a psychologist within a team can be justified by the benefits received 
by the team as a whole not just the individuals on a clinical psychologist's case load. 
Consultation 
As clinical psychologists are often a limited resource, consultation is one way to 
ensure psychologists can have an effective impact on as many people's psychological 
wellbeing as possible. This can take several forms but often focusses on using the 
psychologist's specialist assessment and formulation skills to develop an understanding of the 
person's difficulties in order to inform treatment. Sometimes this will involve the 
psychologist meeting the individual for a short period of time, other times this will involve 
meeting with the team supporting the person and examining with them how they could think 
differently about the problem. Increasing emphasis is being placed on consultation especially 
for clinical psychologists at higher levels of experience and pay. Consultation models have 
been used widely within some services such as learning disability and challenging behaviour 
services. Clinical psychologists working within other services such as adult mental health 
services would do well to adopt aspects of these models into their work. This could help 
reduce waiting lists and ensure a larger number of people receive help. 
Leadership 
With the introduction of New Ways of Working (see for example, Department of 
Health, 2007), the focus for leadership became that of competence rather than profession. 
Increasingly clinical psychologists are taking up positions of leadership within NHS settings 
and they are being increasingly expected to do so (BPS, 2010). Applied psychologists are 
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seen as important sources of knowledge in the "normal" psychological processes around 
change and transition and how these affect the individual, group and system (BPS, 2007). 
Change and transition are very common in NHS teams and they have to be addressed in order 
to enable teams to work effectively. The combination of knowledge around group processes, 
good communication and organisational skills, high levels of knowledge and expertise in 
psychological theory and good interactional skills make psychologists well placed to become 
leaders of services. 
There needs to be more of a focus on leadership in the future, frameworks need to be 
developed to aid the progression of clinical psychologists into leadership roles and training 
needs to include aspects on leadership (BPS, 2007). This will help to ensure clinical 
psychologists can make an active contribution to services at a high level. 
Service Development 
As well as contributing to service development through leadership at strategic level, 
clinical psychologists of all levels can contribute to service development and can play an 
important role in this area. This can include working with service users and carers to facilitate 
their role in service planning and delivery, understanding and working with issues affecting 
organisational change, developing partnerships with commissioners and other parties, and 
using psychological knowledge and theory to design psychologically effective services (BPS, 
2007; 2010). Furthermore, service evaluation, audit and research conducted by clinical 
psychologists can be used to develop effective services and highlight areas for improvement. 
WAYSFORWARDSANDIDEASFORTHEFUTURE 
The unique abilities and skills that clinical psychologists can bring to NHS settings 
are discussed above. Unfortunately it seems in practice these skills and abilities are not being 
used either due to service pressures for outcomes or constrictive service designs. Moreover 
not all psychologists view these aspects as part of their role. In order to ensure the future of 
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the profession it is important that clinical psychologists emphasise their worth and what they 
can offer to services. Services also need to be re-designed away from the psychiatrist 
dominant medical model to a more collaborative, multi-disciplinary, individualised model. 
This was started by the "New Ways of Working" initiative (see for example, Department of 
Health, 2007). More needs to be done to ensure that clinical psychology continues to have a 
contribution within the NHS. Some writers have argued that dramatic changes need to happen 
to service design and clinical psychologist's attitudes and approach otherwise psychology 
will have no future within the NHS (Watson, 2003, cited in Mowbray, 2010). 
Therefore clinical psychology needs to adapt and services need to change in the 
future. Several ideas and focusses have been suggested for this. Firstly, the BPS has recently 
published a document focussing on psychological health and wellbeing and how clinical 
psychologists can contribute to the improvement of this (BPS, 2009). With the development 
of IAPT services and the increasing focus on treating mental health problems quickly and 
effectively in primary care, there is a new area in which clinical psychologists can make a 
useful contribution. This can include using psychological theory to improve access for those 
who do not currently access services, for example men and people from ethnic minority 
backgrounds. Furthermore these services are often not led by psychiatrists and there is 
increasing scope for clinical psychologists to lead, design and shape these services. Focussing 
on wellbeing also highlights a shift in the rhetoric surrounding mental health from focussing 
on the few with severe and enduring "illness" to promoting a focus on keeping mentally 
healthy. 
The focus on mental health and wellbeing can be spread to the workplace, both within 
an NHS context and a wider context. Presenteeism is where people attend work despite 
feeling unwell. This leads to reduced productivity and effectiveness and costs companies a 
great deal.in light of Dame Carol Black's (2008) report into staff sickness, presenteeism and 
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absence, there has been a great focus on keeping people in work well physically and 
especially psychologically. Clinical psychologists could play an effective role in improving 
the wellbeing of the whole workforce by developing programmes and services focussing on 
the promotion of good mental health (MAS, 2007). 
Mowbray (2008; 2010) has described his v1s10n of the future where clinical 
psychologists are instrumental in the establishment of centres for psychological health and 
wellbeing which provide psychological services to whole communities. These would be 
social enterprises owned by psychologists and be home to psychologists with many different 
interests offering a range of psychological therapies (Mowbray, 2008; 2010). This would 
provide a real alternative to the current system which focusses on mental illness rather than 
mental wellbeing. This focus would ensure a much larger section of the population would be 
affected and helped by psychologists and psychological theory and models. 
Secondly, it seems the future involves clinical psychologists branching out from the 
typical NHS settings in which they have traditionally worked. This would include working 
with other client groups such as cancer patients and patients with other chronic and life 
affecting conditions. This has already started and it seems will be a fruitful area of focus for 
the future (Wolf, 2007). Other areas include stroke and neuro-rehab as the survival rates 
improve and the population is ageing. The older population has long lacked psychological 
provision but this is changing and this creates an area for clinical psychologists to show their 
merit. 
Thirdly, Mowbray (2008) proposes that psychologists of different specialisms and 
backgrounds join together to promote psychological thinking within the NHS. He proposed 
the formation of institutes of healthcare psychology which would draw together all aspects of 
psychological science which focus on health. This would provide a broader foundation of 
psychological knowledge, stimulate research, support initiatives including influencing health 
17 
policy, and guarantee a focus on psychological principles and theories being applied to all 
areas of health and healthcare (Mowbray, 2008; 2010). Clinical psychologists cannot afford 
to be complacent and hope for services within the NHS to change, instead they should be 
active in creating services and institutions which have a focus on psychological knowledge 
and practice. The above ideas are just a small sample of the myriad of ways clinical 
psychologists can creatively contribute to the NHS in future. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING AND PRACTICE 
If clinical psychology has to adapt and broaden its scope then training has to adapt at 
an equal rate. The context of the NHS is constantly changing and it is important for training 
programmes to keep abreast of this in order to ensure the clinical psychologists they produce 
are fully equipped for work in the NHS. It seems training programmes attempt to do this by 
maintaining good links with the NHS trusts they serve and with qualified clinical 
psychologists working within the area. 
It is also the responsibility of trainees to ensure their training provides them with the 
skills they need. Trainees should seek out opportunities for enhancing the skills described 
above within their placements and should spend time reading and researching current 
developments within the NHS and the profession. This can be done by tailoring placement 
contracts to meet their learning needs which is actively encouraged by training courses. 
Furthermore trainees should be members of professional bodies such as the BPS and read 
information and discussions about the future of the profession that are published by them. 
Personal and professional discussion groups could also be used to share ideas about the future 
direction of the profession. 
However, in reality the pressures of training and the cost of membership of bodies 
such as the BPS often prevent trainees from spending time considering what skills they will 
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need post qualification if the NHS is changing. More should be done within training 
programmes to facilitate and encourage this. 
In practice it seems there is a great deal of variation in how clinical psychologists 
view the future of the profession and where the emphasis of the role should lie. Obviously 
this will vary from setting to setting but it is discouraging to hear of clinical psychologists 
who view their role as predominantly to provide psychological therapy and not to use the 
many additional skills described in this essay. This will have to change if the profession is to 
continue and it is up to lead psychologists and also newly qualified psychologists to lead the 
way in forging a distinct and valued role within the NHS. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the current context of the NHS and the current status of the profession 
of clinical psychology mean that clinical psychology needs to prove its worth in order to 
ensure its future within NHS settings. There are flaws in using the scientist-practitioner 
model in its current form and this model needs to be adapted to include other important 
-aspects of the work clinical psychologists can do. Clinical psychology can no longer solely 
focus on their skills as therapists as there are other, cheaper practitioners who have these 
skills. Instead clinical psychologists need to adapt and be flexible and creative in forging 
roles which incorporate the many unique contributions they can make to NHS services. The 
current context of the NHS means that it is uncertain how services will be designed in future. 
While many find this uncertainty a frightening and daunting prospect, it does create a climate 
for clinical psychologists to create and design services very different to the status quo which 
could meet the needs of the wider population better. A few possible examples of this have 
been discussed .. 
This essay has argued that clinical psychologists can make several distinct 
contributions within NHS settings. These include the combination and synthesis of 
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knowledge of psychological theory, research, and practice. Psychologists are uniquely placed 
to work across academic and clinical settings and this can have a number of benefits for the 
profession, services and individuals. This "scientist-practitioner" model should be widened to 
include the other unique skills of assessment and formulation of complex cases, 
neuropsychological assessment, supervision, reflective practice, evaluation, research and 
audit, teaching, training and sharing knowledge, consultation, leadership and service 
development. The combination of all these different skills and abilities make clinical 
psychologists uniquely placed to shape the changing NHS and efforts should focus on 
enhancing these areas in future. Through using this set of skills and abilities, clinical 
psychologists are able to reach out to a large section of the population and improve 
psychological wellbeing for as many people as possible. 
As things are at the moment, many professionals and lay people are unsure what 
clinical psychologists do, what is unique to the profession and what they can offer to NHS 
services. It is clear that if this does not change there is no future for the profession. The 
profession as a whole and individual clinical psychologists should focus on changing these 
attitudes, adapting the way they work to suit the needs of the population and the NHS settings 
they work in. Clinical psychology does have a lot to offer and clinical psychologists have 
many unique skills which can make a meaningful contribution to improving psychological 
wellbeing. 
REFLECTIONS 
On reflection, the writing of this essay has enhanced my development as a clinical 
psychologist as it has broadened my view of what clinical psychologists can offer with the 
NHS and in wider contexts. It has helped me to think creatively about how I want to shape 
my future career and has inspired a passion in me to "think outside the box" in terms of how 
clinical psychologists can help improve psychological wellbeing. I especially like Mowbray's 
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(2008) idea about setting up centres for psychological wellbeing, he has created a more 
coherent and polished vision of an idea I had had myself. 
This essay made me think about how psychologists work within the different settings 
I have encountered on placement. I have seen a large variation in the role clinical 
psychologists do play and the influence they have within teams. I have noticed that it is often 
the role of psychologists to emphasise the importance of thinking broadly around the client 
and their difficulties and to hold onto wider psychological perspectives. Across my 
placements emphasis on therapy as the role has varied and the reading for this essay has 
reinforced my view that while it is an important aspect, it is not the only part of the role. This 
has made me think about what areas I need to get further experience in and has inspired me to 
look for more varied opportunities for leadership and development in my next placements. 
I am aware that my current position as a trainee has influenced this essay. I have 
committed a great deal to my training so far and at the beginning of my career there is 
perhaps a need to see all the positive contributions the profession can make and a need to see 
a future for the profession. This may have influenced my selection and analysis of the 
literature around this topic. 
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ABSTRACT 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) describes a pervasive pattern of symptoms 
which can have a serious impact on quality of life. It is linked to high suicide and self-harm 
rates. BPD has been difficult to treat and is over-represented in people using mental health 
services. Treatments for BPD which are easy to implement, effective, cost-effective and 
acceptable to patients and staff have been sought. This review examines the evidence of the 
effectiveness of the STEPPS programme for people with BPD. STEPPS is an adjunctive 
group programme which is easy to implement and train staff in delivering. The evidence 
suggests STEPPS is effective in reducing symptoms of BPD but not self-harm behaviours. 
There are several methodological limitations to the studies conducted so far and further work 
is needed in this area before firm conclusions can be drawn. The National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) has outlined several priorities for the treatment of BPD; this 
review considers whether STEPPS meets these priorities. 
DECLARATION OF INTEREST 
My interest in this topic was sparked by starting my placement. I am based at a busy 
community mental health team where resources are short. There are many clients on the 
caseload that have a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. This client group has 
historically been difficult to treat and people with this diagnosis often need on-going support 
from services or have multiple admissions to hospital. In this context a group treatment that is 
easy to train staff in and requires relatively little input seems intuitively to solve several 
problems. I have been allocated a client that has completed this programme and I was asked 
to read up on the subject. All the material accompanying the programme sounds promising 
but I was interested in discovering what the evidence for this approach is and what it aims to 
achieve. 
25 
INTRODUCTION 
Borderline Personality Disorder 
The term Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is used to describe a pervasive 
pattern of unstable personal relationships, emotional instability, fluctuating self-image, and 
impulsive behaviour (NICE, 2009, American Psychiatric Association, 2000). It can involve 
efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment, multiple suicide attempts or threats, self-
mutilating behaviour, chronic feelings of emptiness, inappropriate and intense feelings of 
anger and behaviours related to anger, and transient psychotic symptoms (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). BPD is associated with increased use of mental health care 
facilities (Bender et al., 2001). It can be associated with impaired quality of life and poor 
social, psychological and occupational functioning (NICE, 2009). BPD affects approximately 
1 % of the general population and more women than men (NICE, 2009). The prevalence 
among those using mental health services has been estimated at 15 % (e.g. Torgerson, 
Kringlen and Cramer, 2001) although estimates vary. 
Many people find the term Borderline Personality Disorder pejorative, difficult and 
unacceptable (Black, Blum, Pfohl and St. John, 2004). Bartels and Crotty (1998) have 
suggested the term Emotional Intensity Disorder be used instead. This term may more 
accurately reflect the difficulties faced by people with this diagnosis. The ICD-10 category 
Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder is comparable to the term Borderline Personality 
Disorder (NICE, 2009). For the purpose of this review BPD will be used. 
Issues facing services 
People with a diagnosis of BPD have been denied access to community mental health 
services because of their diagnosis (NICE, 2009). Traditional mental health treatments 
including medication are less effective for people with a diagnosis ofBPD (NICE, 2009). For 
this reason treatments specifically for BPD have been developed. These include Dialectical 
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Behaviour Therapy (DBT) (Linehan, 1993) and Mentalization-Based Therapy (MBT) 
(Bateman and Fonagy, 2008). DBT seems to be emerging as the treatment of choice (Harvey, 
Black and Blum, 2010). However, this treatment is lengthy, costly and requires highly skilled 
therapists that have received considerable training (Harvey et al., 2010). Due to these 
limitations, services are struggling to provide therapy to the large numbers of people on their 
caseload with a diagnosis of BPD. There is increasing pressure on services in the UK to be 
cost-effective, deliver treatments as quickly as possible and to use outcome measures to 
account for their effectiveness. The increased suicide risk for people with a diagnosis of BPD 
means they are especially vulnerable and in need of good quality care. A group programme 
that can be delivered cost-effectively, over a relatively short period, with proven outcomes 
may meet some of the needs of mental health services. 
The STEPPS programme 
STEPPS stands for Systems Training for Emotional Predictability and Problem 
Solving. It is a group programme developed by Blum and colleagues (2002) based on earlier 
work by Bartels and Crotty (1998). STEPPS is a 20-week programme that combines elements 
from Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy and skills training with a systems component. The 
systems component includes friends and family members nominated by the participant to 
provide support. The programme is adjunctive to on-going individual therapy. STEPPS was 
developed in order to meet the needs of a rural and dispersed population and the needs of 
mental health services to provide an effective treatment for people with a diagnosis of BPD 
that is cost-effective and practical. 
NICE guidance 
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has recently published guidance 
on the treatment of BPD (NICE, 2009). The results and inconclusive as there are few 
Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) evaluating the effectiveness of available treatments. 
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NICE recommends that treatments are "complex" (comprise of several elements) and that 
they continue for at least three months. For women who have recurrent self-harm, DBT is 
recommended (NICE, 2009). The guidance highlights key priorities for treating people with a 
diagnosis of BPD which can be used to evaluate interventions. 
Aims of the review 
To date there is no published review on the effectiveness of the STEPPS programme. 
This review aims to evaluate the available evidence and assess whether STEPPS meets NICE 
(2009) priorities for treatments for BPD symptoms. 
METHOD 
The terms Borderline Personality Disorder AND STEPPS OR Emotional Intensity 
Disorder were entered into the database PsycINFO. Articles were excluded from the review 
if they did not refer to the STEPPS programme, they were case studies, or access to the full 
article could not be gained. This left a total of seven articles reporting on the effectiveness of 
the STEPPS programme plus an editorial discussing the evidence and a letter in response to 
one of the articles. 
REVIEW 
The aims and goals of STEPPS 
The authors of the programme describe their aims, goals and the potential benefits of 
STEPPS (Blum et al., 2002; Black et al., 2004). The authors report that STEPPS is cost-
effective as it is relatively brief and it is delivered in a group format. Its brief nature means it 
is applicable to a number of community settings. A manual that can be easily followed means 
that many staff from a variety of backgrounds can easily be trained to deliver the programme 
inexpensively. This is contrary to DBT which requires extensive, costly training, for highly 
experienced practitioners. The manual enables evaluation of effectiveness of the programme 
as it ensures similar delivery across studies. The STEPPS programme can run alongside any 
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existing therapy avoiding disruption to the therapeutic relationship; something people with a 
diagnosis ofBPD find difficult (NICE, 2009). 
The integration of several components is a further strength of STEPPS. The systems 
element is advantageous because people with a diagnosis of BPD often are enclosed in a 
system of unhealthy and dysfunctional relationships. Even if members of the system are well-
meaning, their actions can reinforce dysfunctional behaviours and attitudes. Involving family 
and friends can help participants use the material discussed in the group and can enhance the 
changes they are learning to make. It also enables participants to take responsibility for 
helping key members of their system respond more effectively (Black et al., 2004). STEPPS 
uses elements of CBT and skills training which both have a good evidence base. 
Current evidence 
The first study on the effectiveness of STEPPS was published by Blum and 
colleagues in 2002. In this preliminary report, the authors report data for 52 participants, 28 
of which completed at least 10 sessions of the programme. The pilot data reported shows a 
decrease in BPD symptoms as measured by the BEST (Borderline Evaluation of Severity 
over Time) test, a test developed by the authors. Reliability and validity data for this scale are 
reported in the article (Blum et al., 2002). The authors also found the STEPPS programme led 
to a decrease in negative affect. The effect sizes for these results were large. These results are 
from a very small sample of patients, with no control group so little can be generalised from 
this study and the reliability is low. 
Drop-out rate was high across the study and only data from those who did not drop-
out is presented, this could have led to bias in the results as those who did not complete the 
programme may have dropped out due to not finding it helpful. The data collection was 
incomplete as it was decided to conduct the analysis after the programme had run, because of 
this there were limited assessments done with the participants and only some outcomes were 
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able to be evaluated. As suicide risk is such an important factor in BPD (NICE, 2009) it 
would have been beneficial to have data on the effect of the programme on suicide attempts, 
threats and ideation, and self-harm episodes. The authors acknowledge the limitations of this 
study and highlight areas for further research. 
Blum and colleagues (2002) also report data from a small scale satisfaction survey 
completed by a sub-set of participants and therapists. This survey found high levels of patient 
and therapist acceptance for the efficacy and process of the programme. This is an important 
aspect to consider when evaluating a treatment as participants will drop out if they do not 
consider the treatment acceptable. Therapists will not refer to the programme if they do not 
support it. Again this data was only collected from participants who had completed the 
programme, potentially biasing the results in favour of the programme as those who dropped 
out are more likely to be dissatisfied. 
Black and colleagues (2004) build on the preliminary report described above by 
describing in more depth the aims and values of the STEPPS programme and detailing what 
the course entails. They report preliminary evidence of effectiveness although still no RCT 
had been conducted at this point. Because of this it was unclear whether STEPPS itself leads 
to positive outcomes or whether a general component of group therapy or on-going individual 
therapy is responsible. This article also cites preliminary results from the Netherlands 
suggesting STEPPS can be adapted for use in different countries (Frieje et al., 2002, cited in 
Black et al., 2004 (original paper in Dutch)). 
A randomised control trial was needed to properly assess whether improvements are a 
result of the effectiveness of the programme, or due to a general factor related to therapy, or 
improvement that occurs naturally over time. Blum, Allen, McCormick and Black (2008) 
published the results of a RCT plus one-year follow-up. The study involved 124 participants 
randomly assigned to the STEPPS programme (65 participants) or Treatment As Usual 
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(TAU) (59 participants). The sample was representative of those currently using services in 
Iowa but included few men and people from ethnic minority backgrounds so may not be 
generalisable beyond White, American women. The results show improvements in scores on 
the Zanarini Rating Scale for Borderline Personality Disorder (ZBPD), impulsivity ratings, 
negative affectivity, mood and global functioning measures (Blum et al., 2008). The largest 
effect size of 0.84 was for the reduction in ZBPD scores. These improvements were 
maintained at one-year follow-up. This suggests the STEPPS programme can be effective in 
managing the symptoms associated with BPD over the short and longer-term. 
The study found people in the STEPPS group had less emergency hospital visits and 
less crisis calls, a particularly important finding as these can occur frequently in this client 
group. However the STEPPS programme had no significant effect on hospital admissions for 
self-harm another important symptom ofBPD. 
Unlike studies of other therapies for this client group, this study found treatment gains 
for the STEPPS programme between week 16 and week 20 (Schulte-Herbriiggen, Koerting 
and Roepke, 2008, Blum et al., 2008). The authors suggest this may be due to the protective 
nature of the systems component of the therapy or a buffering effect of the one-year follow-
up period (Blum et al., 2008, reply to Schulte-Herbriiggen et al., 2008). 
A strength of the study is that several outcomes were used and all measured factors 
which may have important real-world benefits. The study looked at patient satisfaction and 
found higher levels of satisfaction among those who completed the STEPPS programme 
compared to TAU. 
The study included patient ratings of symptoms, these showed a high level of 
agreement with the other outcome measures. However, at follow-up, participant self-ratings 
were not significantly different between STEPPS and TAU groups. It is positive that the 
patients' perspective was included as in a real world setting the benefits should be clear to the 
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patients or they will drop-out or refuse treatment. This study controlled for many factors and 
provides detailed evidence in support of the STEPPS programme. It deserves credit for being 
the first RCT in this area and for the thorough approach of the authors. 
Silk (2008) credits the authors in the editorial accompanying the article for providing 
evidence that people with a diagnosis of BPD can make positive gains and remission from 
symptoms may be possible. Services have previously had a negative view about whether 
much can be accomplished for these patients and evidence of gains made over a relatively 
short time period that are maintainable is commendable. Silk (2008) also praises the authors 
that STEPPS is adjunctive to any existing treatment and therefore one treatment is not pitted 
against the other to determine which is "best". Although this is a positive feature of the 
programme it makes it harder to evaluate as it is unclear whether benefits can be attributed to 
STEPPS or another factor. 
There are several limitations to this study. Firstly, researchers were not truly blind to 
which treatment group participants were in due to the nature of the design; the authors 
acknowledge this and that this increased potential bias in the results. Secondly, as with many 
other studies, there was a high drop-out rate and data for those that dropped out was not 
included, meaning the reasons for drop-out and potentially less positive effects of the 
programme aren't included. Not all participants were assessed at follow-up, thus reducing the 
power of these results. Furthermore, it is unclear whether there are differences between those 
assessed at follow-up and those who were not which may have had a confounding effect on 
the results. 
The study was conducted in eight smaller treatment cohorts in different areas over a 
long period of time. Results were relatively consistent across the groups thus suggesting that 
STEPPS can be applied to different cohorts with good effectiveness (Blum et al., 2008). 
However, this variation means different group processes may occur across the cohorts and 
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have an effect on the results. It is harder to account for possible confounding variables when 
several cohorts are used. Moreover, the recruitment strategy for the study was mixed; whilst 
this is positive because it meant a greater variety of participants, sample variety makes it 
harder to control for other possible contributing factors which may have had a confounding 
effect on the results. 
It has been highlighted that more participants in the STEPPS group received 
individual therapy than the TAU group and it could be that factors associated with individual 
therapy account for the improvements seen in the STEPPS group (Schulte-Herbrilggen et al., 
2008). It is difficult to control for the effects of individual therapy due to the adjunctive 
nature of the programme. 
High discontinuation rates have occurred in all studies of the STEPPS programme to 
date. Black and colleagues (2009) report findings of an exploratory study of potential 
predictors of response to the STEPPS programme using data from the RCT trial described 
above (Blum et al., 2008). Findings suggest higher baseline symptom severity scores are 
related to a greater improvement from the programme. Optimum levels of improvement are 
achieved by participants who attended 15 or more sessions. Factors related to discontinuation 
were: higher levels of impulsivity as measured at baseline, a higher number of diagnosed 
personality disorders as well as BPD, and fewer psychotropic medications used. This study is 
an important first step in assessing which clients are most likely to benefit from the STEPPS 
programme and who is most likely to drop-out. If factors associated with discontinuation can 
be highlighted then perhaps extra support can be given to the participants at most risk of 
drop-out or alternative treatments sought for these clients. 
Not all potential variables associated with discontinuation were measured by this 
study and further work should look at these factors in greater depth including hostility 
towards treatment and motivational factors. Due to the many variables measured a number of 
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statistical tests were performed on this data across the two papers (Black et al., 2009; Blum et 
al., 2008), this leads to a greater probability of type 1 error. 
A pilot study on a UK population found comparable results to the RCT described 
above (Harvey et al., 2010; Blum et al., 2008). Results from 38 participants showed highly 
significant improvements in mood, BPD symptoms and negative and positive affectivity 
following participation in the STEPPS programme (Harvey et al., 2010). This study only 
included 6 men so again may only be generalisable to women as the contribution of gender 
factors cannot be assessed accurately with such a small sample. 
There are a number of weaknesses to this study as well as the small sample. The study 
does not make it clear what the characteristics of the sample are and it is misleading as to 
how many participants comprise the sample. There were six STEPPS groups of differing 
characteristics that were analysed in this study. At the end of the study one group comprised 
only two participants which raises concerns about the dynamics of this group. Having several 
groups makes it difficult to account for differing group processes and the results vary across 
groups. To try and control for the potential variation in groups one facilitator was consistent 
across three of the groups and another was consistent across the other three. This reduced the 
possibility that facilitator variation had an effect on outcomes but did not eliminate it. The 
analysis corrected for some potential biases in the results. 
Again there were high drop-out rates and those who dropped out were not followed-
up. Again the amount and type of individual support participants received alongside the 
programme varied and was not controlled for; this could have had an effect on the results. An 
RCT needs to be conducted in the UK to assess the outcomes of the STEPPS programme 
compared to current treatment as usual. 
Black and colleagues (2008) present preliminary findings from an uncontrolled pilot 
study that demonstrates the effectiveness of the STEPPS programme amongst a female prison 
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population. Evidence suggests that 20 -55% of women offenders in prisons have symptoms of 
BPD (Black et al., 2008). Therefore it may be beneficial to provide STEPPS to a prison 
population. As the programme is relatively brief and it is easy to train facilitators, it can be 
adapted to a prison environment with relative ease. This study shows that STEPPS can be 
implemented effectively in a prison; attendance of the programme led to a significant 
reduction in negative thoughts, symptoms associated with BPD, negative affectivity and 
depression. Participants also reported high levels of satisfaction with the programme. Effect 
sizes were similar to those of the RCT reported above (Blum et al., 2008). This successful 
adaptation of STEPPS highlights the useful versatility of the programme. However, the 
positive outcomes found could be due to general factors including the extra social support 
associated with the programme, increased hope, and the therapeutic alliance, rather than 
STEPPS itself. It could be that any group would yield similar benefits. 
Schuppert and colleagues (2009) describe adaptations that have been made to a Dutch 
version of STEPPS so that it can be used with adolescents experiencing BPD symptoms. An 
RCT was conducted involving 43 adolescents aged between 14 and 19 years old, 36 
participants completed pre and post assessments. Again participants were mostly female. 
STEPPS and TAU showed an equal reduction in BPD symptoms. STEPPS led to an increase 
in internal locus of control and increased sense of control over mood swings. Differences 
between those who dropped out and those that completed the programme were assessed. The 
authors found that completers had increased levels of internalising behaviour at first 
assessment; this could be due to increased severity leading to increased motivation to change 
or to increased insight into their difficulties. This study suggests some potential benefits of an 
adapted programme for adolescents based on STEPPS. 
However, an adolescent STEPPS programme was no more effective at reducing BPD 
symptoms than TAU. Levels of BPD symptoms were low at baseline leaving little room for 
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improvement. These low levels of BPD symptoms suggest the participants may not have 
actually needed treatment. There were higher levels of drop-out in the STEPPS group; group 
processes may have played a role in this. This study measured different variables to the other 
studies reviewed and therefore it is difficult to compare these results across studies. The 
authors had to develop their own BPD assessments as there is a lack of high quality 
assessments for BPD in adolescents. Further work is needed in this area before firm 
conclusions can be drawn on the effectiveness of STEPPS for adolescents. 
Implications and general limitations of the current evidence 
It is hard to determine the effectiveness of the STEPPS programme as the different 
studies report findings on outcome measures of different phenomena. Studies include 
measures of one or more of the following outcomes: BPD symptoms, affect, suicide and self-
harm behaviour, impulsivity, internal locus of control, perceived control over emotions, 
patient satisfaction, and more. Services, therapists, researchers, and clients will have differing 
perspectives over which outcome is important. This leads to a confusing picture over the 
effectiveness of the STEPPS programme. 
Overall, there is some evidence for the effectiveness of the STEPPS programme in 
reducing BPD symptoms and improving affect. As STEPPS is adjunctive to any other on-
going treatment it can be viewed as "value added" (Black et al., 2004). The systems 
component may account for more positive responses to finishing the course than studies of 
other therapies have found (Blum et al., 2008; Schulte-Herbrilggen, Koerting and Roepke, 
2008). 
More research is needed in this area before firm conclusions about the effectiveness 
of the programme can be drawn. There are still few studies in this area and a lack of well-
controlled RCTs. Only one study reviewed wasn't written and conducted by the team who 
developed the programme. This is a potential source of bias as those who developed the 
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programme have an interest in it doing well. The same authors sell the STEPPS manual and 
provide training in STEPPS so need evidence in support of the programme in order to profit 
from it. Impartial research by people not connected to the programme is needed. 
Only one study didn't find a reduction in BPD symptoms for participants in the 
STEPPS programme compared to controls (Schuppert et al., 2009), this may be because the 
programme is effective or it may be due to a publication bias where studies that found 
STEPPS not to be effective have not been published. 
The adjunctive nature of the programme poses a large problem for researchers; many 
participants are receiving individual therapy alongside the programme, the nature of this 
individual support may vary between participants and the extent to which the therapist 
supports the programme will also vary. These elements could have a large influence on 
outcome results. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain whether the individual therapy is 
leading to positive changes or the STEPPS programme even when a TAU group is used as a 
control measure, as differences in individual therapy between STEPPS and TAU groups that 
cause any differences in outcome cannot be ruled out and are not controlled for. This will 
remain a problem that is unlikely to be resolved whilst community samples are used for these 
studies. 
It could be that group processes in general account for the positive effects of the 
STEPPS programme. Increased social support, better understanding of the disorder and the 
normalising effect of the group could all lead to the improvements rather than elements that 
are distinctive of STEPPS. To investigate this and ensure it is features of the STEPPS 
programme specifically that are helpful, research needs to be done comparing outcomes from 
those attending a STEPPS programme with those attending a support group or another 
comparable group for 20 weeks. 
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Furthermore, group dynamics will vary across groups, this means there is variation in 
all the samples used in the studies above and they cannot be viewed as homogenous samples. 
Statistical analysis of the results should control for which group participants were in to be 
sure one wasn't particularly more or less effective than others, thus skewing the results. A 
further problem with the analysis of the results is that the RCTs used ANOV A to analyse the 
results. ANOV A assumes that all data points are independent from each other which is not 
true for group therapy as one person's experience and outcome will be affected by other 
members of the group. 
Few men and people from ethnic minority backgrounds were in the samples studied, 
reducing the generalisability of the findings. This is mainly due to the opportunistic nature of 
the recruitment for studies as they were all drawn from people using mental health services. It 
may be the samples are representative of the wider community mental health services in the 
areas studied and may reflect a general under representation of men and people from ethnic 
minority backgrounds in services. In order to generalise the results to a wider population 
studies in different communities and cultures need to be conducted. 
All studies report high discontinuation rates. This is a common problem in this client 
group and mental health research in general. It is positive that research has started 
investigating the factors affecting discontinuation and outcome (Black et al., 2009) and 
further work is needed to fully understand the factors involved. Programmes need to be aware 
of the potential for discontinuation and should be creative and innovative in finding ways to 
reduce this and improve outcomes for all. 
None of the studies report significant reductions in suicide attempts and threats or 
self-harm behaviours. Suicide and self-harm are very common in this population, cause 
severe harm to patients and families, and place a large burden on services; reducing these 
should be a priority for services (NICE, 2009). There is good evidence for the use of DBT 
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with those people with a diagnosis ofBPD who self-harm frequently and dangerously (NICE, 
2009). It may be helpful to evaluate which type of intervention is most helpful for which 
symptom ofBPD so that services can be developed to provide the most effective care for the 
most people in a cost-effective manner. Although STEPPS is not designed to be pitched 
against another therapy, and there are reasons why this is not advisable (Silk, 2008), it may 
be helpful for services to have this information in order to pick the therapies that best suit 
each individual client. 
NICE (2009) have highlighted recommendations for future research on treatments for 
BPD. Some of these can be applied to research on the effectiveness of the STEPPS 
programme. Firstly, NICE (2009) recommend development of an agreed set of outcome 
measures that allow comparison across studies and the development of evidence-based 
treatments. These outcome measures should be validated in order to ensure they accurately 
reflect patient experience. Secondly, RCTs should be conducted of at least 18 months in 
duration to ensure any benefits are maintained. RCTs should also include indications of cost-
effectiveness. Thirdly, NICE (2009) highlight the importance of research on psychosocial 
interventions in this area; STEPPS has a psychosocial element in the involvement of friends 
and family members and the focus on relationship skills training. 
Does STEPPS meet NICE recommendations? 
NICE (2009) guidance specifies key priorities in providing support for people with a 
diagnosis of BPD. If the STEPPS programme is provided widely by services, it should meet 
these priorities. 
• Access to services 
STEPPS provides access to services as it is a relatively brief, group intervention that 
all mental health staff can be trained in cost-effectively and easily. This enables more 
provision for people with a diagnosis of BPD that may otherwise not be able to receive 
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support due to the lack of resources for individual therapy among community mental health 
teams. 
• Autonomy and Choice 
The evidence suggests the STEPPS programme is acceptable for clients. People can 
choose whether to attend or not and there is detailed information about the course that is 
easily available to service users. 
• Developing an optimistic and trusting relationship 
This may not be as easy to develop in a group setting but it is possible to develop a 
good relationship with the facilitator and the other members of the group; this will depend on 
interpersonal factors. 
• Managing endings and supporting transitions 
Participants in the programme are prepared for the ending via the course material. The 
inclusion of friends and family members may make the ending and transition easier (Blum et 
al., 2008). Participants can also choose to complete a follow-on programme STAIRWAYS 
which is less regular and provides a more gradual transition (Black et al., 2004). 
• 
Involving families and carers (with the patient's permission) 
Involving friends and family members is an integral part of the programme. 
• Explaining assessment and diagnosis clearly 
Psycho-education about the diagnosis of BPD makes up a large part of the programme 
especially in the early sessions (Black et al., 2004; Blum et al., 2004). 
• Managing self-harm and attempted suicide 
The programme contains an element on behaviour management skills which includes 
sessions on managing destructive behaviour including self-harm and suicide (Black et al., 
2004). There is little evidence of the effectiveness of the STEPPS programme in reducing 
self-harm and suicidal behaviour. 
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• Training for staff (including good supervision provision) 
It is relatively quick and easy to train staff in the programme (Black et al., 2004). It is 
unclear how much supervision is provided to facilitators. 
• Monitoring the effect of treatment 
The programme includes regular self-monitoring using diary sheets and the BEST test 
(Blum et al., 2002; Black et al., 2004). 
NICE (2009) recommends treatments are "complex"; STEPPS meets this 
recommendation as it comprises several elements including skills training, CBT and a 
systems component. STEPPS meets the NICE (2009) guideline of being over 3 months long. 
CONCLUSION 
There is growmg evidence for the effectiveness of the STEPPS programme in 
reducing symptoms ofBPD and improving affect. There is little evidence of the effectiveness 
of the programme in reducing suicide and self-harm behaviours and this is an important 
aspect of any intervention for BPD. Further research is needed to address the short-comings 
of research to date and to further clarify the effectiveness of the STEPPS programme. This 
research should be carried out by researchers who are independent of the team who 
developed the programme in order to remove potential bias. Further work should be done 
comparing the STEPPS programme with other group programmes. Further research should 
include more men and people from ethnic minority backgrounds. 
Evidence suggests STEPPS can be adapted for a variety of clients and settings. 
Evidence to date suggests STEPPS is compatible with most of the NICE (2009) priorities. 
The STEPPS programme may be popular with services due to its relatively brief, easy to 
deliver, format that is available to several service users at once. Research suggests the 
programme is acceptable for service users and staff. 
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REFLECTIONS 
I have learnt about the STEPPS programme, its aims and potential benefits. This will 
help me to support my clients who are attending the programme concurrently with individual 
work or who have already completed the programme. I have also learnt the importance of 
looking at potential treatments in depth rather than accepting that a treatment is effective. 
Some treatments such as the STEPPS programme have a small evidence base and therefore 
should be monitored closely and audited at a local level rather than accepted outright. I will 
need to consider that the current evidence is derived from mainly white American or British, 
female samples, STEPPS may not be as effective for men or people from other ethnic 
backgrounds. 
The evidence contradicts previous views that BPD can't be treated and this helps me 
to have a positive attitude to working with this client group. It has been useful for me to look 
at the NICE guidance in this area to see the need for further research and to understand the 
key priorities in any work with this client group. I will endeavour to apply the NICE (2009) 
principles to my practice. 
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In this account I will describe the problem-based learning (PBL) task, my reflections 
on it at the time and looking back. I have written the events chronologically with learning, 
reflections and applications in italics after each part. 
When we were told we had a problem-based learning task entitled "Relationship to 
change", I was uncertain as to what to expect. I read the article we were given fervently that 
night looking for some answers on how to approach the task. Unfortunately this did not give 
me the answers I was looking for and this uncertainty was uncomfortable. However, as so 
much was new and uncertain at this time, this was not unusual and I decided to accept it in 
the hope all would become clear. I met the other six people in my group the next day. I was 
expecting our facilitator to take the lead but she explained that she would not be doing this, 
the task was deliberately broad, and it would develop over the course of our sessions. I felt 
my anxiety rising, although it stayed at a manageable level and I was surprised it was not 
worse. Some members of the group were more anxious than I was and this helped me stay 
calm. I fell into a calm, level-headed role, saying that we had plenty of time. This calmness 
surprised me as in my personal life I am the ''worrier" and my husband is the calm one. 
Since this task my supervisor has said to me that I am a calm presence and I seem 
unfazed by tasks asked ofme. I think the experience of the PBL task helped me to see that 
remaining calm and assured that things would work out is a useful strategy. I am pleased I 
am able to stay calm professionally and I aim to take this strategy forwards. Of course I 
become anxious at times, but the more experiences I have of everything going well, the less 
anxious I become about situations. I think it is helpful for the efficacy of the group for 
members to stay calm. 
In the first session we reflected on our own experiences of change in order to look for 
some themes and issues. It was interesting to hear other people's journeys to getting onto the 
course and our facilitator reflected on how resourceful we had all been. This was comforting 
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as many ofus spoke about how we were experiencing self-doubt, thinking others were better 
than us and we didn't really deserve to be there. I was thinking there must be a mistake, that I 
was the odd one out, that I would be found out. It was such a relief to know I wasn't the only 
one thinking this. I was grateful to other members of the group for airing this doubt as it 
meant I felt safe to air my doubts as well. 
This early sharing of experience and/ears helped us to draw closer as a group and 
helped us to develop an understanding of each other. I think this initial discussion broke 
down some barriers and enabled us to work together better by reducing the initial shyness. I 
think this worked well because the sharing was mutual and we all felt on an equal level with 
each other. Openness and sharing of information is characteristic of groups which are 
functioning well (Tuckman, 1965). 
This is different from the relationships we have with clients because we ask so much 
about them, we expect them to share their most personal experiences with us, and yet they 
know very little about us. It made me realise how scary that must be for clients. I know I only 
felt safe to share my thoughts and feelings because everyone was and because some of them 
had already been voiced. This led me to try to put clients at ease and to indicate that it is ok 
to express difficult feelings by giving some examples and naming difficult emotions. It is my 
hope that by articulating these things myself, the client may then feel safe to discuss them. 
In the second session we discussed themes emerging from our own experiences. It felt 
we were already working well as a group, the discussion seemed to be shared equally and no 
one person took charge which helped us all feel safe to contribute. There was still some 
anxiety within the group as to what the presentation was going to be on and a desire to put 
some structure in place. This helped to keep us focussed on the task but it also had the 
disadvantage of stifling more exploratory discussion. We found this a difficult balance to 
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strike. In retrospect I think we could have spent more time exploring the ideas further and 
reflecting on the application of these ideas. 
This desire to get the task done quickly can happen when working with clients if there 
are time or service pressures, or pressures from the clients to get quick results. I have learnt 
from this experience that there needs to be plenty of space for clients to explain and explore 
ideas in the early stages before work becomes too focussed. It is helpful to consider this when 
working in teams, such as within the multi-disciplinary team involved in a client's care. Team 
reflexivity has been found to improve decision making (van Ginkel, Tindale, and van 
Knippenberg, 2009) but so often service pressures call for quick decision making leaving no 
space/or reflection. I have learntfrom this experience that space/or reflection is important 
and I aim to promote this when working within a group or team. 
We reflected on change as a process versus change as having discrete stages. It 
seemed more intuitive to us to view change as a process (Fischer, 2003), as stage models of 
change ( e.g. Protraska, 1992) seemed too arbitrary and our experience did not fit easily into 
stages. 
Recently I have been working with a client who has anorexia. She is very keen to see 
change in big steps, she expects things to change quickly and overnight otherwise it means 
she has failed. Having learnt about change as a process, I am trying to work with her to view 
change as gradual that may happen slowly and therefore be harder to recognise each day but 
when she looks back in a few weeks or months she will be able to recognise the progress she 
made. 
After the second session I was still surprised at how calm I was and how much I was 
enjoying working in this different way. I don't usually enjoy group work, in the past I would 
rather just do it all myself, perhaps because I like to be in control. This time was different; I 
enjoyed learning from the others in the group and the mutual sharing of experience. I liked 
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the fact that everyone was respectful and we seemed to all be equal. At this point my only 
concern was that I didn't have enough to do between sessions; I wanted to make sure I was 
"pulling my weight" and I wanted to feel like a useful and helpful member of the group. 
I tend to have a need to feel helpful and I sometimes find it difficult when clients are 
stuck or don't seem to find our sessions useful. I worry about doing a good enough job, and I 
can have a tendency to want to ''fix" things. I know I need to work on being able to let this 
go, to be able to say to myself "you did your best" and accept that sometimes we can't help 
people, it's not the right time, or the situation is beyond anyone's control. Reflecting on this 
task has helped me realise this and I will take this to supervision as part ofmy development. 
This positive experience of working in a group will help me in my future work within a 
multi-disciplinary team as it helped me to see the benefit of learning from others and the 
different contributions people have to offer. I will remember that mutual respect and 
everyone feeling equal seemed to be important and I will endeavour to foster this in the teams 
J work in. Power imbalances and a search to establish a hierarchy are common in groups but 
need to be overcome in order to be more effective (Tuckman, 1965). A sense of group 
interdependence and a realisation that each member has their own important part to play 
improves efficiency of the group (Alavi and McCormick, 2008). 
We began to develop a structu_!e for our presentation. One group member brought in 
diagram of her own journey. This was a tool she had used in her previous work and it was 
useful to see it applied to her experience. We decided to call our presentation "The Journey of 
Change" and we applied theory to the group member's journey. 
I focussed on the factors affecting change, related them to the group member's 
journey and also related these to the client's we may see. The factors that seemed most 
important in bringing about change were: the occurrence of a focal or crisis event, presence 
of social support, an attribution of internal control/high self-efficacy, a need to create a new 
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sense of identity, and a change in environment (Heatherton and Nicholls, 1994; Bandura, 
1982). 
/found it helpful to consider what factors enable change and how to relate these to 
my clients. The most important aspect to me was fostering a sense of self-efficacy and I try to 
help my clients to develop this. It is important to assess clients' resources and self-efficacy 
and help them to determine what they have control over in order to help them facilitate 
change (Heatherton and Nicholls, 1994; Bandura, 1982). Developing self-efficacy can also 
help instil hope in the client that they can change. All the people I have worked with so far 
have experienced severe difficulties, many for a long time. These experiences have lowered 
their self-confidence and their beliefs about their ability to change. I observed this in a client 
with borderline personality disorder who has developed schema about herself as defective 
and worthless. She does not believe she can change or that things can change in her life. This 
means she sees no point in trying to make changes as she does not believe they can happen. 
Our work together is currently focussing on helping her to recognise the changes she has 
made and the areas of her life where she feels she has been successful, such as starting to 
teach children horse-riding. I am trying to help her to foster some sense of self-efficacy so 
she feels able to bring about the changes she wants. 
I was surprised that I was more nervous than usual on the day of the presentation. I 
felt pressure to perform well for the rest of the group as we were marked as a whole and I 
didn't want to let them down. I also felt nervous because we had only been on the course six 
weeks so I hadn't got to know the cohort very well. My nerves got worse as we waited to do 
our presentation because the groups before us were really good and I couldn't help comparing 
our presentation to theirs. Some people used role play which made their presentation livelier 
than ours and I worried people would think ours was dull. Thankfully the presentation went 
well and we received positive feedback. 
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The presentation demonstrated to me that it is possible to feel nervous and still do a 
good enough job. I think it was helpful to go through this as I often ask clients to put 
themselves in situations they find anxiety provoking. This experience helped me to empathise 
more easily with clients facing situations that make them anxious. For example, I could relate 
how I felt to a client experiencing social anxiety around occasions such as parties where he 
worries that people will be judging him. It was useful to consider my experience whilst asking 
him to face the situations he was avoiding as I was able to understand some of the feelings 
this evoked for him. 
I find it difficult to speak in front of groups especially if I do not know them well. For 
example, on placement I attend team business meetings, psychology meetings and supervision 
groups and I get nervous about speaking. This experience has helped me to recognise this is 
something I need to work on. I need to build my confidence in speaking in large groups and I 
am making myself speak so that this gradually becomes easier. I have learnt from this 
experience that things usually go better than I fear and I am trying to apply this to other 
settings. 
I have found this exercise useful in demonstrating to me that I can remain calm and 
enjoy new ways of learning and working with others. I had not related my own experience so 
closely to clients before and I have found I learn well by doing this. Because the task was so 
broad, and we had the opportunity to explore different aspects as a group, I was able to have 
space to reflect and learn about myself, to identify a strength that surprised me and to identify 
areas for my own development. Our group approach seemed to be effective in accomplishing 
the task and in enabling us to become close as a group. The disadvantage of our approach is 
we were perhaps too task-orientated at times, not allowing more time for exploration and 
reflection of ideas. 
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Our presentation conclusion was "change is a subjective, on-going process. Everyone 
has their own journey. Reflecting on this can help us be more open, aware and attentive to the 
factors affecting the process of change for others" and I found relating this to myself and my 
work has been very beneficial. 
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For this year's problem-based learning task we were given a complex scenario 
involving two parents with learning disabilities, Mr and Mrs Stride, whose twin daughters 
had been placed in foster care. The local authority was now looking to have the children 
adopted whereas the parents wanted the children to be returned to them. There were many 
professionals involved and we were told we had been asked by the children's guardian to 
conduct a full risk assessment and, if appropriate, develop a rehabilitation plan. 
When our group first read and discussed the information we were struck by the 
complexity of the "problem". We were unsure as to where to start and we all commented on 
the sense of confusion and the complicatedness of the situation. We spoke about how many 
different professionals were involved and the impact this may have had on the parents. We 
wanted to develop a role-play that would portray this sense of confusion and complexity. The 
first session felt a little overwhelming as we had lots of interesting and creative ideas for a 
role play but I struggled to see how we would turn all of these into a cohesive presentation. 
We decided that each ofus would play a different professional or person involved in 
the case. I was given the role of the grandparents, who wanted to be assessed as carers for the 
children. We elected one of the group members to play the psychologist who would link 
everything together and bring in some research and theory on the issues involved. Our initial 
idea was to have lots of pieces of string which would link the many different people involved 
and this would get tied in tangles and knots and convey the complexity of the situation. 
Next we identified all the issues that could be highlighted during our role-play. We 
developed a list of over ten potential issues to discuss. This demonstrated to us the enormity 
of the "problem" and the difficulty in trying to resolve such a situation. We decided to pick 
three issues which seemed most relevant or interesting to us. 
By the end of our first session we already had a good idea of what the presentation 
would look like although the fine detail needed to be ironed out. This felt challenging as there 
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was a lot to achieve in a short space of time but it also felt good to have a concrete idea so 
soon. Later, I felt this was perhaps a limitation to how we approached it as we did not allow 
ourselves time to explore and reflect on the problem; instead we immediately focussed on 
how we could do the presentation. This may have meant that we ignored potentially 
interesting issues. 
Over the next few sessions we chose the key issues which seemed most important to 
us. These were risk, learning disability and parenting, and social exclusion and poverty. We 
decided the psychologist would introduce and summarise each issue and each person 
involved would then add their thoughts. We began to practice and by the third session we had 
a rough script for the role-play. We were struggling to fit in how we would include the string 
and "getting tied in knots" idea but we still wanted to convey something of the problem 
visually. We then had the idea of using cardboard boxes with different issues written on them 
to build a wall in front of Mr and Mrs Stride. This showed that the conversations were going 
on around them not with them and we felt the professionals were losing sight of the person 
behind "the problem". It also showed the barriers such as blame, stigma and prejudice that 
prevented Mr and Mrs Stride from receiving the support they needed. 
I felt overwhelmed by the nature of the problem. I felt I didn't know where to start 
and how a resolution could be reached. It was interesting portraying the many different 
perspectives involved as I could see where everybody was coming from and how they had 
reached their position but at the same time some of the positions were challenging to my own 
beliefs. After consideration, I still have the opinion that people with learning disabilities 
should be given help to keep their children and that they can be "good enough" parents. 
However, now I can see the difficult position professionals especially social workers are 
placed in in such cases and I can see that unfortunately situations are not clear cut. I became 
aware of some of my own prejudices, mainly towards other professionals and this made me 
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uncomfortable. I think this was a helpful exercise in highlighting and challenging my 
prejudices and this will help me work more collaboratively with other professionals in future. 
In the role-play I took the role of the grandparents. For this I looked up information 
on grandparents looking after their grandchildren and I was surprised to find how common 
this is and how difficult this can be for them. Some of the videos I watched where 
grandparents shared their experiences were really poignant and I felt sad and moved watching 
them. This helped me to take the perspective of people older than me with different life 
experiences. In the role-play the grandparents did not approve of Mrs Stride and argued they 
would be better carers for the children. This was a difficult perspective to take and I made 
comments that I didn't agree with. I found this awkward and I wanted to come out of 
character and say "I don't mean it". I found this difficult to manage but it did highlight to me 
that there are many perspectives on a situation. 
Quite soon into the task I told the group that I was pregnant and would be leaving in 
March. I found this a tough announcement to make as I felt sad to be leaving them and I felt I 
was abandoning the group. I also was very excited about my news so I had conflicting 
emotions. The group responded in a similar way, they were all excited and pleased for me but 
also said how sad they would be not to have me in the group. This gave the task an added 
dimension as it was the last time we would be working together in such a way and I felt 
unhappy about this. I felt we had spent a long time developing positive relationships within 
the group and it felt a shame not to be seeing these through. 
My pregnancy also affected how I approached the task. As I was about to become a 
mother I was beginning to learn what it feels like to love a child. I felt a connection to the 
parents in the "problem" that I would not have felt otherwise. I was already beginning to 
imagine seeing my baby grow and develop and to imagine all I might do for him or her. This 
highlighted to me how distressing it must have been for Mr and Mrs Stride to have had their 
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children taken into care and to be told they are bad parents. This gave a sense of poignancy to 
the task for me and I felt compassion for the Strides. Although this helped me connect with 
the task, it also highlighted to me the need to use our own experiences safely, to reflect on 
these and acknowledge where the feelings come from. I could see that if this had been a real 
case of mine, these feelings may have clouded my judgement. I will take this knowledge with 
me when working with clients with whom I feel a connection or resonance. 
The group worked very differently on this problem than we did last year. Last year we 
were very task focussed and we were very anxious to have the "right" presentation. As a 
consequence we focussed on developing a power-point presentation incorporating theory. 
This year we were adamant we wanted to do something more creative and we were less 
theory focussed and engaged with the problem in a deeper way. I think this was because we 
have evolved as a group; we could now tolerate a certain degree of uncertainty as we felt safe 
with each other. We felt more adventurous and creative and I felt the group allowed each 
member to draw on their strengths more. It felt we had reached the "performing" stage of 
group formation (Tuckman, 1965). I felt we were working as a team, depending on each other 
and using each other for support. 
We did not always focus on the task, one session in particular was spent discussing 
and supporting each other around another aspect of the training which some of the group 
were struggling with. Although this demonstrated the way people felt safe and able to use the 
group for support, it also demonstrated the limitations of working within a group who know 
each other well. That is we strayed from the task and needed re-focussing in order to get it all 
done. Without the structure of a chair, and often without a facilitator, we found we were all 
talking at once, coming up with lots of different ideas and also going off topic. To this end we 
elected a "puller-inner" who would keep an eye on time and encourage the group to refocus if 
necessary. This system worked well and helped us to stay on track. 
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At one point the person playing the psychologist in the role play had more to do than 
others and she seemed to take on the role of provider for the group and the rest ofus happily 
fell into this pattern. A couple of sessions later we were able to identify this as a group and 
discuss it. This honesty helped us acknowledge the problem and helped us work together 
more, taking the burden off this one person. This is a further example of how the group has 
developed, feeling comfortable enough to tackle a difficult situation without blame or 
conflict. 
I have learnt the value of working in a group that know each other well, feel safe with 
each other and trust one another. A group can promote more creativity (Rose, 2001) 
especially when tackling a task which does not have a simple solution (Blair, 1991) and I 
found that to be the case. I can apply this learning to my clinical work when I am asked to 
work as part of a multidisciplinary team, in supervision groups, or when working with a team. 
I have learnt the value of good relationships within a group and I will try and encourage these 
in the groups I work in. This could be done by socialising as a group away from the task, 
spending time within the group getting to know each other, and trying to ensure consistency 
of group members. 
We were struck by the need for a containing space. We found we felt safer and 
worked better when we were in the same room. We joked about this at first as it felt quite 
insignificant but upon reflection it felt the surroundings were important. This reminded me of 
the psychodynamic ideas around providing a secure frame for the client in order to help them 
feel safe and contained (Winnicott, 1971; Lemma, 2003). I had not recognised the insecurity 
a lack of consistency can bring before and the changing of rooms really highlighted this to 
me. I have learnt that a small thing can make a big difference and I plan to try and ensure 
consistency of rooms for my clients and any groups I work in as well. 
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This task highlighted the complexity of situations we can face in clinical practice. I 
was struck by how problem-focussed the material was. I was reminded that it is our role as 
psychologists to try and see beyond the "problem", to look at the context and the potential 
strengths and resources people have available to them. This task taught me the importance of 
trying to hold multiple perspectives in mind when facing an issue. I have begun to do this on 
my current older people placement. As part of my placement I have worked with the 
Challenging Behaviour Service who work with clients in residential and nursing homes. In 
this work I have had to consider the perspectives of the staff, the client, the other residents 
and other professionals, such as psychiatrists and GPs. I have applied my learning from this 
task when trying to do this. It has helped not to see only the "problem" but rather to consider 
what the client may be trying to communicate and I have tried to learn more about them and 
their lives before they were in a care home. The visual impact of building our cardboard box 
wall in front of Mr and Mrs Stride was a strong reminder to me not to lose sight of the person 
·••· behind the "problem" and I have tried to remember this in my work on this placement. It was 
' also helpful for my current placement for me to play the grandparents as I was able to try and 
take the perspective of an older person and adjust my thinking accordingly. 
The task highlighted the over-emphasis on risk that can happen when considering 
parents with learning disabilities. We reflected as a group on how our professional culture, 
and society as a whole, is very risk-averse following some recent high profile cases. Whilst 
we could see the necessity to consider risk and to protect children from abuse, we found 
ourselves thinking about how this risk-averse culture and professional fear ofrecrimination 
impact on those we are supposed to help. It highlighted our desire as professionals to protect 
ourselves and shift blame rather than approaching a situation as a team. 
I am reminded of this blame and anti-risk culture in team meetings at my current 
placement. Often discussions revolve around what the client needs and how this is not being 
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provided. The professionals involved often blame social services for this and there is an 
"anti-social services" rhetoric. Often the conclusion is reached that the team needs to put in 
writing their opinion and what they have done in order to protect themselves if something 
goes wrong. This task has showed me how unhelpful such a position can be and how a more 
collaborative, less blaming, more strengths focussed approach may be helpful in these 
situations. 
I enjoyed this task and feel I learnt a lot about managing complex cases both 
personally and professionally. 
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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LEARNING DISCUSSION GROUP PROCESS 
ACCOUNT 
Summary 
In this account I describe my experience of my personal and professional learning 
discussion group (PPLDG). The group met for approximately 17 sessions within the first 
academic year. I first describe the tasks and focus of the group including what I learnt from 
them. I then discuss the development of the group and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
approach we took. I then reflect on my experience and development within the group and the 
links between this and my professional development. I found the PPLDG group a useful and 
insightful process. I have learnt from experience how a group develops from seven strangers 
at the beginning of the year to a close-knit team at the end. I have learnt that I can have a 
valuable role within a group and my confidence has grown about being in groups. I can apply 
this learning to my clinical work, especially when working within a team. 
PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LEARNING DISCUSSION GROUP PROCESS 
ACCOUNT - SECOND YEAR 
Summary 
In this account I describe my experience with two PPLDG groups. My experience of 
personal and professional learning discussion groups (PPLDG) has been unusual. Halfway 
through my second year I took a year out on maternity leave after which I joined another 
cohort. I therefore finished one group early and then joined another pre-formed group. This 
was an interesting process which held challenges for me and has taught me a great deal. I 
describe the ending and starting processes in this account. I learnt about the value of taking 
risks and the differences between different groups. 
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OVERVIEW OF THREE YEARS OF PLACEMENTS 
Year I -Adult Mental Health; Community Mental Health Team and Inpatient Unit 
(1/2 a day per week), October 2010 - September 2011 
- Conducted psychological assessments autonomously and in liaison with other members of 
the multidisciplinary team 
_ Developed collaborative formulations of a wide range of difficulties using a wide range of 
therapeutic models including CBT and psychodynamic 
_ Delivered individual psychological therapy using CBT, psychodynamic and behavioural 
principles 
_ Co-facilitated an anger management group in the CMHT and a WRAP group at Langley 
Green 
_ Delivered training on debriefing and defusing after serious incidents to staff team 
_ Conducted neuropsychological assessments using the ACE-R; WAIS-IV; and WMS-IV 
-Conducted an audit of the provision of NICE-recommended treatments for psychosis and 
presented the findings to the team 
Year 2-Older People's Mental Health, Older People's Community Mental Health 
Team, October 2011 - March 2012 
_ Conducted psychological assessments and developed formulations of a wide range of 
difficulties using CBT and systemic models 
- Delivered individual CBT interventions 
_ Conducted neuropsychological assessments to inform multidisciplinary diagnosis of 
dementia using a large battery of neuropsychological tests including WAIS-III; WAIS-IV and 
WMS-III 
_ Delivered a cognitive stimulation group for people with dementia and their carers 
_ Delivered training on the ACE-R for staff team 
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Maternity leave - April 2012 -April 2013 
Year 2 - Child and Adolescent Mental Health; CAMHS and Child Development Team, 
April 2013 - September 2013 
-Conducted psychological assessments autonomously and in liaison with other members of 
the multi-disciplinary team, families and schools. 
-Developed formulations collaboratively using language appropriate to the developmental 
level of the child/young person 
-Delivered individual psychological therapy with young people using CBT, compassion-
focussed therapy, mindfulness, and behavioural principles 
-Delivered interventions with family members in order to support them alongside the 
child/young person 
-Delivered training to other members of the multi-disciplinary team on CBT techniques and 
how to adapt them to young people 
_ Conducted autism assessments that included the WISC or WPPSI, NEPSY, social cognition 
battery, play observations, interviews with the child and parents 
-Conducted school observations 
-Made a safeguarding referral and liaised with other agencies to manage risk 
Year 3 - Specialist Placement, Research and Development Department, September 2013 
-March 2014 
-Worked on setting up an OCD clinic jointly between the R&D department and Health in 
Mind 
-As part of this I conducted routine assessments ofOCD jointly with a CBT therapist 
-I developed and piloted a group for the friends and family of people with OCD 
_ Co-facilitated a 12 week ERP group for people with OCD 
_ Developed the SPSS database for the clinic 
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- Lead meetings around the clinic 
- Developed leaflets for use in the clinic 
- Developed a protocol for use at Step 2 for OCD and provided training for the Psychological 
Well being Practitioners on OCD 
- Conducted assessments as part of the Mindfulness for Voices (M4V) trial and attended 
steering group meetings around this trial 
Year 3 - Learning Disability, Community Learning Disability Team - Challenging 
Behaviour, April 2014 -August 2014 
-The service provides support for people exhibiting challenging behaviour across West 
Sussex 
_ Conducted a full functional assessment for one client jointly with a behaviour support 
practitioner 
_ Shadowed Speech and Language therapist and OT 
_ Conducted individual therapeutic work with clients 
_ Conducted assessments for the SOTSEC sex off ender group 
_ Used the WAIS-IV to assess I.Q. and strengths and weaknesses for one client 
_ Conducted a dementia assessment with a client with Downs Syndrome 
_ Used systemic ideas to conduct work with families 
_ Liaised with many different people involved including care managers, service providers, 
support workers, families, psychologists, behaviour practitioners, OT, SALT, nurses, and 
social workers. 
_ Delivered teaching on understanding WAIS reports to social workers. 
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ABSTRACT 
NICE (2009) guidelines for schizophrenia recommend CBT for psychosis and family 
therapy. The provision of these treatments by a local community mental health team (CMHT) 
was audited. 55 clients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or related conditions were 
identified. The records of these clients were then reviewed using case notes and electronic 
records. The number offered a NICE (2009) recommended treatment were highlighted. 
Details of the treatment offered were recorded. In total 5 clients have been offered a NICE 
(2009) recommended treatment within the past two years. Potential reasons for this include 
lack of staff training and supervision, client and family factors and service management 
factors. These factors are discussed and recommendations for improving adherence to NICE 
(2009) guidelines are made. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Schizophrenia is a severe and chronic mental health condition that can cause 
significant impairments to sufferers. Currently schizophrenia accounts for 24% of mental 
health service provision, with two thirds of that on inpatient care (figures cited in NICE, 
2009). Schizophrenia also costs the economy, due to the cost of benefit provision, loss of 
productivity, housing costs, costs to the criminal justice system, and carer burden (Mangalore 
& Knapp, 2007). A total of 80% of people receiving treatment for schizophrenia remain 
unemployed, at considerable personal and economic costs (Mangalore & Knapp, 2007). The 
total cost in England in 2004/2005 was £6. 7 billion (Mangalore & Knapp, 2007). 
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Consequently there has been a large focus on the provision of effective treatment for the 
disorder. If effective treatments are implemented this will reduce the economic burden on 
mental health services as well as reducing distress and improving quality of life for service 
users and their families. This would be especially beneficial due to the economic pressure on 
services from cuts in financial provision and a drive to reduce the number of inpatient beds 
(Mangalore & Knapp, 2007, British Psychological Society, 2000). 
There is growing evidence for the effectiveness of CBT in reducing psychotic 
experiences and the distress and disability they cause ( e.g. Kuipers et al., 1997). NICE 
guidelines (2009) recommend people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia ( or related disorders, 
including schizoaffective disorder, schizophreniform disorder and delusional disorder) are 
offered at least 16 sessions of CBT for psychosis. They recommend CBT that is manualised 
and derived specifically for psychotic symptoms ( e.g. Chadwick, Birchwood & Trower, 
1996). Key components of CBT for psychosis include coping with symptoms, reducing 
distress, and relapse prevention through the identification of warning signs and triggers 
(NICE, 2009). Despite strong evidence for the effectiveness of CBT for psychosis in reducing 
symptoms and preventing relapse, and for the cost-effectiveness of this approach (Kuipers et 
al., 1997; 1998), some reports have found CBT is not readily available, mostly due to lack of 
resources and training (British Psychological Society, 2000; Berry & Haddock, 2008). 
A family intervention of at least ten sessions is also recommended where people are in 
close contact with their family (NICE, 2009). Family interventions should have a specific 
supportive, educational or treatment function and should include problem-solving or crisis 
management work. The person with schizophrenia should be included if practical and the 
whole family's preferences should be taken into account (NICE, 2009). There is considerable 
evidence of the impact of caring for a family member with schizophrenia, including increased 
stress and relationship breakdown (Fadden, Bebbington & Kuipers, 1987). There is evidence 
68 
that family therapy can decrease the incidence of psychotic episodes and increase 
employment prospects, and these improvements are maintained eight years later (Tarrier & 
Barrowclough, 1996). Family interventions are also effective in decreasing stress in the other 
family members (Penn & Mueser, 1996). These interventions are cost-effective and can save 
services money (Tarrier, Lowson & Barrowclough, 1991). In spite of these benefits family 
therapy is uncommon in community mental health services (British Psychological Society, 
2000; Berry & Haddock, 2008). 
A local NHS Trust requested that the provision of CBT and family work for 
schizophrenia within their services was audited. It was the impression of the service that 
NICE (2009) guidelines were not being fully implemented. There is increasing pressure on 
services to comply with NICE guidelines, with the introduction of "Payment by Results" 
(Department of Health, 2011) and the increase in competition from other providers. It seems 
possible that NICE guidelines are to become mandatory standards to be achieved and 
therefore NHS trusts are keen to establish services which can meet these guidelines. In order 
for the Trust to comply with NICE (2009) guidelines and provide a good service for people 
with schizophrenia they must first identify the gaps in current service provision. This is the 
aim of this audit project. 
• 
• 
OBJECTIVES 
To identify the current CMHT caseload . 
To identify how many people on the CMHT caseload have a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia or related conditions. 
• To identify how many of those have been offered CBT for psychosis or family 
therapy and whether the therapy offered meets NICE (2009) criteria. 
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METHOD 
The current caseload of a local CMHT was identified using computer records kept by 
the service for the date of 1st February 2011. 
All care co-ordinators and other staff members who had a caseload in the CMHT were 
asked to give the auditor a copy of their caseload on February 1st 2011 and to highlight those 
clients1 with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder, schizophreniform 
disorder, delusional disorder, or non-specified psychosis. Eleven out of sixteen members of 
staff responded (69%). 
This project was one of four audits being conducted as part of a broader audit project 
and an audit tool was developed to be completed for each client together with other auditors. 
This was developed from the one recommended by NICE (2009). Questions were added to 
clarify the type of intervention offered and to include recent developments in CBT for 
psychosis ( e.g. including a mindfulness approach). Questions on client demographics were 
also added. See Appendix 1 for the audit tool used. 
Once each client was identified the researchers used paper case notes and the 
electronic clinical records computer system to complete the audit tool. Any difficulties 
accessing information were also recorded. 
Participants 
In total 55 clients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or a related condition were 
identified. Table 1 outlines the demographic characteristics of the participants. 
1 For this report I use clients to refer to those who use mental health services as that is the term most 
commonly used in the service I work in. 
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Table 1 - Client Demographic characteristics 
Variable n Percentage 
Gender: 
Male 44 80% 
Female 11 20% 
Age: 
Range 18- 71 years 
Mean 47.83 years 
Diagnosis: 
Schizophrenia 40 72.8% 
Not-specified psychosis 8 14.5% 
Schizo-affective disorder 4 7.3% 
Delusional disorder 3 5.5% 
Schizophreniform disorder 0 
Date of first contact with services: 
Range 1962-2011 
Mean 1998 
missing= 10 
Ethnicity: 
White British 43 78.2% 
Other White Background 4 7.3% 
Chinese 2 3.6% 
Mixed White and Black African 1 1.8% 
Mixed White and Asian 1 1.8% 
Indian 1 1.8% 
Other Asian Background 1 1.8% 
Not Stated 2 3.6% 
Living Arrangements: 
On their own 20 36.3% 
Residential Home 16 29.1% 
With partner/family 13 23.6% 
With parents 2 3.6% 
Other 3 5.5% 
Missing 1 1.8% 
Employment Status: 
Part time - paid 3 5.5% 
Full time-paid (>30 hours/week) 4 7.3% 
Voluntary - part time 6 10.9% 
Voluntary - full time 0 0 
Retired 3 5.5% 
Unemployed 37 67.3% 
Missing 2 3.6% 
Receiving Benefits: 
Yes 36 65.5% 
No 11 20.0% 
Missing 8 14.5% 
Number of inpatient admissions in the last 
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2 years: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
On-going indefinitely 
No of days in hospital in last two years: 
Range 
Mean 
35 
13 
2 
1 
2 
8->700 
68 da s 
63.6% 
23.6% 
3.6% 
1.8% 
3.6% 
For some variables there was a large amount of missing data due to difficulties in finding this 
infonnation in the case notes. Information on education level has not been displayed as 
infonnation on this was missing for 76% of clients. The majority (80%) of the sample were 
male. The sample was more ethnically diverse than the general population of the area (96.6% 
White British, 2001 census). A lower percentage (67%) of clients were unemployed than 
other estimates ( e.g. 80% unemployment estimate, Magalore & Knapp, 2007). 
RESULTS 
The total number of CMHT clients recorded on the trust electronic system was 940 people on 
1/02/2011. This is likely to be an overestimate as clients who had been discharged had not 
been recorded as such on this system. An alternative estimate of the CMHT caseload was 
gained from the number of clients seen in the previous two month period which was 450 in 
December 2010 and January 2011. Of the 11 staff members who provided information on 
their caseloads, the total number of cases was 34 7 (36.9% of 940; 77.1 % of 450). Out of the 
347 cases identified 55 clients had a diagnosis of schizophrenia or a related condition 
(15.9%). 
In total three clients were offered CBT for psychosis between January 2009 and 
January 2011 (see table 2). Of these two accepted the offer although one dropped out after the 
first session. Another client had 16 sessions of CBT for psychosis prior to 2009. There was 
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evidence in case notes of four clients being referred for psychological assessment for CBT 
but then no further evidence of whether they were seen or not. 
Sessions were still on-going for the client who was offered and accepted CBT for 
psychosis; it was not clear whether this was planned to last at least 16 sessions, eight sessions 
were documented. This was being delivered by a CPN ( community psychiatric nurse) who 
had further training in CBT for psychosis. It was not clear whether this followed a treatment 
manual as suggested by NICE (2009) guidelines and supervision arrangements were not 
clear. Sessions included 3 of the 7 key elements highlighted on the audit tool (see Appendix 
1). 
In total 26 clients (47.3%) lived with or had close contact with their family. Of these, 
two were offered family therapy and one accepted it. The family therapy included the client 
in accordance with NICE (2009) guidelines. Therapy was on-going and it was not clear 
whether it would last between 3 months and 1 year, four sessions were documented. The 
therapy seemed to be in accordance with the aspects of NICE guidance highlighted by the 
audit tool. It was delivered by a CPN undergoing training in family therapy. Supervision 
arrangements were unclear. 
Table 2 - Therapy offered 
Status 
Offered 
Accepted 
Met NICE guidelines 
Delivered by: 
CBT 
3 (5%) 
2 (4%) (1 dropped out after 
one session) 
1 (2%) 
CPN 
Offered and accepted prior to 1 
2009 
Referral documented but no 4 
evidence the client was seen 
Family Therapy 
2 (8%) 
1 (4%) 
1 (4%) 
CPN 
73 
Other support offered included anxiety management classes, hearing voices groups, 
art psychotherapy, relapse prevention groups and one-to-one support which may have 
included CBT techniques but the case notes were unclear. 
DISCUSSION 
The first objective of this study was not achieved as there was no accurate record of the 
caseload. Estimates were gained but these varied widely and staff said they were unreliable. 
The administration staff were working to ensure all clients that were discharged from the 
CMHT were discharged from the computer system and there was a drive to discharge all 
clients that were not seen in the previous six months. This would ensure that the centralised 
electronic system held a more accurate estimate of the overall caseload of the team. An 
accurate overall caseload number is necessary to aid in service planning and future audit. 
The second objective of this study was to identify all clients on the caseload with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia or a related condition. Again this was not possible as some care 
co-ordinators did not supply that information within the timeframe of this study. Reliance on 
busy staff members for this information is problematic as they do not have the time, it is not 
their priority, and many members of staff are often away from the team office where the 
auditors were based. A system whereby diagnosis information could be recorded centrally, 
for example through the electronic system, would facilitate audit as it would bypass the care 
co-ordinators. There were also clients who did not have a care co-ordinator whose care was 
overseen by a psychiatrist. Time constraints meant this study was not able to identify these 
clients. Furthermore, there was no central record of the clients that the psychiatrists were 
responsible for. A central record of these clients would facilitate audit. 
The third objective was to identify how many clients were offered CBT for psychosis 
or family therapy. 5 clients (9%) were offered a NICE (2009) recommended treatment. This 
suggests there is a lack of provision of NICE recommended treatments for people with 
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psychosis. There is strong evidence that these treatments are effective in promoting recovery 
and reducing relapse. The meant clients were not given all the tools which may have aided 
their recovery and they were likely to experience more symptoms and greater distress. Their 
symptoms may have prevented them from working and impaired their quality of life. 
Families may also have been affected as they had no support with the burden of caring for a 
person with schizophrenia. At a service level this means clients were more likely to stay on 
the caseload, more likely to relapse, more likely to experience a crisis and therefore cost the 
service more in resources. 
Several factors could explain the lack of provision of NICE recommended treatments 
for schizophrenia. Firstly, staff had large caseloads (40 on average) and the demands of case 
management meant they had a lack of time to provide any therapeutic intervention. Much of 
the care co-ordinators' time was spent on crisis intervention, risk management and 
medication adherence which take priority in the risk-averse climate of NHS settings (Berry & 
Haddock, 2008). In this climate CBT and family interventions could be seen as a luxury, 
optional extra by staff (Berry & Haddock, 2008). There were one part-time psychologist, two 
part-time CBT therapists and two trainee psychologists at the CMHT and therefore there was 
not the capacity for those clinicians alone to provide NICE recommended treatment for all 
clients who would benefit from it. Therefore it would be necessary for other clinicians such 
as trained CPNs to provide some of the therapy. 
Secondly, there is a lack of training for staff to develop skills in CBT for psychosis 
and family therapy (Tarrier, 2005). Research suggests that even those staff who have received 
some training suffer from self-doubt, fear and a lack of confidence in delivering these 
interventions for complex clients due to lack of clinical supervision (Berry & Haddock, 
2008). 
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Resistance of clinicians has been found to be a barrier to the provision of 
psychological interventions for schizophrenia (Spidel, Lecomte & Leclerc, 2006). In the past 
it was thought that people with psychosis did not respond well to psychological therapy and 
clinicians may still hold this view. There is also an uncertainty amongst clinicians about 
which clients would be suitable for CBT or family therapy (Berry & Haddock, 2008). 
Furthermore, client factors may be a barrier to the provision of NICE recommended 
therapy. These include the stigma of receiving psychological support; denial of symptoms; 
substance misuse; and poor motivation and organisation which hinder successful engagement 
(Spidel, Lecomte & Leclerc, 2006). Families may also be reluctant to engage due to stigma or 
family discord (Berry & Haddock, 2008). This study found that not all those offered 
treatment took up the offer, perhaps due to these factors. 
Moreover, there are potential service-level factors which impede the delivery of 
psychological interventions for people with psychosis. These include the focus on crisis and 
risk management; insufficient support for clinicians; lack of service structures to facilitate the 
delivery of interventions; not prioritising psychological interventions; and organising services 
in such a way that access to families is difficult (Berry & Haddock, 2008). 
Limitations 
This study was limited by the difficulties in obtaining the required information. This 
meant not all clients were identified and, for those who were, not all information was 
obtained. The findings may be an under-estimate of the actual provision of CBT and family 
therapy if the information was lacking from the clinical records. 
This was not an accurate reflection of the whole caseload of the CMHT, only a 
smaller sample of 347 clients. It may be that those care co-ordinators who were more 
interested in the provision of NICE recommended treatments for schizophrenia were the ones 
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who responded and those care co-ordinators may also be the ones most likely to refer their 
clients for treatment. The results may therefore be an over-estimate of the current provision. 
Finally, this audit looked at the provision of CBT and family therapy in the past two 
years for clients on the case load on 1/02/2011. It may be that there were clients offered 
family therapy or CBT in the past two years who were then discharged from the service. It 
was not possible to identify these clients. A longitudinal audit may capture the provision of 
family therapy and CBT for psychosis within the CMHT more accurately. 
Recommendations 
In order to improve the implementation of NICE recommended psychological 
treatments for schizophrenia and related conditions it is recommended that staff skills are 
increased through the provision of training and supervision (Tarrier, 2005). Clients should 
also be involved in this training in order to facilitate links between staff and clients and to 
improve engagement (Fadden, 2006). Staff should be given more information on which 
clients are suitable for CBT and family therapy and should be encouraged to refer appropriate 
clients. Clients should receive more information on NICE (2009) guidelines and evidence-
based treatments and should be encouraged to assert their right to treatments. This can be 
facilitated through developing links with advocacy groups and carer groups (Berry & 
Haddock, 2008). 
Services managers need to allocate time for clinicians to spend delivering NICE 
recommended interventions and should encourage the provision of psychological 
interventions (Berry & Haddock, 2008). Service managers need to structure services in ways 
that facilitate psychological interventions and the inclusion of families where appropriate. 
This should be considered in the current redesign of secondary care services. A clear referral 
pathway for CBT for psychosis and family therapy should be developed and referrals should 
be followed-up by care co-ordinators to ensure that psychological interventions are received. 
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There is growing evidence that group CBT for psychosis can be as effective as 
individual CBT (Wykes, Steel, Everitt & Tarrier, 2008). Although not currently 
recommended by NICE, it may be that group CBT for psychosis provides a way of ensuring 
greater access to CBT for clients as more clients would be able to be seen by a small number 
of clinicians. 
In order to accurately gauge the need for psychological interventions for psychosis it 
is recommended that more accurate recording systems are developed and staff are encouraged 
to keep these up-to-date. 
The findings of this study and the recommendations will be fed-back to the service via 
a meeting with the service manager and a presentation to the team. It is hoped that this will 
raise awareness of the NICE (2009) guidelines, highlight the need for further provision within 
the CMHT, give information on who may benefit from CBT and family therapy, and ensure 
clients who would benefit from CBT for psychosis or family therapy are offered these 
interventions. 
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Appendix 1 - Audit tool 
Patient Sex: □Male Age: 
identifier: □Female 
Diagnosis category: 
□ Schizophrenia 
D Schizophreniform 
D Schizo-affective disorder 
□Delusional disorder 
□Not-specified psychosis 
Date of first contact with secondary services: 
Ethnicitv: 
A: White 
D British 
D Irish 
□ Anv other White background (please write in) 
B: Mixed 
□ White and Black Caribbean 
□ White and Black African 
D White and Asian 
□ Anv other mixed background (please write in) 
C : Asian or Asian British 
□ Indian 
□ Pakistani 
□ Bangladeshi 
□ Anv other Asian background (please write in) 
D : Black or Black British 
□ Caribbean 
□ African □ Any other Black background (please write in) 
E : Chinese or other ethnic group 
□ Chinese 
□ Anv other (please write in) 
Not stated 
□ Not stated 
Living Arrangements: 
□ On their own 
□With partner/Family 
□ With parents 
□ Residential home 
□ Other - soecifv 
Emolovment status: 
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□Part time - paid 
□Full time - paid (> 30hours/week) 
□ Voluntary - part time 
□Voluntary- full time 
□Retired 
□Unemployed 
□Education - part time 
□Education - full time 
Receiving benefits? 
□Yes 
□No 
Education level: 
□No formal education 
□GCSE □ Further education (A-levels, NVQ etc.) 
□ Higher education (degree) 
□Postgraduate 
Current risk: I □Level l I □Level 2 I □Level 3 
Number of recent (within 2 years) inpatient admissions: 
Total length of admission within the past 2 years (in days): 
Additional information: 
CBT INTERVENTIONS: 
In previous 2 years: Yes No 
Was the person offered CBT? 
Details of CBT offer. 
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Was the off er accepted? 
Give details if not accepted: 
Source of referral? (Did patient ask, suggested by staff member?) 
For those service users who accepted offer of CBT, was it: 
Delivered on a one-to-one basis 
Details of the above: 
Delivered over a minimum of 16 planned sessions? 
Details of the above: 
How many sessions in total to date? 
Follow a treatment manual? (specify which) 
Profession of person offering CBT: 
Has the professional had any CBT training/qualifications? 
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Supervision of the CBT work ( evidence of CBT supervision? frequency of 
supervision? profession/qualifications of the supervisor?) 
Did it include at least one of the following: 
People monitoring their own thoughts, feelings or 
behaviours with respect to their psychotic symptoms? 
Details: 
Promoting alternative ways of coping with target 
symptoms? 
Details: 
Reducing distress with respect to their psychotic symptoms? 
~ Details: 
Improving functioning with respect to their psychotic 
symptoms? 
Details: 
Identifying and working with core beliefs or schemas related 
to distressing psychotic experiences: 
-Details: 
-
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Using mindfulness and acceptance principles and practice as 
an alternative way of responding to distressing psychotic 
experiences 
Details: 
Identifying and evaluating beliefs about psychotic 
experiences ( e.g. beliefs about voice power and control) 
Details: 
FAMILY INTERVENTIONS 
In past two years: Yes No 
Does the person live with, or is the person in close 
contact with, their family? 
If 'yes', were the family offered family intervention? 
If the family had family intervention: 
~ 
Did it include the person with psychosis? 
If "not" - why? 
-Was it carried out for between 3 months and 1 year? 
~ If "not" - why? 
Did it include at least 10 planned sessions? 
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If "not" - why? 
Did it take account of the whole family's preference for 
either single or multi-family intervention? 
Did it take account of the relationship between the main 
carer and the person with psychosis? 
Did it have a specific supportive, educational or treatment 
function? 
Did it include negotiated problem solving or crisis 
management work? 
Profession of person offering family intervention: 
Qualifications/training of person/people offering family intervention: 
Supervision of the family intervention ( evidence of family intervention supervision? 
frequency of supervision? profession/qualifications of the supervisor?) 
~ Additional information: 
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QUALITATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT - MARRIED WOMEN'S VIEWS OF 
MARRIAGE 
Abstract 
There is very little research on married women's views and perceptions of married 
life. This research focused on unmarried young people, it is unclear what people's 
expectations of marriage are once they are married and whether these expectations become 
more realistic as marriage progresses. Therefore, this exploratory study aimed to provide an 
account of women's subjective experiences of marriage. A qualitative approach was chosen 
as it enabled an exploration of the topic and enabled rich data to be collected. Thematic 
analysis was chosen as the method as there is no current theory to base the results on and this 
method is accessible to researchers new to qualitative analysis. The overall research question 
was: "What are married women's views of marriage?" To enable an open discussion to take 
place, the participants were asked to bring and describe an object which represented their 
marriage. A twenty minute semi-structured interview was conducted with four women. The 
participants had all been married less than ten years and ranged in age from 21-46 years old. 
four themes emerged from the interviews: Symbolism, Unity and Togetherness; Emotions 
and Memories; and Tradition and Culture. 
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Research Log 
1 Formulating and testing hypotheses and research questions X 
2 Carrying out a structured literature search using information technology and X 
literature search tools 
3 Critically reviewing relevant literature and evaluating research methods X 
4 Formulating specific research questions X 
5 Writing briefresearch proposals X 
6 Writing detailed research proposals/protocols X 
7 Considering issues related to ethical practice in research, including issues of X 
diversity, and structuring plans accordingly 
8 Obtaining approval from a research ethics committee X 
9 Obtaining appropriate supervision for research X 
-
10 Obtaining appropriate collaboration for research X 
11 Collecting data from research participants X 
12 Choosing appropriate design for research questions X 
~ 
13 Writing patient information and consent forms X 
14 Devising and administering questionnaires X 
75 Negotiating access to study participants in applied NHS settings 
-16 Setting up a data file X 
~17 Conducting statistical data analysis using SPSS X 
18 Choosing appropriate statistical analyses X 
19 Preparing quantitative data for analysis X 
20 Choosing appropriate quantitative data analysis X 
21 Summarising results in figures and tables X 
~22 Conducting semi-structured interviews X 
~23 Transcribing and analysing interview data using qualitative methods X 
24 Choosing appropriate qualitative analyses X 
25 Interpreting results from quantitative and qualitative data analysis X 
-
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26 Presenting research findings in a variety of contexts 
27 Producing a written report on a research project X 
28 Defending own research decisions and analyses X 
29 Submitting research reports for publication in peer-reviewed journals or edited 
book 
30 Applying research findings to clinical practice X 
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ABSTRACT 
Paranoia is thought to exist on a continuum with 10-15% of the general population 
experiencing high levels ( e.g. Freeman, 2007). Many different cognitive and affective factors 
have been linked to the experience of paranoia. These include theory of mind, jumping to 
conclusions bias, attributional bias, self-esteem, low mood, anxiety and social anxiety. 
However, there is mixed evidence that each of these factors is related to paranoia. One 
potential reason for this is that few studies have looked at the inter-relationships between 
these factors. Some studies have investigated the role of several factors together but most of 
this research has been done in the clinical population which makes it difficult to isolate 
paranoia from other clinical symptoms which may have a confounding effect on the findings. 
The aim of this study was to contribute to the current understanding of paranoia by 
determining which factors are uniquely related to the experience of paranoia and the direct 
and indirect relationships between these factors and paranoia. 
151 participants aged between 18 and 70 completed an online survey consisting of 
measures of paranoia, cognitive and affective theory of mind, attributional bias, jumping to 
conclusions bias, self-esteem, low mood, generalised anxiety and social anxiety. 
Cognitive theory of mind, social anxiety and generalised anxiety were found to 
predict paranoia. Furthermore, mediation analysis indicated indirect relationships between 
self-esteem and paranoia, and externalising bias and paranoia, through social anxiety. 
The findings build upon previous studies in the clinical population and suggest that 
social anxiety plays a key role in the experience of paranoia. 
INTRODUCTION 
Previous studies have linked many factors with the experience of paranoia. Some of 
these factors can be classified as cognitive; including theory of mind, attributional bias, 
jumping to conclusions bias, and self-esteem. Affective factors including low mood, social 
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anxiety and generalised anxiety have also been linked to paranoia. However, the evidence in 
support of these relationships is mixed and there is little research examining the unique 
contribution of these factors in the context of the others. This study will look at the 
relationships between these different factors and paranoia in a sample from the general 
population. 
Firstly a definition of paranoia will be given, followed by a summary of the recent 
theories of paranoia. Then the evidence linking each cognitive and affective variable with 
paranoia will be discussed, highlighting the potential methodological and confounding issues 
affecting the results. The small existing literature synthesising these many different factors 
will then be discussed and the current models of paranoia highlighted. 
Paranoia 
Paranoia is a term used to describe unfounded or excessive fears about others. 
Paranoid thinking has two key elements: the belief that harm is occurring or is going to occur 
to the person, and the belief that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm (Freeman and 
Garety, 2000). At a clinical level these fears can become fixed, strongly held beliefs which 
are termed 'persecutory delusions' in the clinical literature. Persecutory delusions are a 
common symptom of the diagnostic category 'schizophrenia' (WHO, 2010). 
Paranoia on a Continuum 
It was once thought that paranoid delusions were distinctly different to the thoughts 
people have in the general population have. However, it has been suggested that paranoia 
exists as a continuum (Freeman, 2007; Bebbington et al., 2013). There is considerable 
support for this theory. Firstly, high levels of paranoia have been found in 10-15% of the 
general population (Freeman, 2007) with up to a third of people experiencing regular 
paranoid thoughts (Freeman et al, 2005) and around 45% of people reporting at least one 
paranoid thought in a virtual reality study (Freeman et al., 2008a). This suggests paranoia is a 
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common phenomenon in the general population and not unique to clinical groups. 
Furthermore, delusions and hallucinations as a whole are not confined to a psychotic group of 
patients but are experienced by people with other mental health disorders and the general 
population (Eaton, Romanoski, Anthony & Nestadt, 1991; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl & Ravelli, 
2000). The risk of developing psychosis is increased by the earlier occurrence of low level 
symptoms such as mild paranoia and transient hallucinations (Dominguez et al., 2009), 
suggesting they are manifestations of the same process. 
A prediction based on the continuum theory is that low-level psychotic-like 
experiences, such as non-clinical paranoia, and clinical symptoms, such as persecutory 
delusions, should be understandable in terms of similar causal factors (Freeman Pugh, 
Vorontsova, Antley & Slater, 2010). This is known as etiological continuity (Myin-Germeys, 
Krabbendam & van Os, 2003). Many factors have been linked to the clinical symptom of 
persecutory delusions and the non-clinical experience of paranoia. These factors include 
cognitive factors such as theory of mind and reasoning biases and emotional factors such as 
low mood and social anxiety, although the evidence for these proposed relationships is mixed 
(Freeman, 2007). 
A recent study provided some further support for the dimensional theory of paranoia 
(Freeman et al., 2010). Participants were drawn from the general and clinical populations and 
divided into three groups of 30 according to paranoia levels. The groups were defined as low 
paranoia, non-clinical; high paranoia, non-clinical; and clinical paranoia. The classifications 
were based on participants' response to a task in which the participants completed a virtual 
tube ride and were then asked to describe their fellow passengers. The authors argue this task 
meant that the paranoid ideas suggested by participants must be unfounded because the 
avatars• facial expressions were neutral. They then investigated several proposed factors 
which have been linked to paranoia in each group. They found a stepped change in levels of 
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anxiety, worry, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anomalies of experience, and trauma 
history between the groups; all factors that have been linked to the experience of paranoia 
(Freeman et al., 2010). This step-change indicates a dose-response relationship, i.e. the 
clinical paranoia group had the highest levels of these factors and the highest levels of 
paranoia and the low paranoia, non-clinical group had the lowest levels. This supports the 
dimensional theory of paranoia because there were high levels of paranoia in the non-clinical 
sample and they shared potential causal factors, suggesting clinical and non-clinical paranoia 
are related experiences (Freeman et al., 2010). Therefore it can be argued that research on 
paranoia in the general population provides useful information about the experience of 
paranoia across the whole spectrum. 
Cognitive factors related to paranoia 
Several cognitive factors have been associated with paranoia including Theory of 
Mind, reasoning biases and cognitions. This evidence will be outlined below. 
Theory of Mind "Theory of Mind" (ToM), "mentalizing" or "perspective taking" has 
been described as the everyday ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to others and an 
understanding of how others' behaviours are motivated by their beliefs, thoughts, feelings 
and intentions (Abell, Happe and Frith, 2004; Wellman, 1990; Premack and Woodruff, 
1978). There is mixed evidence as to whether Theory of Mind deficits are linked to 
symptoms of paranoia. Some researchers have found Theory of Mind deficits in those 
experiencing paranoid symptoms of schizophrenia in comparison to non-clinical samples 
(e.g. Randall et al., 2003; Corcoran, Mercer & Frith, 1995) and across several mental health 
diagnoses (Corcoran et al., 2008) using a variety of tasks (Champagne-Lavau et al., 2009; 
Stewart et al., 2009) whilst others have found no deficit (e.g. Langdon et al., 1997; Greig, 
Bryson & Bell, 2004) or no specific deficit linked to paranoid symptoms (e.g. Langdon et al., 
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2006). Indeed, a review of the literature showed that 50% of studies found a Theory of Mind 
deficit associated with paranoia (Harrington, Siegert & McClure, 2005). 
There are several possible reasons for this variation in results. Firstly, there are some 
methodological pitfalls when studying the clinical population. Studies tend to group 
participants according to the predominant symptoms they experience or the presence of 
certain symptoms such as persecutory delusions, however this means the contributions of 
other symptoms cannot be ruled out and it may be that some other symptom is linked to 
theory of mind deficits (Freeman, 2007). For example, theory of mind deficits have been 
linked to the negative symptoms of schizophrenia in some studies (Langdon et al., 2001 ), and 
it could be that the variation in the presence of negative symptoms can explain the variation 
in findings of a link between paranoia and theory of mind. 
To combat the potential confounding effect of other symptoms on the relationship 
between paranoia and theory of mind some studies have examined the relationship between 
paranoia and theory of mind in the general population. One study looked at the relationship 
between Theory of Mind, schizotypy, and persecutory ideation in a sample of 828 students 
and found no relationship between any of the variables (Femyhough et al., 2008). This study 
has the advantage of a very large sample size and they included more than one measure of 
theory of mind and persecutory ideation. However, the student sample may not be 
generalizable to the population as a whole. Furthermore, a measure of persecutory ideation 
may not capture more low-level paranoia that may be more common in the general 
population. 
A second methodological issue is that the sample sizes are small for all clinical 
studies in this area (Harrington et al., 2005; Freeman, 2007) and therefore may be 
underpowered to detect statistically significant effects and so there is a greater risk of type II 
error. For example, the studies reviewed by Harrington and colleagues (2005) all had 
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between 16 and 30 participants with paranoia and so they only had enough power to detect 
large effects. 
Thirdly, there are methodological issues with the measures used to test theory of mind 
abilities. A number of the studies only used one measure of Theory of Mind which may not 
have been sensitive enough to pick up subtle effects (Harrington et al., 2005). There are a 
number of difficulties with the available tests of theory of mind, especially the fact that they 
rely on stories or other stimuli that do not assess the participant's use of Theory of Mind 
skills in real-life situations. A large majority also have ceiling effects in adults from the 
general population (Kaland et al., 2002). Some widely used tests also place high demands on 
memory and it could be that a memory deficit is the cause of observed Theory of Mind 
deficits as not all studies have controlled for this (Harrington et al., 2005). Performance on 
some Theory of Mind tasks seems to be domain-specific i.e. performance varies depending 
on whether verbal, written, visual or auditory measures are used (Langdon et al., 2001; 
Mazza et al., 2001 ). Furthermore, when more than one measure of theory of mind is used 
there is often no correlation between scores on these measures (Fernyhough et al., 2008) 
suggesting they are measuring different aspects of theory of mind, or they are not measuring 
the same construct, or they are not valid and reliable measures. See appendix 7 for a review 
of theory of mind measures. It is advisable to include at least two measures of theory of mind 
with the best reliability and validity available (Garety & Freeman, 1999). Issues with the 
validity and reliability of measures may explain the mixed findings. 
Some researchers have suggested there are different types of Theory of Mind deficits. 
The term "undermentalizing" has been used to describe a lack of a concept of mental states of 
others (Frith, 1992; 2004; Brune, 2005) and has been linked to the negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia (Brune, 2005). The term "overmentalizing" has been used to describe the 
tendency to excessively attribute malevolent intentions to others in ambiguous social 
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situations (Frith, 1992; 2004) and has been implicated in paranoid symptoms although this 
has not been consistently shown (Brune, 2005; Montag et al., 2011). It could be that the 
mixed evidence is due to the lack of clear distinction about the nature of the Theory of Mind 
deficits. 
A final methodological issue is that studies have been unclear about the definition of 
paranoia used and the definition seems to vary across studies (Freeman, 2007). Some studies 
have used a very broad definition of paranoia ( e.g. Pickup and Frith, 2001) meaning it is 
more difficult to draw conclusions about relationships between factors. 
Attributional Bias An attribution is the reason people give as the cause of an event. 
An attributional bias is the tendency to explain or make sense of situations in a certain way. 
For example to attribute the causes of a mistake to your own error, someone else's actions, or 
to chance/luck. It seems likely that some kind of attributional processes are behind the 
experience of paranoid thoughts and beliefs as these involve making judgements about 
others' intentions (Bentall, Kinderman and Moutoussis, 2008). Initial research with people 
with depression highlighted three main dimensions along which attributions can be 
categorized. The internality- externality dimension describes whether someone attributes the 
cause of a situation to themselves or external causes. The stability-instability dimension 
describes whether the cause is likely to remain the case in the future. The globalness-
specificity dimension describes whether this cause is just related to the specific situation or to 
all areas of life (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). 
An initial study found people with high levels of paranoia showed an attributional 
bias towards stable and global causes of events (Kaney and Bentall, 1989). They also found 
that people with high levels of paranoia made more external attributions for negative events 
and internal attributions for positive events (Kaney and Bentall, 1989). This can be viewed as 
a "self-serving" bias as it is protective of self-esteem in the face of negative events ( Campbell 
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& Sedikides, 1999). Many studies have attempted to replicate these findings and some have 
found a "self-serving" attributional style (Fear, Sharp & Healy, 1996) but others have not 
(Humphreys and Barrowclough, 1996). There are some methodological issues which can help 
to explain the discrepancy. 
Firstly, the definition of paranoia used and the source of participants (from the general 
or clinical population) have varied. Some studies have found attributional bias in clinical 
populations but not in people with high levels of paranoia in the general population (Martin 
and Penn, 2001; McKay, Langdon & Coltheart, 2005). Another study found evidence of 
attributional bias only in participants with paranoia and grandiose delusions (Jolley et al., 
2006) suggesting that the attributional bias found may be related to a factor other than 
paranoia itself (such as grandiosity or other clinical symptoms). 
Secondly, studies have varied in the measures of attributional style used. Many 
studies used the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) (Peterson et al., 1982) but this has 
been widely criticised for poor internal consistency, particularly with the subscale measuring 
intemality (Reivich, 1995). More recently the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions 
Questionnaire (IPSAQ) was developed (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). This has better 
reliability than the ASQ and allows the distinction between external personal attributions and 
external situational attributions to be made (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996). This is an 
important distinction because paranoid thinking is about attributing negative motives to 
others. Using this scale, one study found that people with paranoia make more external-
personal explanations for negative events, meaning they are more likely to blame other 
people for bad things happening (Kinderman and Bentall, 1996). However, this has not been 
replicated in further clinical studies (Martin & Penn, 2002; McKay et al., 2005; Randall et al., 
2003; Langdon et al., 2013). 
99 
Another potential methodological issue is the anecdotal evidence suggesting 
participants find it difficult to complete attributional style questionnaires (Freeman, 2007). 
Also studies vary as to who classifies the attribution, the researcher or the participant. 
Evidence suggests that these different groups come to different conclusions as to the nature of 
the explanation provided for a situation (Bentall et al., 2008). For example, patients with 
paranoia often gave attributions for negative events which they classified as external but 
researchers classified as internal (Kinderman, Taylor, Morley & Bentall, 1992). One study 
found there was no relationship between attributions on the IPSAQ and paranoia when people 
with psychosis made the classification of their attributions but there was an association with 
paranoia and highly external-personal attributions when independent raters, who were blind 
to any information about the participant, classified the attributions (Martin and Penn, 2002). 
Therefore it seems that participants may find it difficult to classify their own responses as to 
whether the cause is due to themselves, others, or the situation and this is a flaw in the current 
methods of assessing attributional style. 
The questionnaires used to measure attributional style do not represent the situations 
and events that delusions are often focussed on (such as the look on someone's face or an 
ambiguous gesture) therefore they may not be a valid measure of the attributions made in 
paranoia (Freeman, 2007). A more naturalistic design in which participants were able to ask 
questions about a series of hypothetical events before making their attribution showed that 
participants tended to ask questions which presupposed a certain cause, for example 
participants with paranoia were more likely to ask "Was it something I did?" (Merrin, 
Kinderman and Bentall, 2007). This supports the link between attributional bias and paranoia. 
There is an assumption in the literature that attributional style is a stable trait but some 
evidence suggests that results on tests of attributional style can be modified following a task 
where the experience of failure is simulated (Bentall and Kaney, 2005). A review of the 
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literature concluded that people do not consistently show a tendency to make one attribution 
rather than the other (Bentall et al., 2008). This suggests that context may determine 
attributional style and attributional processes may be dynamic. This makes it difficult to 
measure attributions and difficult to draw firm conclusions around cause and effect (Bentall 
et al., 2008). 
Moreover, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms behind attributional bias. It 
could be that a deficit in the ability to mentalize and attribute mental states to others (poor 
theory of mind) means that people are more likely to attribute negative motives to other 
people and they may also be more simplistic in their attributional reasoning. One study 
supported this hypothesis with the finding that people in the general population with a 
relative theory of mind deficit were more likely to make external-personal attributions for 
negative events (Taylor and Kinderman, 1998). The deficits in theory of mind found were 
only small and within normal limits, so it is difficult to determine whether theory of mind 
deficits are the mechanism behind the observed link between attributional style and paranoia. 
Also this study did not find the predicted link between attributional simplicity and paranoia 
(Taylor and Kinderman, 2002). 
Finally, most of the current studies in this area have small samples and therefore may 
not have enough power to detect small effects or more subtle differences in attributional 
style. 
Jumping to conclusions bias Jumping to conclusions bias is the tendency to make 
decisions more readily, based on less information, than most people, even when an option to 
collect more information is available (Moore & Sellen, 2006; Garety & Freeman, 1999). 
There is considerable evidence that people with delusions have a jumping to conclusions bias 
(Freeman, 2007). This has been established using a probabilistic reasoning task in which 
participants have to decide which of two hidden jars coloured beads are being drawn from. 
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They are told that each jar has a proportion of red and blue beads. A bead is drawn and 
participants can guess which jar it came from or ask for another bead. Participants with 
delusions repeatedly ask for fewer beads before making a decision about which jar has been 
chosen than non-clinical controls (Garety & Freeman, 1999). This result has been replicated 
on many occasions (Freeman, 2007) including in people at high risk of developing psychosis 
(Broome et al., 2007) and individuals whose delusions have remitted (Moritz and Woodward, 
1995), suggesting it is a stable trait. However, these studies focussed on people with all types 
of delusions and not specifically paranoid ones meaning it is difficult to determine whether 
jumping to conclusions is a feature of paranoia per se, or a more general feature in delusions, 
or some other factor such as IQ. One study focussed on persecutory delusions specifically in 
28 people with delusions and 30 non-clinical controls. More participants in the delusions 
group showed a jumping to conclusions bias than controls suggesting that jumping to 
conclusions bias plays some role in paranoid thinking, but it is not the only factor as 50% of 
the delusions group did not show the bias (Startup, 2004). In most clinical samples it is likely 
people with paranoid delusions have other delusional beliefs which may be linked to jumping 
to conclusions bias. In order to overcome this, studies into paranoid thinking in the general 
population have been conducted. Some studies have found a relationship between jumping to 
conclusions and high delusional ideation in non-clinical participants (Colbert and Peters, 
2002) but others have not replicated this (Van Dael et al., 2006). One study into jumping to 
conclusions bias and paranoid thinking in the general population found no relationship 
(Freeman et al., 2005). It may be that biases in reasoning are more subtle in the non-clinical 
population and further research in this area is needed (Freeman, 2007). 
It has been argued that the beads task is artificial and does not replicate real-life 
situations in which people may jump to conclusions. However, studies using more naturalistic 
paradigms, such as the game "20 questions" or asking questions about a negative event, have 
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also found the link between delusions and jumping to conclusions, suggesting it is not an 
experimental artefact but a strategy that is used in real-life questioning (John & Dogeson, 
1994; Merrin, Kinderman & Bentall, 2007). The jumping to conclusions bias can even be 
provoked by a stressful situation which has been shown to enhance paranoia (shopping in the 
Camberwell Road, London; a highly deprived area) (Ellett, Freeman & Garety, 2008). 
It may be that when stressed (by the environment) it is advantageous to make snap 
judgements based on little evidence Gump to conclusions) in order to stay safe and this leads 
to paranoia. However, it could be that people with paranoia are already looking out for threat 
and are therefore more likely to jump to conclusions in a difficult environment. A recent 
study found a link between state anxiety, jumping to conclusions bias, and paranoia, with 
jumping to conclusions bias mediating the link between anxiety and paranoia, suggesting 
feeling anxious leads people to jump to conclusions and this leads to paranoid thinking 
(Lincoln et al., 2010). 
The cause of jumping to conclusions bias is yet to be clearly established and other 
biases such as the belief confirmation bias (Freeman, Garety, McGuire & Kuipers, 2005) or a 
bias against disconfirmatory evidence (Moritz & Woodward, 2006) may play a role. These 
biases relate to the tendency to search for evidence in support of one's belief only, and the 
tendency to discount or ignore evidence which does not support your theory. 
Self-esteem and negative cognitions. A long-standing theory about the cause of 
paranoia which can be traced back to the work of Freud (1911/2002) is the "Delusions-as-
defence theory". Many authors have suggested that paranoid thoughts are a defence against 
negative thoughts towards the self and actually protect against low self-esteem. This idea was 
first introduced by psychodynamic theorists (Colby, 1977) and expanded upon by researchers 
such as Richard Bentall (Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994). Other authors have argued that 
delusions are emotionally congruent and reflect poor self-esteem (Freeman et al., 2002; 2004; · 
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Freeman, 2007). There is mixed evidence for the link between self-esteem and paranoia. It 
can be argued that if paranoid thoughts are a defence then they should be linked to neutral or 
higher self-esteem, but if they are linked to low self-esteem or negative beliefs this supports 
Freeman and colleagues' (2002; 2008b) theory. 
There are few studies in the clinical population linking self-esteem and persecutory 
delusions and sample sizes are small, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions (Freeman, 
2007). Studies in the general population allow for larger sample sizes and avoid complicating 
factors such as the effect that diagnosis and experience of being a mental health patient might 
have on self-esteem. Findings in the general population show support for Freeman and 
colleagues' theory that low self-esteem is linked to paranoid thinking (Ellett, Lopes & 
Chadwick, 2003; Freeman et al., 2005a; Fowler et al., 2006; Johns et al., 2004; Martin & 
Penn, 2001; McKay, Langdon and Colheart, 2005). Some studies have also found this link in 
clinical groups (Drake et al., 2004). Further experimental work examining the role oflow 
self-esteem is needed to fully establish cause and effect (Freeman, 2007). 
However, supporters of the delusions as defence theory argue that self-esteem in 
people with psychosis is dynamic and unstable and suggest at times of acute psychosis, where 
paranoia is high, self-esteem is higher than in other clinical groups (Bentall, et al., 2008; 
Bentall, 2001 ). The delusion-as-defence theory would argue that there should be a 
discrepancy between a person's underlying, implicit, self-esteem and their stated, explicit 
self-esteem (Freeman, 2007; Bentall et al., 2008). This is very difficult to measure because it 
involves processes which the theory argues are not conscious and any failure to find such 
discrepancies can be attributed to poor methodology rather than a lack of support for the 
theory (Freeman, 2007). However, some methods have been used to try and assess this 
including the Emotional Stroop task (Garety & Freeman, 1999; Smith, Freeman & Kuipers, 
2005). This task involves presenting emotional and non-emotional words and asking 
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participants to say the colour of the words. In general participants take longer to name the 
colour of emotional rather than neutral words as they are more salient (Gotlib, McCann & 
Douglas, 1984). The delusion-as-defence model would predict a bias towards negative self-
concept words for people with paranoia more than controls and differences between this and 
overt self-esteem. This has not been found (Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Fear et al., 1996). Lyon 
and colleagues (1994) demonstrated that people with paranoia tend to make implicit internal 
attributions for negative events and explicit external attributions. They concluded this 
supports the idea of delusions as a defence against underlying low self-esteem (Lyon et al., 
1994). However this finding has not been replicated in many subsequent studies (Kristev, 
Jackson & Maude, 1999; Martin & Penn, 2002; McKay et al., 2005; Peters and Garety, 
2006). All of these studies looked for statistical evidence for this discrepancy at the means at 
group level. Therefore we do not know whether this suggested discrepancy between overt and 
implicit self-esteem exists in individuals. Other measures of implicit self-esteem have not 
consistently found the predicted discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem in 
people with paranoia (Bentall et al., 2008). 
Trower and Chadwick (1995) argued that there are two types of paranoia; "Poor-Me" 
and "Bad-Me". "Poor-Me" paranoia refers to ideas relating to the belief that persecution is 
undeserved. "Bad-Me" paranoia refers to negative beliefs about the self and the idea that 
persecution is justified and deserved. Using this distinction, researchers have argued that 
"Poor-Me" paranoia is linked to neutral self-esteem and "Bad-Me" paranoia is linked to low 
self-esteem. There has been some support for this distinction with some studies finding lower 
self-esteem in people with "Bad-Me" than "Poor-Me" delusions (Chadwick, Trower, Juusti-
Butler, & Maguire, 2005; Melo, Taylor, & Bentall, 2006). One study found paranoia was 
linked to higher self-esteem following "Poor-Me" paranoid thoughts but lower self-esteem 
following "Bad-Me" paranoid thoughts (Udachina, Varese, Oorschot, Myin-Germeys, & 
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Bentall, 2009). The authors argue that this shows paranoia can be used as a defence in some 
circumstances (Udachina et al., 2009). 
However, the distinction does not appear to be as simple as first thought with 
evidence suggesting people often switch between "Poor-Me" and "Bad-Me" paranoia (Melo 
et al., 2006). Using a cross-sectional method, low self-esteem was associated with both types 
of paranoid thoughts (Melo & Bentall, 2013). However, using a longitudinal design, "Poor-
me" paranoia and low self-esteem predicted an episode of "Bad-Me" paranoia and "Bad-Me" 
paranoia predicted an episode of "Poor-Me" paranoia which the authors argue supports the 
idea that people try and avoid "Bad-Me" thoughts which leads to "Poor-Me" thoughts (Melo 
& Bentall, 2013). The authors argue this supports Bentall's (2001) dynamic theory of 
paranoia in which people are locked into a continuous fight against negative views of the self 
(Melo & Bentall, 2013). This theory is extremely complex and difficult to measure and 
supporting evidence tends to come only from the advocates of this theory. It can be argued 
that it is more parsimonious to accept the theory of Freeman and colleagues that low self-
esteem and negative beliefs of the self are more likely to cause paranoia (Freeman, 2007). 
Furthermore, in clinical samples, "Poor-Me" paranoia seems to be rare compared to "Bad-
Me" thinking (Fornells-Ambrojo & Garety, 2005) suggesting the distinction may not be a 
helpful one in terms of understanding paranoia. 
Instead of focussing on self-esteem as a whole, it may be more helpful to focus on 
specific negative beliefs and their role in causing paranoia (Chadwick et al., 2005; Freeman et 
al., 2002; Fowler et al., 2006; Garety et al., 2006). Links between specific negative beliefs 
and paranoia have been well established in both the clinical (Fowler et al., 2006; Fowler et 
al., 2012; Smith et al., 2006) and non-clinical populations (Freeman et al., 2003; 2005b). 
Fowler and colleagues (2006) found that negative schematic beliefs about the self and others 
were a stronger predictor of paranoia in a sample of 700 students and 250 patients with 
106 
psychosis than self-esteem as traditionally measured, and schematic beliefs enabled 
discrimination between the clinical and student samples whereas self-esteem did not. Further 
studies have combined measures of negative beliefs, low self-esteem and mood and 
concluded all three have a role in paranoia (Fowler et al., 2012). This suggests a combination 
of low mood, low self-esteem, and negative views of the self and others play a direct role in 
paranoia which is more supported, much less complex and more intuitive than the delusions-
as-defence theory. 
In conclusion, there is more evidence of a direct and non-defensive link between self-
esteem, negative cognitions and paranoia. The exact causal direction of the relationships is 
not established and may be circular (Freeman, 2007). 
Mood and paranoia 
Theories of persecutory delusions highlight the fact that the content of delusions is 
often emotionally congruent and therefore emotion and delusions may be linked (Freeman 
and Garety, 2003). Depression has been found to be one of the best predictors of paranoia in 
the general population (Martin and Penn, 2001 ). Depression has also been found to be 
related to the severity and distress related to paranoia (Smith et al., 2006). Many studies are 
cross-sectional so it is difficult to determine whether depression or paranoia occurs first or 
they both occur concurrently, therefore it is not possible to determine cause and effect. A few 
longitudinal studies have sought to address this. One study used structural equation modelling 
to ascertain if there is a link between depression and paranoia and if so in which direction. 
They found depression was predicted by greater levels of paranoia at every stage of 
assessment over an 18 month period and concluded that this is evidence that paranoia causes 
depression (Drake et al., 2004). This link between paranoia and depression was not mediated 
by self-esteem or insight (Drake et al., 2004). However, there could be another factor causing 
both paranoia and depression or another, unmeasured factor could mediate the relationship so 
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it is not possible to draw such a firm conclusion about causation from this study. Increases in 
depression have been reported before instances of paranoid thinking using experience-
sampling methods suggesting that depression predicts paranoia (Thewissen et al., 2011 ). 
Other studies have found depressed mood predicts paranoia when combined with negative 
cognition (low self-esteem, negative beliefs about self and others) (Fowler et al., 2012). 
Freeman and colleagues (2012) found depression and depressive thinking are independent 
predictors of paranoid thinking in the general population. This has been explained using the 
"bad-me" subtype of paranoia (Trower and Chadwick, 1995). Other authors have postulated 
that the social exclusion experienced by people with depression may lead them to perceive 
themselves as a target for others (Freeman et al., 1998). 
In summary it appears depression and paranoia often co-exist and there may be a 
relationship between the two. However, the direction and nature of this relationship is unclear 
and more research is needed in this area. 
Social Anxiety and Paranoia 
Social anxiety is a general term which can be used to refer to several related 
constructs and is often used interchangeably with the term Social Phobia. Mattick and Clarke 
(1998) argued there are two separate but related constructs that make up social anxiety; 
Social Phobia and Social Interaction Anxiety. Social phobia refers to the anxiety and feelings 
of fear experienced at the prospect of being observed or watched by other people. Social 
interaction anxiety refers to distress and fear of being judged when meeting and talking with 
other people (Mattick and Clarke, 1998). 
Anxiety, especially social anxiety, has been linked to paranoia. Freeman and 
colleagues (Freeman et al., 2005; Freeman, 2007) have argued that paranoia exists on a 
continuum of experiences from very common themes of social evaluation through to ideas 
regarding severe threat to self, with many people in the general population experiencing the 
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former and fewer experiencing the latter. Figure 1 shows this continuum in hierarchical fom1. 
The common themes identified match those of social anxiety. Therefore, it could be argued 
that paranoia is an extreme form of social anxiety. Furthermore, social anxiety could lead to 
more extreme thoughts about threat to self. 
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Figure 1. The paranoia hierarchy (Freeman et al., 2005) 
Studies have consistently found associations between anxiety and paranoid thinking in 
the general population (Martin & Penn, 2001; Johns et al., 2004; Freeman et al., 2011; 2012) 
and in the clinical population (e.g. Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2007; Lysaker et al., 2010; 
Schutters et al., 2012). These cross-sectional studies clearly demonstrate associations but 
make it difficult to determine the direction of the relationships and most studies do not 
include all the proposed factors which could cause anxiety and paranoia, such as cognitive 
variables like theory of mind and reasoning biases. Anxiety has been found to be predictive 
of paranoid thinking (Freeman et al., 2003; 2005b; 2008; Valmaggia et al., 2008) and 
increases in anxiety have been found to occur before paranoid thinking in patients with 
psychosis (Thewissen et al., 2011 ), strengthening the evidence for a developmental role of 
anxiety in paranoid thinking. In the virtual reality tube ride study discussed above, people 
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who had more paranoid thoughts about neutral stimuli had three distinct characteristics: the 
tendency to worry, higher levels of anxiety, and negative thoughts about self and others 
(Freeman et al., 2008a). This suggests that anxiety and worry play a role in determining 
people's interpretation of a neutral situation as something threatening. 
Moreover, in samples from the general population it has been shown that paranoid 
thinking builds upon common interpersonal anxiety and worries such as fears of rejection 
(Freeman et al., 2005a, b; Freeman et al., 2008b; Schutters et al., 2012). A recent 
experimental study demonstrated a link between anxiety and paranoia. 90 healthy participants 
were randomly assigned to either complete a task which induced anxiety or a neutral task. 
Those in the anxiety group showed an increase in paranoid thinking and an increased bias 
towards jumping to conclusions (Lincoln et al., 2010). This study was well-designed and had 
a number of strengths including the randomised design and experimental manipulation. It 
provides good support for a causal link between anxiety and paranoia. 
Social anxiety has also been shown to predict the persistence of paranoid thinking in a 
clinical sample (Startup et al., 2007). However, this study had only 25 participants and 
therefore the finding may be spurious and needs to be replicated with a larger sample size. 
Freeman and colleagues (2008) also cite anecdotal evidence taken from patient accounts of 
their experiences that anxiety plays a large part in their day-to-day life. 
It has been argued that anxiety and paranoia share the same psychological processes. 
Firstly, many individuals with persecutory delusions have a thinking style characterised by 
worry (Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
meta-worry processes contribute to the distress associated with paranoid thinking (Freeman et 
al., 2001) and worry has been linked to the persistence of paranoid thinking (Startup et al., 
2007). 
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A second factor shared by both anxiety and paranoia is the presence of safety 
behaviours. Safety behaviours are behaviours carried out in order to prevent a feared 
catastrophe from happening (Salkovskis, 1991 ). This has the important consequence that 
people fail to disconfirm their belief that a catastrophe will occur and the conviction in threat 
beliefs (i.e. paranoid beliefs) is maintained (Freeman et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2008b). 
Thirdly, both anxiety and paranoia have been linked to a bias for threat suggesting 
that both could lead to hypervigilance and a bias for interpreting situations negatively, as in 
the tube ride study (Fear, Sharp & Healy, 1996; Bentall, Kaney & Bowen-Jones, 1995; 
Freeman et al., 2008a). 
It may be that there is a relationship between social anxiety and paranoia because they 
are manifestations of the same construct, or they are separate phenomena caused by the same 
factors, or social anxiety leads to paranoia because they share the same causes and 
psychological process. It is difficult to determine which of these slightly different theories 
may be correct but there is good evidence of a relationship between social anxiety and 
paranoia. 
Rationale for this study 
Many factors, both cognitive and emotional, have been linked to paranoia with 
varying degrees of consistency and mixed results in most areas. These factors include theory 
of mind, attributional bias, jumping to conclusions bias, self-esteem, low mood, generalised 
anxiety and social anxiety. Most studies have looked at potential factors in isolation and 
therefore not ruled out the possibility of an unmeasured confounding variable. The mixed 
findings could be due to the many of factors discussed above, including methodological 
factors and difficulties associated with studying clinical populations. Very few studies have 
examined the relationships of multiple factors with paranoia and the relationships between 
the suggested factors. It seems unlikely that one of the posited factors alone can explain the 
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occurrence of paranoid thinking in every individual person. The evidence suggests that many 
of the factors related to paranoia are linked to one another and that paranoid thinking is 
diverse, meaning it is more likely that a combination of factors can explain the existence of 
paranoid thinking. Therefore a study is needed in the general population, using a large 
sample, using several measures of constructs such as theory of mind to overcome the issues 
of validity and reliability with the established measures, which incorporates measures of 
other potentially confounding and inter-related variables. 
Bentall and colleagues (2009) have used structural equation modelling to establish the 
relationships of different factors with paranoid delusions. They tested 173 participants with 
paranoid thinking with diagnoses of schizophrenia spectrum disorders, depression, or late-
onset schizophrenia-like psychosis and sixty four matched controls. They assessed 
participants on measures of theory of mind, jumping to conclusions, attributional style, IQ, 
mood, anxiety and self-esteem. The model suggests that both pessimistic thinking style (low 
self-esteem, high levels of depression and anxiety) and cognitive performance (lower 
intellectual functioning, poor theory of mind and jumping to conclusions bias) are related to 
paranoia, with the emotion-related processes being more highly correlated (Bentall et al., 
2009). A major strength of this study is the focus on the specific symptom of paranoia across 
diagnostic categories rather than the wider diagnostic category as a whole, meaning it is 
possible to make clearer conclusions about the nature of paranoia itself. This study lends 
support to the theories of paranoia which emphasise the direct link between emotional 
processes and negative thinking and paranoia ( e.g. Freeman, 2007) and also allows the 
potential impact of cognitive factors to be considered. This draws together research in many 
different areas and has implications for the treatment of paranoia as it highlights the benefit 
of treating mood-related factors and using metacognitive skills training to improve cognitive 
reasoning (Bentall et al., 2009). 
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However, there are a number of weaknesses with this study. Firstly this study only 
included one Theory of Mind measure (which is simply described as three theory of mind 
stories) which may not have been validated. The difficulties measuring theory of mind are 
highlighted above and due to the poor validity of measures it is advisable to use at least two 
different measures of theory of mind. Secondly they did not account for social anxiety which 
has been associated with paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002). Finally, they concluded that 
executive functioning is related to paranoia but this was not measured directly. 
Fowler and colleagues (2012) have investigated some of the emotion-related factors 
linked to paranoia and tried to establish which factors cause and maintain paranoia using a 
longitudinal design and path analysis. They found that negative cognition, low self-esteem 
and low mood cause and maintain paranoia and did not find any evidence in the opposite 
direction (Fowler et al., 2012). This is an important step in demonstrating the links between 
emotional factors and paranoia but it did not measure or consider the potential impact of 
cognitive factors such as reasoning biases or theory of mind. Again this study was in the 
clinical population and so it was not possible to rule out the influence of other symptoms. 
It would be advantageous to study the factors related to paranoia in the general 
population. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, it allows for the whole range of 
experience of paranoid thinking to be investigated. The continuum theory of paranoia and 
Freeman and colleagues' (2005) hierarchical model suggest that paranoid thoughts are 
common in the general population and are widespread. This would suggest that paranoid 
thinking is not always pathological and may even be adaptive in some circumstances, for 
example to protect from threat (Bebbington et al., 2013; Freeman, Garety & Fowler, 2008). 
Investigating the processes linked to paranoia in the general population would enhance 
understanding of the whole range of paranoid experiences and is normalising rather than 
pathologising. It also means the potential confounding effect of other symptoms in the 
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clinical population can be ruled out. Furthermore, it enables studies to use larger sample sizes 
than most studies of clinical populations due to the difficulty in recruiting and assessing 
people from the clinical population. (Bebbington et al., 2013; Freeman, 2007). 
One study has attempted to look at the relationship between affective factors 
(insomnia, worry, depression and anxiety) and paranoia in the general population and found 
they all predict the occurrence and persistence of paranoid thinking (Freeman et al., 2012). 
This study did not include the relationships between cognitive components or self-esteem and 
paranoia. 
One study included both cognitive and affective potential factors related to paranoia 
in a sample of 193 undergraduate students (Martin & Penn, 2001 ). Low mood, social anxiety, 
avoidance, evaluation apprehension, self-monitoring and low self-esteem were all 
significantly associated with paranoia but attributional biases were not (Martin & Penn, 
2001 ). However this was not a representative sample of the population as a whole and it did 
not measure other potential cognitive variables such as theory of mind and other reasoning 
biases. 
Another study has argued that poor theory of mind and social anxiety are two distinct 
paths to paranoid thinking and they are not linked (Lysaker et al., 2010). However, the 
method of analysis in this study was questionable because participants were assigned to one 
of four groups (high paranoia, poor ToM; low paranoia, good ToM; high paranoia, high 
middle ToM; low paranoia, low middle ToM) based on arbitrary cut offs which were not 
clinically meaningful. They then found participants in the high paranoia, high-middle ToM, 
group had higher levels of social anxiety and argue that social anxiety is a pathway to 
paranoia that is distinct to low Theory of Mind. However, there are other plausible 
explanations for this finding such as being socially anxious inhibits the use of theory of mind 
abilities due to the reduction in cognitive abilities that is associated with anxiety. Further 
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research is needed in order to determine the relationships between proposed cognitive factors 
affecting paranoia and affective factors , especially social anxiety. 
A model of the development of clinical paranoia has been proposed which includes 
the many posited factors related to paranoia; this is called the threat anticipation model of 
paranoia (Fowler, 2000; Freeman et al., 2002; 2012; Freeman, 2007; Freeman & Freeman, 
2008). This model highlights the importance of both affective and cognitive factors in the 
development of paranoia and the role of internal and external events (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2 - The threat anticipation model of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman 
2007; Freeman & Freeman 2008; Freeman et al., 2008b). 
In summary, some studies have attempted to overcome the limitations of previous 
research in this area by assessing the contribution of several factors to paranoid thinking but 
there have been very few studies which have addressed both cognitive and affective aspects 
in the same study and none which have done this in the general population. Therefore a study 
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looking at the relative associations between the proposed key factors associated with paranoia 
in the general population is needed. Furthermore, the theory that social anxiety and paranoia 
are part of the same hierarchy would suggest that they may share similar causal factors and 
social anxiety may play a key role in the development of paranoid thinking in the general 
population. Therefore it may be that some factors are related to paranoia indirectly through 
social anxiety and an investigation into potential mediating relationships would be helpful in 
understanding how cognitive and affective factors are related to paranoia and each other. 
Aim and research question 
The aim of this study was to contribute to the current understanding of paranoia by 
determining which factors are uniquely related to the experience of paranoia and whether 
there are relationships between the suggested factors. The study aimed to address the 
limitations of previous research by investigating the key factors that have been linked to 
paranoia in previous studies in a sample drawn from the general population. 
The specific research questions were: (1) "What cognitive and affective factors are 
uniquely associated with the experience of paranoia in the general population?" (2) "Do 
affective factors mediate the relationship between cognitive factors and paranoia or do 
cognitive factors mediate the relationship between affective factors and paranoia? 
Hypotheses 
There are two potential mediation models based on the theories and evidence outlined 
above. Firstly, cognitive variables such as theory of mind and reasoning biases may be related 
to paranoia and that this relationship is mediated by affective factors such as anxiety, social 
anxiety and low mood. This model is presented in Figure 3. 
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1. Social Anxiety 
2. Generalised Anxiety 
3. LowMood 
1. Cognitive Theory of Mind 
2. Emotional Theory of Mind 
3. Jumping to Conclusions Bias 
C Paranoia 
4. Externalising Bias 
5. Personalising Bias c' 
6. SelfEsteem 
Figure 3 - the first proposed mediation model of the relationships between cognitive factors, 
social anxiety and paranoia. 
The specific hypotheses based on this model were: 
a) The cognitive variables (cognitive and emotional Theory of Mind, Jumping to 
conclusions bias, externalising bias, personalising bias, and self-esteem) will 
significantly predict social anxiety, generalised anxiety and low mood - Path A 
b) Affective variables (social anxiety, generalised anxiety, and low mood) will 
significantly predict paranoia, whilst controlling for the influence of each of the 
cognitive variables - Path B 
c) The cognitive variables will significantly predict paranoia - Path C 
d) The above will no longer been the case when controlling for affective variables - Path 
C' 
Alternatively, it could be that feeling socially anxious, anxious or depressed leads to 
cognitive deficits such as poor theory of mind and reasoning biases and this leads to paranoia. 
This model was also tested (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 - the second proposed mediation model of the relationships between cognitive 
factors, social anxiety and paranoia. 
The specific hypotheses based on this model were: 
a) Affective variables (social anxiety, generalised anxiety, low mood) will significantly 
predict the cognitive variables ( cognitive and emotional theory of mind, jumping to 
conclusions bias, externalising bias, personalising bias and self-esteem) - Path A 
b) The cognitive variables will significantly predict paranoia, whilst controlling for the 
influence of each of the affective variables - Path B 
c) Social anxiety, generalised anxiety and low mood will significantly predict paranoia 
-PathC 
d) The above will no longer been the case when controlling for the cognitive variables -
Path C' 
METHOD 
Design 
This study used a cross-sectional design with a self-selected sample from the general 
population. The dependent variable was the level of paranoia. The independent variables 
were cognitive Theory of Mind, affective Theory of Mind, Jumping to Conclusions Bias, 
Externalising Bias, Personalising Bias, Depression, Anxiety, Social Anxiety, and Self-Esteem 
(all measured by self-report questionnaires). The variables were selected to match those used 
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in Bentall and colleagues' (2009) study and also to include aspects of the threat anticipation 
model of paranoia, such as social anxiety (Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman 2007; Freeman & 
Freeman 2008; Freeman et al., 2008b ). 
Participants 
Recruitment. This study recruited participants from the general population using an 
online survey. An advertisement was placed on the social networking sites Facebook and 
Twitter, the advertising website Gumtree, and mental health charities such as Sane also 
advertised the study using their social networking pages on Facebook and Twitter. This was 
in order to obtain participants with a wide range of paranoia scores in order to avoid floor or 
ceiling effects. Higher levels of paranoia have been found in inner city areas (Freeman, 2007) 
and for this reason recruitment was targeted at people from these areas, using the website 
Gumtree, as this enabled inner city locations to be specified. See Appendix 1 for the 
recruitment advertisement. 
Inclusion/exclusion criteria. The study was open to all. However, participants were 
excluded from the analysis if they completed the measures too quickly (within 30 minutes, as 
calculated by the author timing how long it took to complete the questionnaires as quickly as 
possible whilst paying attention). No participants were excluded on these grounds. 
Sample size estimates. Green ( 1991) advocates the "rule of thumb" that sample size 
== 104 + the number of independent variables. This suggested a sample size of 119 was 
needed to obtain a power of 80% to detect a medium effect size at the 5% level using a 2-
sided test as this study has 15 independent variables. The exact effect sizes expected were not 
known as most existing studies in this area have not used the same measures, or method of 
analysis, or population, as this study so a medium effect size was assumed. One study which 
combined measures of some cognitive and affective factors in the student population found 
large effects (t = 0.59) using multiple regression analysis (Martin & Penn, 2001). Fritz and 
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MacK.innon (2007) suggest a sample size of 76 is needed for mediation analyses to detect 
medium effects in both pathways. Therefore it was aimed to recruit at least 119 participants. 
Participant information. Participants were anonymous and were not asked to give 
any identifying information. 255 participants began and 151 participants aged 18-70 (M 34. 7, 
SD 12.29) completed the online survey. Of these 125 (83%) were female, 145 (96%) were 
White, 75 (49.7%) were married, in a civil partnership or living with a partner, 99 (65.6%) 
were employed and 58 (38.4%) had a diagnosis of a mental health condition. 
Ethical Considerations 
This project was given favourable ethical opinion by the Surrey University Faculty of 
Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee. Participants were asked to read a detailed 
information sheet and to give consent to take part in the study. It was made clear that they 
could withdraw at any time by closing their web browser. Participants were made aware the 
study may address sensitive issues in the information screen. Participants were given 
information on where they could seek support if the study caused them any distress in the 
debrief screen shown at the end of the study. They were also informed that their responses 
were anonymous and no identifying information was collected and that the data would be 
stored securely and retained for a period of ten years. See appendix for the letter of 
favourable ethical opinion and copies of the participant information sheet, consent screen and 
debrief information. 
Measures 
Measures were selected based on the following criteria: 
• Reliability- good internal consistency indicated by an acceptable level of Cronbach' s 
alpha (over 0.7) 
• Widely used within the field 
• Acceptable face and content validity 
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• Brevity - as this was a large survey with many different measures 
• Available in a computerised format 
See appendix 6 for copies of all measures. 
Paranoia. This was measured using the Paranoia Checklist (Freeman et al., 2005). 
This is a multi-dimensional measure that assesses three aspects of paranoia (frequency, 
preoccupation and distress). There are 18 items in which participants are given a thought and 
asked to rate how often they have had it, how much they believe it, and how distressing they 
found that thought on a five point scale. It has excellent internal reliability (Cronbach's alpha 
of 0.9 or above for all three scales) and good convergent validity when compared to other 
measures of paranoia, including the Paranoia Scale (Freeman et al., 2005). It is used widely 
in research into paranoia in the general population. In the current study Cronbach's alpha for 
the frequency scale was 0.96; for the preoccupation scale was 0.95 and for the distress scale 
was 0.97. 
Theory of Mind. There is currently a paucity of measures of Theory of Mind for 
adults with robust psychometric properties (see appendix 7 for a review). After a thorough 
literature search of the available measures and consultation with an expert in adult Theory of 
Mind (Deeley, personal communication) two of the most widely used tests of adult Theory of 
Mind were decided upon due to their sensitivity to differences in adults in the general 
population, the ease of use, and the fact they reportedly capture different aspects of theory of 
mind. Furthermore, an unpublished measure of more complex theory of mind skills in 
vignettes approximating real-life dilemmas was also used in this study. 
1. Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright and Hill, 2001; Baron-Cohen, 2004). This measure presents 36 pictures of 
people's eyes and asks participants to identify which emotion the person pictured is 
experiencing from a list of four choices. One point is awarded for each correct answer 
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leading to a total score out of 36. This test has been found to be sensitive to subtle theory 
of mind differences in adults and adolescents (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001; Baron-Cohen, 2004). Internal consistency estimates have been reported to range 
from poor to acceptable with Cronbach's alphas of between 0.48 and 0.70 in different 
studies (summarised in Vellante et al., 2013 and Kirkland et al., 2013). 
2. Strange Stories (Happe, 1994). This test presents stories in which an individual says 
something they do not literally mean. An example of a story is: 
Simon is a big liar. Simon's brother Jim knows this, he knows that (1) Simon never tells 
the truth! Now yesterday Simon stole Jim's Ping-Pong paddle, and Jim knows that Simon 
has hidden it somewhere, though he can't find it. He's very cross. So he finds Simon and he 
says, "Where is my Ping-Pong paddle? You must have hidden it either in the cupboard of 
under your bed?" Simon tells him the paddle is under his bed. 
Q: Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the paddle? 
The original set of 24 stories contained 12 story types with two examples of each type. 
The subset of the four most challenging stories for adults was used (Fletcher et al., 1995; 
White et al., 2009) in this study. These stories included: misunderstanding, double bluff, 
persuasion and white lies (see appendix for the items and scoring). This subset of stories has 
been found to be sensitive to Theory of Mind differences in neurotypical adults. There is 
good correlation between this smaller selection of stories and the original 24 item test which 
gives evidence of the construct validity of these items (White et al., 2009). Further evidence 
of construct validity is that it correlates highly with a theory of mind battery of tests (White et 
al., 2009). This test is reported to have good inter-rater reliability (White et al., 2009) but 
there are no other reported reliability statistics such as Cronbach's alpha. In this study 
Cronbach's alpha was 0.39 which is poor. 
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3. Novel Test of Social Cognition (Gulliver, 2008, unpublished). In this test participants are 
first presented with a social dilemma and asked why they thought the protagonist acted in 
such a way. They are then given further information and asked more questions about this 
situation, including what they would do or what they would advise a friend. This measure 
was designed to overcome some of the methodological flaws in current tests of theory of 
mind. It was designed to test participants' use of their theory of mind skills in complex 
real-life situations. It has three scales, perspective taking, accuracy/plausibility, and 
empathy. This has been validated in a previously unpublished study and was found to 
have good internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha's of 0. 76 - 0.89, good inter-rater 
reliability (significant intraclass correlations coefficients ofr = 0.72 tor= 0.96) and good 
face validity (Gulliver, 2008, unpublished). A subset of the four most reliable and valid 
vignettes was taken from this test by selecting the four items that correlated most strongly 
with other measures of theory of mind, with the best item to total scale correlations, and 
with the most variation within the item. Cronbach's alpha for the total of all scales in this 
study was 0.8. 
An example of one of the vignettes is: 
Info: A woman has an unwanted pregnancy. She decides not to have an abortion. 
Question: Why might she decide this? 
Info: She is a Roman Catholic. The Catholic Church strong prohibits abortion. 
Question: What would you advise and how would you feel in this situation if you shared the 
woman's belief that abortion is wrong, and were a friend of hers? 
Question: Do you consider abortion to be morally wrong? 
Participants' responses to each item are given a score of 0- 2 on each scale, giving a 
maximum score of 8 for each scale (see Appendix 8 for scoring criteria). 
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Jumping to Conclusions Bias. The Beads Task was used to measure jumping to 
conclusions bias (Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991). In this task participants are shown two 
jars, one with 85 black beads and 15 yellow beads in and one with 85 yellow beads and 15 
black in. They are told that one of the jars has been chosen. They are then presented with one 
bead and asked either to guess which jar the beads came from or to see another bead. The 
outcome measure is how many beads the participant asks to see before making a guess as to 
which jar was chosen. This task has been found to accurately discriminate between people 
with and without paranoia and is widely used (Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991 ). 
Attributional Bias. The Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire 
(IPSAQ) was used to assess attributional bias (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). This is a 32-item 
questionnaire in which participants are asked to give a cause for a situation, for example "a 
neighbour invited you in for a drink", and say whether the cause is due to something about 
them, someone else, or the situation/circumstances. This questionnaire was specifically 
designed to measure attributional style in people with paranoia in the general population. 
Externalising Bias (EB) is calculated by subtracting the number of internal attributions for 
negative events from the number of internal attributions for positive events. The potential 
range of the EB score is -16 to + 16 with EB scores of above 0 indicating a "self-serving" 
bias. Personalising Bias (PB) is calculated by dividing the total number of personal 
attributions for negative events by the sum of the total personal and situations attributions for 
negative events. A PB score above 0.5 suggests the tendency to use personal rather than 
situational external attributions for negative events (more likely to blame other people than 
the situation). 
The IPSAQ has acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha for EB a= 0.72, 
and PB a= 0.76). EB and PB have been found to be unrelated (Spearman's r = - 0.14, p = 
0.21) (Kinderman & Ben tall, 1996). The EB scale has been found to correlate highly with the 
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internal scale of the ASQ (Spearman's r = 0.39, P < 0.002) and scores on the PB scale can be 
predicted by BDI score(~= 0.85, t = 3.32, P < 0.002) which demonstrates good convergent 
validity (Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). In this study Cronbach's alpha for the overall measure 
was 0.84. 
Mood. The PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009) was used to measure depression. This is an 
eight-item questionnaire which asks participants to rate how often they have experienced a 
symptom over the past two weeks. The responses are rated on a four-point scale: "not at all, 
several days, more than half the days, and nearly every day". It is a variation of the widely-
used PHQ-9 which is used in primary care settings. The PHQ-8 was chosen over the PHQ-9 
because the PHQ-8 does not contain the item on suicidality. It was thought unethical to ask 
about suicidality when no further support could be offered to participants and participants' 
responses were anonymous. The PHQ-8 has good face validity and reliability (Cronbach's 
alpha= 0.86) and is sensitive to differences in severity (Kroenke et al., 2009). Cronbach's 
alpha in this study was 0.93. 
Anxiety. The GAD-7 (Spitzer et al., 2006) was used to measure generalised anxiety. 
This is a seven-item questionnaire which asks participants to rate how often they have 
experienced a symptom over the past two weeks. The responses are made on a four-point 
scale "not at all, several days, more than half the days, and nearly every day". This is brief 
and widely used in the general population. Cronbach's alpha for this scale has been reported 
as 0.92 and it has good test-retest reliability (intraclass correlations with Mental Health 
Practitioner-administered version of the same scale= 0.83) (Spitzer et al., 2006). In the 
current study Cronbach's alpha was 0.95. 
Social Anxiety. This was measured using the Mattick and Clarke (1998) Social 
Phobia Scale (SPS) and Social Interaction Anxiety Scales (SIAS). These are two 20 item 
scales in which participants are asked to rate how much the statement is characteristic of 
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them from 0 (not at all) to 4 ( extremely). The two scales measure two different aspects of 
social anxiety and therefore it is recommended both are used (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
These have high levels of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha= 0.94 for both scales) and 
test-retest reliability and have been shown to discriminate between social anxiety and other 
clinical symptoms such as generalised anxiety and depression (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
They also have good convergent validity when compared with other measures of social 
anxiety (for example the social phobia subscale of the Marks and Mathews (1979) Fear 
Questionnaire) (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). In this study Cronbach's alpha was 0.96 for the 
SPS and 0.90 for the SIAS. 
Self-esteem. This was measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 
1965). This is a widely used easy to administer brief measure used to assess individual self-
esteem. It has ten items and participants have to rate how much they agree with the statement 
on a 4-point scale. This measure has had numerous psychometric analyses which suggest 
acceptable to high internal reliability and good test-retest reliability (Gray-Little, Williams 
and Hancock, 1997). In this study Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.92 for the positive 
items and 0.89 for the negative items. 
Demographics. Information on age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, employment and 
educational achievement was collected. There were also optional questions on mental health 
diagnosis, drug and alcohol use at the end of the online survey. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited through advertising and charity websites and redirected to 
the study website. They were then asked to read an information sheet and consent to take part 
in the study before proceeding. Firstly demographic questions were presented as these were 
thought to be a gentle introduction to the study. The paranoia checklist was then presented as 
this was the most important questionnaire as it was the focus of the study. Then the measures 
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of all the independent variables were presented in an order that gave some variation in the 
type of response needed (free text response or selection of set responses, visual or verbal 
information). This was in order to prevent fatigue or boredom of the participants as there 
were a number of measures to complete. The full set of measures in the order presented can 
be found in Appendix 6. The study took approximately 45 minutes to complete. Participants 
were free to withdraw at any time by closing their web browser. At the end of the study 
participants were shown a debrief screen which provided them with further information on 
the study and also gave them contact details of where they could find support if necessary. 
See Appendices 3- 5 for the information, consent and debrief screens. 
Planned Data Analysis 
Data was analysed using the statistics package SPSS. The raw data was screened for 
missing data and all cases with missing data were removed. Means, standard deviations and 
distribution of each scale were calculated and checked for normality. If the assumptions of 
parametric tests were not met then non-parametric statistics were used. Initially correlations 
were calculated between each independent variable and the dependent variable separately. 
Then hierarchical multiple regression analyses were carried out in three steps. Firstly the 
demographic variables that have been linked to paranoia were entered (age, gender, years in 
education); then the cognitive variables (theory of mind, attributional bias, jumping to 
conclusions bias, and self-esteem); and then the affective variables were entered (depression, 
generalised anxiety, and social anxiety) into the model. If some of the variables predicted 
paranoia when entered into the model alone but then stopped being significant when other 
variables are entered into the model then this would be suggestive of potential mediation 
relationships. Mediation analyses were then planned using the following models based on the 
. reading of the literature: 
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1. Social Anxiety 
2. Generalised Anxiety 
3. LowMood b 
1. Cognitive Theory of Mind 
2. Emotional Theory of Mind 
3. Jumping to Conclusions Bias 
C 
Paranoia 
4. Externalising Bias 
5. Personalising Bias c' 
6. Self Esteem 
Figure 5 - the first proposed mediation model of the relationships between cognitive factors, 
social anxiety and paranoia. 
1. Cognitive Theory of Mind 
2. Emotional Theory of Mind 
3. Jumping to Conclusions Bias 
a/ , _4_. _E_x_t_em_a_li-si_n_g_B_i_as _______ __,J / _ 5. Personalising Bias 
1. Social Anxiety 
2. Generalised Anxiety 
C 
-------------------------3> Paranoia 
3. LowMood c' 
Figure 6- the second proposed mediation model of the relationships between cognitive 
factors, social anxiety and paranoia. 
RESULTS 
Descriptives and distribution of the data 
Table 1 shows the mean, standard deviation and distribution of each of the scales used 
in the study. This data was tested for normal distribution using the Shapiro-Wilk test as it is 
more powerful than the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test (NIST, 2008; Field and Hole, 2003). 
Significant deviations from normality are shown in bold. No scales were normally distributed 
and therefore non-parametric tests were used for the analysis. 
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Table t - Mean, Standard Deviation and distribution of the data. 
Variable Minimum Maximum Possible Mean Standard w Sig. 
Range Deviation 
Paranoia 0 70 0-72 15.02 17.23 0.793 0.000 
Checklist 
Frequency 
Scale 
Paranoia 0 72 0-72 17.87 17.31 0.804 0.000 
Checklist 
Conviction 
Scale 
Paranoia 0 72 0-72 16.68 18.58 0.787 0.000 
Checklist 
Distress Scale 
Paranoia 0 214 0-216 48.58 51.93 0.795 0.000 
Checklist total 
Reading the 11 34 0-36 26.33 3.76 0.949 0.000 
Mind in the 
Eyes 
1 10 1-10 5.37 3.12 Beads task 0.892 0.000 
total draws 
Self-esteem 0 30 0-30 15.62 6.71 0.977 0.014 
Strange Stories 0 8 0-8 6.44 1.40 0.864 0.000 
TCSC 4 8 0-8 7.51 0.87 0.618 0.000 
accuracy scale 
0-8 4.32 TCSCEE 0 8 1.85 0.963 0.000 
Scale 
TCSC PT scale 3 8 0-8 6.87 1.27 0.820 0.000 
Externalising -13 14 -16 - +16 0.95 4.91 0.960 0.000 
bias 
Personalising 0 1 0-1 0.62 0.27 0.955 0.000 
bias 
PHQ8 0 24 0-24 8.54 7.14 0.882 0.000 
GAD7 0 21 0-21 6.66 6.44 0.844 0.000 
SPS 0 76 0-80 21.08 18.44 0.856 0.000 
SIAS 6 65 0-76 27.68 14.17 0.913 0.000 
TCSC - Test of complex social cognition 
EE - Emotional Empathy scale 
PT - Perspective Taking scale 
SPS - Social Phobia Scale 
SIAS - Social interaction anxiety scale 
w _ Shapiro-Wilk test statistic 
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The paranoia checklist would not be expected to be normally distributed as it is likely 
that only a small proportion of the general population would experience very high levels of 
paranoia and a large proportion of the population would be expected to experience no 
paranoia or low-levels of paranoia. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the paranoia checklist 
total scores which are skewed towards the baseline as expected. The means and standard 
deviations of the paranoia checklist scales are similar to those found by Freeman and 
colleagues (2005) so it is likely that the distribution of scores on the paranoia checklist 
accurately reflects the occurrence of paranoia in the general population. Similarly it could be 
expected that the measures of mood and anxiety and cognitive factors would not be normally 
distributed and would be skewed towards the "normal" range, in most cases thi is the 
baseline but for the self-esteem and theory of mind measures this is the ceiling. The 
distribution of scores on all scales is skewed in the direction expected. Predictor variable do 
not need to be normally distributed for multiple regression analyses what is important is that 
the residuals from the regression analysis are normally distributed (Field, 2013) . 
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paranoia checklist tot.ii 
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Figure 7 - distribution of the paranoia checklist total scores. 
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Drop outs 
I 04 participants ( 41 % ) dropped out of the study. There were no differences between 
those who dropped out and completed the survey on demographic variables (such as age, 
gender, years in education) and scores on the paranoia checklist (see appendix 9). As there 
were no significant differences between those who dropped out and those who completed the 
survey, the data from those who dropped out was excluded from the analysis. This was the 
most rigorous way of managing missing data and the study was still adequately powered 
when these cases were removed. This avoided making any inferences about those people who 
dropped out. It also avoided the possibility of duplicate cases if people were unable to 
complete the survey and then completed it at a later date. 
Correlations between variables 
Spearman's rho correlations were calculated between scores on the paranoia checklist and all 
other variables (see table 2). The total paranoia checklist scores were significantly correlated 
with age, self-esteem, Test of complex social cognition accuracy and perspective taking 
scales (Theory of Mind), externalising bias, low mood (PHQ-8), anxiety (GAD-7), and both 
measures of social anxiety. Years in education, reading the mind in the eyes, total draws on 
the beads task, and personalising bias were not significantly correlated with paranoia and so 
were not included in the multiple regression analysis. 
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Table 2 - Spearrnan's Rho correlation coefficients between all variables and the 
paranoia checklist scales 
Variable 
Paranoia Checklist frequency 
scale 
Paranoia Checklist conviction 
scale 
Paranoia Checklist distress scale 
Paranoia Checklist total 
Age 
Years in education 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Beads task total draws 
Self-esteem 
Strange Stories 
Test of Complex Social Cognition 
accuracy scale 
Test of Complex Social Cognition 
Emotional Empathy scale 
Test of Complex Social Cognition 
Perspective Taking scale 
Total Cognitive Theory of Mind 
scale (Test of complex social 
cognition scales plus strange 
stories) 
Externalising Bias 
Personalising Bias 
PHQ8 
GAD7 
SPS 
SIAS 
Paranoia 
Checklist 
frequency 
scale 
0.865** 
0.834** 
0.921 ** 
-0.290** 
-0.130 
-0.149 
0.037 
-0.568** 
-0.065 
-0.255** 
-0.145** 
-0.219** 
-0.ls* 
-0.317** 
0.097 
0.698** 
0.635** 
0.794** 
0.720** 
* - r is significant at the p=0.05 level 
** - r is significant at the p=0.01 level 
Paranoia 
Checklist 
conviction 
scale 
1 
0.921** 
0.976*"' 
-0.229** 
-0.145 
-0.134 
-0.060 
-0.528** 
-0.059 
-0.212•• 
-0.111 
-0.202* 
-0.15 
-0.265** 
0.084 
0.593** 
0.588** 
0.760** 
0.656** 
Paranoia 
Checklist 
distress 
scale 
1 
0.962** 
-0.217** 
-0.106 
-0.088 
-0.071 
-0.490** 
-0.028 
-0.195** 
-0.045 
-0.132 
-0.08 
-0.237** 
0.082 
0.559** 
0.598** 
0.745** 
0.654** 
Paranoia 
Checklist total 
1 
-0.256** 
-0.135 
-0.125 
-0.037 
-0.552** 
-0.054 
-0.260** 
-0.101 
-0.191 * 
-0.14 
-0.287** 
0.080 
0.629** 
0.614** 
0.789** 
0.700** 
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The effect of gender 
Independent samples T-tests were used to investigate gender differences on all the 
independent variables. Table 3 shows the t-test results. There were no significant differences 
between males' and females' scores on the paranoia checklist. There were significant gender 
differences in jumping to conclusions, with men making a choice sooner than women, and 
significant differences in some of the theory of mind scales, including strange stories and the 
test of social cognition scales, with men scoring lower on average than women. Due to these 
differences between males and females, gender was included in the regression analysis. 
Table 3 -Mann-Whitney U tests comparing mean scores of males and females on each 
measure 
Variable Males (N=25) Females u p 
{N=126} 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Paranoia Checklist total 51.96 56.51 49.10 51.20 1548.0 .89 
Reading the Mind in the eyes 25.36 4.10 26.52 3.67 1329.0 .25 
Beads task total draws 3.96 2.30 5.65 3.20 1116.0 .02 
PHQ-8 8.36 6.92 8.57 7.20 1554.5 .92 
GAD-7 6.68 6.10 6.66 6.52 1456.5 .55 
SPS 17.84 15.68 21.72 18.93 1386.0 .34 
SIAS 25.84 13.26 28.04 14.37 1462.0 .57 
Self-Esteem 16.80 6.23 15.38 6.80 1418.0 .43 
Strange Stories 5.56 1.58 6.61 1.30 946.5 .00 
Test of Complex Social 7.08 1.19 7.60 .77 1197.0 .02 
Cognition accuracy scale 
Test of complex social 6.16 1.57 7.01 1.17 1083.0 .01 
cognition perspective 
taking scale 
Test of complex social 3.56 1.90 4.48 1.81 1148.5 .03 
cognition emotional 
empathy scale 
-0.20 4.282 1.10 5.06 Externalising Bias 1272.5 .13 
Personalisin~ Bias 0.60 0.31 0.62 0.26 1508.5 .83 
Significant differences are shown in bold 
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The effect of substance abuse 
Mann-Whitney U tests also demonstrated differences in scores on the paranoia 
checklist between those who answered "yes" or "no" to the questions about drug and alcohol 
use. Those who had used drugs and regularly used alcohol scored higher on average on the 
paranoia checklist than those who had not (see table 4). For this reason drug and alcohol use 
were included as possible predictors in the multiple regression analysis. 
Table 4 - Mann-Whitney U tests comparing scores on the paranoia checklist for those 
who answered yes to using drugs or alcohol 
Variable N Mean paranoia u p 
checklist score 
"Have you ever used drugs or inhaled Yes 68 63.84 
1930.5 .002 
substances to get high, feel elated or get 
No 81 38.35 
a buzz?" 
"Have you ever needed to drink a Yes 29 94.72 
710.0 .000 
significant amount of alcohol to get you 
No 122 38.84 
through the day?" Yes or No 
NB answering these questions was optional so N does not total 151 for each question. 
Relationships between independent variables 
Spearman's rho correlation coefficients were calculated for the relationship between 
each independent variable (see appendix 10). These variables were then tested for 
multicollinearity in a preliminary multiple regression analysis including all the independent 
variables and by examining the tolerance and VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) for each 
variable. A general rule is that a tolerance of less than 0.2 and a VIF of above 5 is 
problematic (O'Brien, 2007). The only problematic variable was the Social Phobia Scale 
which had a tolerance of 0.16 and a VIF of 6.14. This was most likely due to the shared 
variance with the other social anxiety measure (SIAS).This variable was therefore removed 
from the analysis. 
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Theory of Mind measures 
The Cognitive Theory of Mind measures (Strange stories and test of complex social 
cognition scales) were highly correlated with each other and therefore could possibly have 
caused instability in the multiple regression models. Therefore the scores for the three scales 
from the test of complex social cognition and the strange stories total were added together 
and included in the analysis as one total cognitive theory of mind scale. This scale had 
acceptable internal consistency with a Cronbach's alpha score of 0.71 which was an 
improvement on the internal consistency of the measures separately. 
Regression analysis 
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was carried out to predict paranoia. In 
order to make the regression analysis more robust and to avoid violations of the assumptions 
of regression, bootstrapping of 1000 samples was performed, as recommended by Field 
(2013) (see appendix 11 for discussion of how the data meets the assumptions of multiple 
regression analysis). A hierarchical approach was taken to the multiple regression analysis 
with the demographic variables added first, then the cognitive variables then the affective 
variables. An alternative method was also carried out in which the affective variables were 
entered at the second stage and the cognitive variables were entered at the third stage. This 
method was chosen in order to assess the contribution of each of the variables and to test for 
possible mediation effects using a logical approach. 
On the first step the demographic variables age, gender, drug and alcohol use were 
entered into the model. In this model alcohol and drug use significantly predicted paranoia 
(see table 5) (R2 = .22). The negative beta values indicate that those who answered yes to 
alcohol and drug use were experiencing higher levels of paranoia. 
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Table 5 - Linear model of predictors of scores on the paranoia checklist with 95% bias 
corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses. 
b SEB p p 
Constant 184.24 24.22 .00 I 
(136.79, 234.94) 
Age -0.29 0.32 -.069 .355 
(-0.83, 0.28) 
Gender -0.43 9.63 -.003 .967 
(-18.17, 17.66) 
Alcohol Use -53.86 10.89 -.405 .001 
(-75.00, -32.22) 
Drug Use -16.87 8.47 -.162 .049 
(-35.09, 2.060) 
On the second step all the cognitive variables that were significantly correlated with 
paranoia were entered into the model including the total of the cognitive theory of mind 
measures, externalising bias, and self-esteem. The second model explained significantly more 
of the variance than the first model (R2 = .49, ll. R2 = .26, p < 0.001) and had showed a large 
effect size (:F = 0.96). Alcohol use, drug use, cognitive theory of mind, self-esteem, and 
externalising bias significantly predicted paranoia (see table 6). Lower levels of theory of 
mind, lower self-esteem and less externalising bias were linked to increased paranoia. 
Table 6 - Linear model of predictors of scores on the paranoia checklist, with 95% bias 
corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses. 
b SEB p 
Constant 245.18 33.06 .001 (179.99, 302.13) 
Age 0.01 0.30 .003 .975 (-0.54, 0.60) 
Gender -8.17 8.61 -.06 .338 (-25.15, 7.99) 
Alcohol use -31.83 10.75 -.24 .003 (-53.79, -10.20 ) 
Drug Use -14.98 7.00 -.14 .039 (-29.64,-0.741) 
Self Esteem -2.55 0.65 -.33 .001 (-3.88, -1.37) 
Externalising Bias -2.55 1.04 -.24 .018 (-4. 73, -0.42) 
Cognitive Theory of Mind -2.52 0.79 -.20 .002 
(Composite score of ToM measures) (-3.97, -0.78) 
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On the third step all the emotional variables were entered into the model ( depression, 
anxiety, Social interaction anxiety scale). The third model explained significantly more of the 
variance than the second model (R2 = 0.73, LlR2 = 0.25, p < 0.001) with a large effect size (F 
= 0.89). In this model anxiety (GAD-7 scores), social anxiety (social interaction anxiety scale 
scores), and cognitive theory of mind, predicted scores on the paranoia checklist (see table 7). 
Higher levels of generalised anxiety and social anxiety were linked to increased paranoia and 
poorer theory of mind abilities were linked to increased paranoia. 
Table 7 - Linear model of predictors of scores on the paranoia checklist with 95% bias 
corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses. 
b SEB p p 
Constant 60.47 32.48 .053 (-4.89, 116.11) 
Age 0.15 0.27 .04 .498 (-.29, 0.58) 
Gender -1.73 6.20 -.01 .792 (-12.56, 9.28) 
Alcohol Use -13.42 8.22 -.10 .103 (-28.56, 2.67) 
Drug Use -8.06 5.03 -.08 .124 (-19.17, 3.13) 
Self Esteem -0.01 0.47 -.001 .983 (-0.95, 0.82) 
Externalising Bias -1.02 0.68 -.10 .135 (-2.45, 0.55) 
Cognitive Theory of Mind -1.47 0.60 -.12 .016 
(-2.67, -0.08) 
Social anxiety 1.64 
(1.01, 2.23) 
0.33 .45 .001 
Anxiety 3.10 0.68 .39 .001 (1.93, 4.22) 
Low Mood -0.61 0.69 -.08 .370 (-2.10, 1.12) 
Significant predictors of paranoia for each model are shown in bold 
This analysis was repeated with the emotional variables entered at step 2 and the 
cognitive variables entered at step 3. This resulted in the same final model at step 3 and the 
addition of the cognitive variables caused a significant although small change in R2 (R2 = 
0.73, AR2 = 0.017, p = 0.039). See appendix 11 for tables summarising the alternative model. 
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Mediation analyses 
When the emotional variables were added into the multiple regression analysis some 
of the other variables (self-esteem, externalising bias) no longer significantly predicted scores 
on the paranoia checklist and others had less of an effect (theory of mind). Furthermore, 
scores on the paranoia checklist were highly correlated with scores on the measures of social 
anxiety in particular. It seems that the emotional variables have an effect on the relationship 
between cognitive variables and paranoia. It is possible that the cognitive variables predict 
paranoia due to the strong relationship between anxiety, especially social anxiety, and 
paranoia. Therefore two mediation models were tested, firstly the indirect effect of cognitive 
variables (cognitive theory of mind, externalising bias, and self-esteem) on paranoia through 
anxiety and social anxiety and secondly the indirect effect of anxiety and social anxiety on 
paranoia through the impact on the cognitive variables. The previously hypothesised 
mediation models were modified according to the results of the multiple regression analysis 
to exclude the variables that had no significant relationship with paranoia and to include 
anxiety as a possible mediator due to the significant relationship between anxiety and 
paranoia. Mediation analyses were conducted using the PROCESS program for SPSS (Hayes, 
2014) using the method described by Hayes (2013). 
1. Cognitive Theory of Mind 
2. Externalising Bias 
3. SelfEsteem 
Social 
Anxiety (M1) 
c' 
Anxiety (M2) 
Figure 8 - Mediation Model 1 
Paranoia 
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Table 8 - Regression coefficients, Standard Errors and Model Summary for the 
multiple mediation model of cognitive variables on paranoia through social anxiety and 
anxiety (figure 8). 
Pathway 
M 1 (Social anxiety) M2 (Anxiety) Y (Paranoia) 
Independent Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE 
variable 
Theory of Mind a1 -0.41 0.20 .038 a2 -0.14 0.10 .173 c' -1.55 0.56 
Self-Esteem a1 -1.23 0.14 .000 a2 -0.46 0.07 .000 c' 0.09 0.48 
Externalising a1 -0.50 0.19 .010 a2 -0.26 0.10 .009 c' -0.76 0.55 
bias 
Anxiety b1 3.05 0.57 
Social Anxiety b2 1.69 0.29 
Model R
2
-0.495 R2 -0.611 R2 = 0.847 
p 
.006 
.846 
.165 
.000 
.000 
Summary F(3,147) = 48.09, p < 0.001 F(3,147) = 29.24, p < 0.001 F(S,145) = 73.80, p < 0.001 
There was a significant direct effect of theory of mind on paranoia when social 
anxiety and generalised anxiety were controlled for. There was a significant relationship 
between theory of mind and social anxiety (a1 path) but not between theory of mind and 
generalised anxiety (a2 path). 
There was no significant direct effect of externalising bias on paranoia once social 
anxiety and generalised anxiety were controlled for. There was a significant relationship 
between externalising bias and social anxiety (a1 path) and generalised anxiety (a2 path). 
There was no significant direct effect of self-esteem on paranoia. There was a 
significant relationship between self-esteem and social anxiety (a1 path) and generalised 
anxiety (a2 path). 
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There were significant relationships between social anxiety and paranoia (b 1 path) and 
generalised anxiety and paranoia (b2 path). 
The overall indirect effect of the cognitive variables (theory of mind, externalising 
bias and self-esteem) on paranoia through social anxiety was significant (as the bootstrapping 
confidence intervals did not cross zero, see table 9) suggesting a mediation relationship. 
There was no significant overall indirect effect of the cognitive variables on paranoia through 
generalised anxiety (as the bootstrapping confidence intervals cross zero) despite significant 
relationships between the cognitive variables and generalised anxiety and between 
generalised anxiety and paranoia. 
Table 9 - Total Indirect Effects and bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for 
each of the proposed pathways between the cognitive variables and paranoia through 
social anxiety and generalised anxiety. 
Indirect Bootstrap SE Bootstrap Lower Bootstrap Upper 
Effect Confidence Interval Confidence Interval 
Total -1.12 0.66 -2.35 0.20 
Social anxiety -0.70 0.39 -1.59 -0.01 
Generalised Anxiety -0.42 0.37 -1.25 0.21 
Significant indirect effects are highlighted in bold 
There is no estimate of effect size as this cannot be calculated for models with 
multiple independent variables (Hayes, 2013). 
Mediation analysis was also conducted to test an alternative mediation model 
presented in figure 9. 
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/I._ _1_. _C_o_gn-it-iv_e_Th_e_o_ry_o_f_M_in_d ____ ____, 
Social Anxiety 
Anxiety c' 
2. Externalising Bias 
3. SelfEsteem 
Figure 9 - Mediation model 2 
Paranoia 
The total direct effect of anxiety and social anxiety on paranoia, when 
controlling for the effect of the cognitive variables in the model, is significant and therefore 
the influence of social anxiety and anxiety on paranoia is not based on the relationship 
between the cognitive variables on paranoia. 
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Table 10- Regression coefficients, Standard Errors and Model Summary for the multiple mediation model of emotional variables on 
paranoia through theory of mind, self-esteem and externalising bias (figure 9). 
Independent 
Variable 
Anxiety 
Social Anxiety 
Theory of Mind 
Externalising bias 
Self-Esteem 
Model 
Summary 
M 1 (Theory of Mind) 
Coeff. SE p 
a, 0.004 0.08 .962 
a, -0.06 0.04 .153 
R2= 0.032 
F(2,148) = 2.45, p = 0.09 
Pathway 
M2 (Externalising Bias) M3 (Self-esteem) 
Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p 
a2 -0.15 .09 .100 a3 -0.15 .10 .138 
a2 -0.11 0.04 .007 a3 -0.27 0.05 .000 
R2 =0.474 R2 =0.47 
F(2,148) = 21.47, p F(2,148) = 64.78, p < 0.000 
< 0.001 
Y (Paranoia) 
Coeff. SE p 
c' 3.05 0.57 .000 
c' 1.69 0.29 .000 
b, -1.55 0.56 .006 
b2 -0.76 0.55 .165 
b3 0.09 0.48 .846 
R2 =0.847 
F(5,145) = 73.80, p < 0.001 
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There was no evidence of an indirect effect of social anxiety and anxiety on paranoia 
through theory of mind, externalising bias and self-esteem as the bias-corrected bootstrap 
confidence intervals for the indirect effects, based on 10,000 bootstrap samples, all include 
zero (see table 11). 
Table 11 - Indirect Effects and bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for each of 
the proposed pathways between social anxiety and anxiety and paranoia through theory 
of mind, externalising bias and self-esteem. 
Total 
Theory of Mind 
Externalising 
Bias 
Self-Esteem 
Indirect 
Effect 
0.14 
0.08 
0.08 
-0.03 
Bootstrap SE 
0 .14 
0.07 
0.08 
0.13 
Bootstrap Lower Bootstrap Upper 
Confidence Interval Confidence Interval 
-0.14 0.42 
-0.01 0.25 
-0.03 0.30 
-0.27 0.24 
In summary the first mediation model is partially supported, there is evidence that 
there is an indirect relationship between theory of mind, self-esteem and externalising bias 
through social anxiety but not general anxiety and there is also a direct independent effect of 
theory of mind on paranoia. There is insufficient evidence of an indirect effect between social 
anxiety and generalised anxiety on paranoia through theory of mind, self-esteem and 
externalising bias. There is a significant direct effect of social anxiety and generalised anxiety 
on paranoia. See Figure 10 for the final mediation model. 
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Social 
Anxiety 
Cognitive Theory of 
Mind 
Paranoia 
Externalising Bias 
, 
, 
',,,, ,,,' 
Self Esteem 
................. ----------, ,,,,,' 
Generalised 
Anxiety ----------------
Key 
.... _ __ >~ Significant indirect pathway 
' .. ----> Indirect pathway not significant 
figure IO-The final mediation model of the relationships between cognitive factors, social 
anxiety and paranoia. 
DISCUSSION 
This section will summarise the overall findings of the study in relation to the 
research questions and initial hypotheses. The findings specific to each independent variable 
will be discussed in relation to previous theory and in the context of previous models of 
paranoia. Then the implications of the study will be highlighted and the strengths and 
weaknesses will be discussed. Finally, areas of further work will be suggested. 
Findings 
As hypothesised, theory of mind, externalising bias and self-esteem all had a 
significant relationship with paranoia but externalising bias and self-esteem did not predict 
paranoia when anxiety and social anxiety were accounted for. This finding and the high 
correlation coefficient between social anxiety and paranoia supported the hypothesis that 
mediation relationships were likely. The initial proposed mediation model was adapted in 
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response to the results of the multiple regression analysis. As predicted in the hypotheses, this 
study found evidence of an indirect relationship between some cognitive variables ( cognitive 
theory of mind, externalising bias and self-esteem) and paranoia through social anxiety. 
However, there was also a direct relationship between theory of mind and paranoia when 
controlling for social anxiety and generalised anxiety. There was no overall indirect effect of 
the cognitive variables through generalised anxiety although externalising bias and self-
esteem both have a significant relationship with general anxiety. Therefore the initial 
hypotheses were partially supported. The results did not support the second proposed 
mediation model in which social anxiety and anxiety predict paranoia through cognitive 
variables. 
These findings partially replicate the study by Bentall and colleagues (2009) which 
looked at associations between many different cognitive and affective factors and paranoia in 
a clinical sample. This present study also found Theory of Mind and anxiety to have a direct 
relationship with paranoia but did not find the associations between self-esteem, jumping to 
conclusions bias and low mood that Bentall and colleagues (2009) did. This study also 
included measures of social anxiety which was found to be highly related to paranoia. 
This study provides some support for Freeman and colleagues' threat anticipation 
model of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman 2007; Freeman & Freeman 2008; Freeman 
et al., 2008b) as it supports the idea that both cognitive (reasoning) and affective factors are 
important in the development of a persecutory belief. However, this study did not find 
support for the importance of all proposed reasoning factors Gum ping to conclusions bias) or 
affective factors (low mood/depression). 
The continuum theory of paranoia (Freeman, 2007; Bebbington et al., 2013) was 
supported by this study because similarly high levels of paranoia were found in this sample as 
other non-clinical samples (for example, Freeman et al., 2005) and this study provides 
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evidence of etiological continuity as paranoia was associated with similar factors as found in 
clinical samples (e.g. Bentall et al., 2009). 
The role of individual factors and paranoia 
Anxiety and Social Anxiety. As hypothesised, generalised anxiety and social anxiety 
predicted paranoia. These findings suggest that poor theory of mind, low self-esteem and 
lower levels of externalising bias lead to increased social anxiety and this in tum leads to 
higher levels of paranoia. This supports Freeman and colleagues idea of a hierarchy of 
paranoia where initial social-evaluative concerns that are shared by a large number of the 
population can lead to more extreme thoughts about threat to self from others (Freeman et al., 
2005; Freeman, 2007). The results also support the threat-anticipation model of paranoia 
which emphasises the role of worry and anxiety (Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman 2007; 
Freeman & Freeman 2008; Freeman et al., 2008b). 
Both measures of social anxiety were highly correlated with scores on the paranoia 
checklist (Spearman's rho correlation coefficients were 0.79 for the SPS and 0.70 for the 
SIAS and Pearson's r correlation coefficients were 0.86 for the SPS and 0.80 for the SIAS). 
Such strong correlations support the theory that social anxiety and paranoia may be part of 
the same continuum or construct (Freeman et al., 2005; Freeman, 2007). There is also the 
possibility that the measures of social anxiety and paranoia are in part measuring the same 
construct. This could be due to the measure of paranoia used. Some of the individual items on 
the paranoia checklist seem to reflect the general social-evaluative concerns of the hierarchy 
of paranoia and it can be argued that these items also reflect social anxiety. These items are 
listed below: 
• 2. 'There might be negative comments being circulated about me.' 
• 7. 'Strangers and friends look at me critically' 
• 9. 'Bad things are being said about me behind my back.' 
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• 15. 'People are laughing at me.' 
It could be that the social anxiety measures are highly correlated with these particular 
items and this is affecting the relationships between the variables. Further analysis is needed 
which looks at which factors predict scores on the paranoia checklist excluding these items in 
order to determine whether this is the case. 
Theory of Mind. This study used three measures of theory of mind/social cognition; 
this was done in order to overcome some of the difficulties with measuring theory of mind 
and the issues with the reliability and validity of individual measures. The cognitive measures 
of theory of mind were combined into one variable in the multiple regression and mediation 
analyses due to correlations between each factor. As predicted, lower levels of cognitive 
theory of mind were associated with higher levels of paranoia. Theory of mind was found to 
predict paranoia, and to have a direct relationship with paranoia even in the context of social 
anxiety. This supports the association between poor theory of mind and paranoia which has 
been found in some studies (Harrington et al., 2005) even when other potential factors related 
to paranoia were accounted for (Bentall et al., 2009). This is the first study to find such a link 
between theory of mind and paranoia in the general population. The inclusion of measures 
which are designed for use in the general adult population helped to overcome some of the 
previous methodological issues such as ceiling effects. 
However, the relationship between theory of mind and paranoia does appear to be 
complex because there was a significant indirect effect of theory of mind on paranoia through 
social anxiety as well as a direct effect. This only partially supports the hypothesised 
mediation model 1. Higher theory of mind abilities were associated with less social anxiety in 
this sample. This accounted for some of the relationship between theory of mind and paranoia 
but a significant direct effect remained. It could be that people with poorer theory of mind 
abilities find it more difficult to attribute emotions and motives to others and this leads to 
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them feeling both more socially anxious, and more paranoid, as they misattribute negative 
thoughts and motives to others. 
Not all the measures of theory of mind used in this study were found to be related to 
paranoia. Contrary to the hypotheses, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test had no 
significant relationship with paranoia. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test is a test of 
affective theory of mind which has been reported to be a "pure" test as it is supposed to test 
Theory of Mind independently from other abilities (such as 1.Q.) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen, 2004). However this claim has been disputed as it 
has been found to be associated with vocabulary (Petersen & Miller, 2012) and it has been 
argued that this test is actually a test of emotional empathy (Vellante et al., 2013 ). There are 
two possible reasons as to why there was no relationship between participants' scores on the 
reading the mind in the eyes test and paranoia. Firstly it could be that the distinction between 
affective theory of mind and cognitive theory of mind is valid and that these are two separate 
constructs with distinct relationships with other factors (as suggested by Langdon et al., 2006; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2007). Secondly, it could be that the 
methodological issues with the reading the mind in the eyes test mean that it is not a valid 
measure of affective theory of mind. Further work in this area is needed in order to determine 
whether there is a distinction between affective and cognitive theory of mind (Bosco et al., 
2009; Badgaiyan, 2009; Stratta et al., 2011). The finding that different tests of theory of mind 
had different relationships with paranoia emphasises the need to include more than one 
measure of theory of mind. 
Attributional Bias. As predicted there was a significant relationship between 
externalising bias and paranoia, although this did not remain once affective variable were 
controlled for. There was a significant indirect relationship between externalising bias and 
paranoia through social anxiety. 
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Previous research and theories of paranoia would suggest that people with higher 
externalising bias (i.e. people who make more external attributions for negative events, also 
referred to as "self-serving bias") would have higher levels of paranoia (Kinderman and 
Bentall, 1997; Fear et al., 1996; Kaney and Bentall, 1989) although the findings in this area 
have been mixed (Bentall et al., 2008) and a large-scale study which included several 
potential factors related to paranoia found no relationship between attributional bias and 
paranoia (Bentall et al., 2009). 
In this study, the relationship was not in the direction expected; higher levels of 
externalising bias were found to be related to lower levels of paranoia, although this 
relationship was negated once social anxiety was accounted for in the multiple regression 
analysis. The results of the mediation analysis suggest that the significant negative 
relationship between externalising bias and social anxiety (whereby higher levels of 
externalising bias are related to lower social anxiety) accounts for the link between 
externalising bias and paranoia: there is an indirect relationship between externalising bias 
and paranoia through social anxiety. This finding is surprising as it could be expected that 
higher levels of externalising bias (i.e. blaming others for negative events) would lead to 
higher levels of social anxiety and paranoia as people would be expecting people to behave 
malevolently towards them. However, some previous research has found that people with 
high social anxiety show less externalising bias and are more modest due to a fear of 
embarrassment if they are found to be wrong; they would rather assume negative situations 
are their fault and avoid embarrassment (Arkin, Appleman & Burger, 1980). This link 
between low externalising bias and higher social anxiety could explain the unexpected 
relationship between lower externalising bias and higher paranoia. 
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There are also several methodological issues which might explain this finding. Firstly 
the externalising bias scale ranges from -16 to 16 with scores above O indicating a strong self-
serving bias. It may be that the scale is not incremental and that categorising the participants 
into those with an externalising bias and those who don't would have been a better way of 
analysing the data. Previous research has categorised participants into those who have a "self-
serving bias" (Externalising bias scale scores of above 0) and those who do not and this 
method has found differences between the groups in terms of paranoia (Kinderman & 
Bentall, 1997), however several studies have not replicated this finding (Martin & Penn, 
2002; McKay et al., 2005; Randall et al., 2003). Further analysis categorising participants 
according to whether they scored above or below zero on the externalising bias scale may 
help to clarify the direction of the relationship between externalising bias and paranoia. 
However, it could be argued that categorising people is artificial and variation in the data 
would be lost with this method. 
Furthermore, there have been reported methodological issues with the IPSAQ 
whereby different classifications of the explanation provided for a situation are given by 
different raters (Bentall et al., 2008). For example, patients with paranoia often gave 
attributions for negative events which they classified as external but researchers classified as 
internal (Kinderman et al., 1992). One study found there was no relationship between 
attributions on the IPSAQ and paranoia when people with psychosis made the classification 
of their attributions but there was an association with paranoia and highly external-personal 
attributions when independent raters, who were blind to information about the participants, 
classified the participants' attributions (Martin and Penn, 2002). Therefore it seems that 
participants may find it difficult to classify their own responses as to whether the cause is due 
to themselves, others, or the situation and this is a flaw in the current methods of assessing 
attributional style. Further analysis could be conducted where the classifications are 
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independently rated and then compared to the participants' classifications to ascertain 
whether this is a factor in this sample. 
Finally, it has been hypothesised that there are other cognitive mechanisms linked to 
externalising bias and that people with poorer theory of mind are more likely to show an 
externalising bias (Kinderman, Dunbar & Bentall, 1998; Taylor and Kinderman, 2002). 
However if this was the case then we could still expect to find a positive relationship between 
externalising bias and paranoia and there was no relationship between theory of mind and 
externalising bias in this sample (spearman's rho= 0.007; p = 0.94). Therefore it seems likely 
that the surprising direction of the relationship between externalising bias and paranoia is 
either due to issues with the measure used or due to the previously found negative 
relationship between social anxiety and externalising bias (Arkin et al., 1980). Re-analysis of 
the data using either two categories of externalising bias or using independent ratings of the 
responses may result in different findings and would help to clarify the reason for this 
finding. 
The hypothesised relationship between personalising bias and paranoia was not found 
in this study. Previous research found those participants whose scores indicated the existence 
of personalising bias had higher levels of paranoia than those who did not show personalising 
bias (Bentall & Kinderman, 1996) and it could be expected that those participants who 
blamed other people rather than the situation ( or luck/chance) for negative events would have 
higher levels of paranoia. It could be that this study did not find the expected relationship 
between personalising bias and paranoia because it would be more meaningful to categorise 
participants based on whether they scored above 0.5 on the personalising bias scale and then 
investigate whether this categorical variable predicted scores on the paranoia checklist. 
Furthermore, the other methodological issues with the IPSAQ measure discussed above may 
be relevant to this scale as well. Finally, it could be that this finding is valid and personalising 
151 
bias is not related to paranoia in the context of other factors. Re-analysis of the data using 
categories or independent raters would help to determine whether these methodological 
issues explain the current findings. 
Self-esteem. As predicted, this study found a significant relationship between self-
esteem and paranoia which did not remain once social anxiety was controlled for. There was 
an indirect relationship between self-esteem and paranoia through social anxiety. There was 
also a significant relationship between self-esteem and general anxiety although no overall 
indirect relationship between self-esteem and paranoia though general anxiety. The inclusion 
of social anxiety in this study is likely to be why this study did not find the direct association 
between self-esteem and paranoia that previous studies have found (Bentall et al., 2009; 
Fowler et al., 2012. Lower levels of self-esteem were related to higher levels of social anxiety 
and consequently higher levels of paranoia in this sample. This provides support for Freeman 
and colleagues' theory that low self-esteem and paranoia are directly linked (Freeman et al., 
2002; 2004; 2005c; Freeman, 2007) with paranoid ideas reflecting themes of low self-esteem. 
It supports the existence of"bad-me" paranoia as described by Trower and Chadwick (1995). 
This finding does not support the "delusion-as-defence" theory ( e.g. Ben tall (2001) 
because this theory argues that people with paranoia have an explicit neutral level of self-
esteem due to the protective function of paranoia. 
Jumping to conclusions bias. This study did not find the hypothesised relationship 
between jumping to conclusions bias and paranoia. A relationship between jumping to 
conclusions bias and paranoia in the clinical population has been well established (Freeman, 
2007) but not all studies in the general population have found such a link (Freeman et al., 
2005). It may be that there is some other factor unique to clinical populations, such as the 
presence of other delusions or symptoms, that leads to a tendency to jump to conclusions. 
Alternatively, it could be that differences in jumping to conclusions bias are more subtle in 
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non-clinical populations and the beads task is not sensitive enough to detect such subtle 
changes (Freeman, 2007). However, the responses on the beads task ranged from 1 - 1 O 
draws, the mean was 5.37, and there appeared to be a good spread of responses so there were 
not obvious ceiling effects with this population. There was also a gender difference in 
jumping to conclusions bias in this sample, with men more likely to jump to conclusions and 
it could be the smaller proportion of men in this sample explains the lack of a relationship 
between jumping to conclusions bias and paranoia. However when only the men were 
selected for analysis there was still no significant correlation between jumping to conclusions 
bias and paranoia (spearman's rho= -0.19, p=0.36) so it is unlikely that the smaller 
proportion of men explains the lack of a relationship between jumping to conclusions bias 
and paranoia. 
This study did not support the relationship between anxiety and paranoia through 
jumping to conclusions bias found in a previous study (Lincoln et al., 2010) as there was no 
relationship between jumping to conclusions bias and anxiety or either measure of social 
anxiety (see appendix 10) as well as no relationship between jumping to conclusions bias and 
paran01a. 
Low Mood. Unexpectedly, although there was a significant positive correlation 
between depression and paranoia, this did not predict paranoia once other variables were 
controlled for in the multiple regression analysis. This finding is contrary to the hypotheses 
and to some previous studies (Martin and Penn, 2001; Smith et al., 2006; Fowler et al., 2012; 
Freeman et al., 2012). This study does not support the claim that depression plays a causal 
role in paranoia (Drake et al., 2004; Fowler et al., 2012) although the cross-sectional nature 
of this study does not rule out the possibility that depression precedes paranoia ( as suggested 
by Fowler et al., 2012). This study used a different measure of low mood to the ones used in 
the majority of previous research (BDI and HADS). It could be that this difference in 
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measurement explains the current failure to find a link between depression and paranoia. This 
seems unlikely because the measure used has good validity and reliability and is designed for 
use in the general population (Kroenke et al., 2009). A further potential reason for the 
difference in findings between this and previous studies is that this study included a number 
of other factors which had a relationship with paranoia that were not included in all the other 
studies linking low mood and paranoia (such as social anxiety) and it is in fact these factors 
that explain the previously found link between low mood and paranoia. Indeed in this study 
depression was highly correlated with generalised anxiety and both measures of social 
anxiety, as well as negatively correlated with self-esteem, externalising bias and theory of 
mind (see appendix 9). Therefore there could also be an indirect relationship between low 
mood and paranoia through one or more of the other variables that were found to be 
associated with paranoia (generalised anxiety, social anxiety, self-esteem, externalising bias, 
theory of mind). Further analysis could investigate this possible mediation. 
Gender. There was no significant effect of gender on paranoia. Although there were 
some significant gender differences on some of the measures, these did not affect the results. 
This could be due to the sampling bias and the small number of men in the study which could 
be masking any effect of gender on paranoia. A more balanced sample is needed in order to 
make more firm conclusions on the effect of gender on paranoia. 
Age. This study found that age was significantly correlated with paranoia, with people 
who are older being less paranoid. This supports some previous findings (van Os, 2009). 
However, once the influence of the other variables was controlled for, age did not predict 
paranoia. This sample had a good range of ages (18-70) but may not have been fully 
representative to the population as a whole as there were fewer older people in the sample. 
This could have affected the findings as there may be some age differences that were not 
captured in the sample. 
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Substance misuse. Drug and alcohol use were found to be related to paranoia but 
they did not predict paranoia once other variables were controlled for. Cannabis use has 
previously been linked to psychosis (van Os, 2009). This was not the focus of this study but 
further work looking at the role of drug and alcohol use in paranoia may be beneficial in 
understanding and treating paranoia. 
Strengths of the study 
There were many strengths to this study. Firstly this study builds upon previous 
studies by looking at many different cognitive and affective factors that previous research has 
found associations with paranoia. This study addressed flaws in previous research by using 
the most validated and reliable measures of many different cognitive and affective variables 
in a general population sample. The investigation of the potential mediation pathways 
between the factors associated with paranoia is a further strength of this study. 
Studying the general population allowed for the whole range of experience of 
paranoid thinking to be investigated and enhanced understanding of the whole range of 
paranoid experiences including the more extreme and distressing experiences found in the 
clinical population. This approach also ruled out the potential confounding effect of other 
symptoms in the clinical population studies. Furthermore, it enabled a larger sample size than 
most studies of clinical populations due to the difficulty in recruiting and assessing people 
from the clinical population in research. (Bebbington et al., 2013; Freeman, 2007). This study 
had a sample size with enough power to detect effects that are halfway between medium and 
small effects (see Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). This reduced the possibility of type II errors in 
interpreting the data. 
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Limitations of the study 
It is possible that the sample is not representative of the general population, firstly 
83% of the sample was female and although this study found no effect of gender on paranoia, 
it is possible that there are differences between males and females that were not captured by 
this study due to the lack of male participants. It may be that the findings of this study are 
primarily generalisable to women in the general population. This gender difference was 
probably due to the recruitment strategy as women are more likely than men to use social 
networking sites (ONS, 2011). In order to address this limitation, further studies should target 
male participants, perhaps through other websites (for example professional networking 
websites, such as Linkedln, which males are more likely to use than females (0NS, 2011)), in 
order to achieve a more balanced sample. 
Another sampling issue is that the majority of participants (96%) were White which 
again does not reflect British society as a whole (87% White in 2011 census, ONS) and there 
may be some unknown cultural factors which affect the experience of paranoia which this 
study could not address. Furthermore the medium by which the study was delivered may 
have excluded some participants. Although many people have access to the internet (77% of 
households, ONS, 2011) not everyone does and some sections of society are less likely to 
have internet access (such as those from areas of deprivation, older people, those with lower 
levels of education/computer literacy (ONS, 2011)) and it is therefore likely that people from 
these groups are under-represented in this sample. 
Furthermore, it is not known if there are certain characteristics that make people more 
likely to participate in online surveys and if these characteristics could have affected the 
results of this study. Further research is needed to investigate this. This issue is not unique to 
online studies, there are possible factors which affect whether people are likely to participate 
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in any form of psychological research, but there may be other factors (such as computer 
literacy) specific to online research. 
Despite more young people using social networking sites (91% of people aged 16-24, 
ONS, 2011 ), some older people do use social networking ( 18%, ONS, 2011) and the age 
range in this sample was broad (18-70 years old). Age was also included as a factor in the 
multiple regression analysis and did not predict paranoia once cognitive and affective 
variables were controlled for so it seems unlikely that age is a significant factor affecting the 
results of this study. 
There was a large drop-out rate for this survey and it is not known why this was. 
Personal feedback from participants would suggest it may be due to the length of time it took 
to complete all the measures and participants either became bored or fatigued or had time 
pressures leading to them dropping out. There were no differences in paranoia or other 
characteristics between those who dropped out and those who did not. It is unknown whether 
people were more likely to drop out at certain points of the study due to issues with specific 
tests. 
One final sampling issue is that although the study was well-powered, there was not 
enough power to detect small effects (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007) and therefore the possibility 
of type II errors cannot be ruled out. 
A further potential limitation is that many of the questionnaires were designed to be 
delivered in paper and pencil format and have not been validated for electronic use. One 
large-scale study has investigated the validity and reliability of electronic questionnaires by 
comparing the results of questionnaires delivered via paper and pencil and electronically and 
found no significant differences in the results from the two methods. The authors concluded 
electronic questionnaires are a valid method of delivery of psychological measures (Jones, 
Femyhough, de Wit & Meins, 2008). A potential benefit of delivering questionnaires online 
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without collecting personal data is that participants are completely anonymous and there may 
be less influence of social desirability factors or interpreter bias when scoring the free text 
responses. 
The cross-sectional nature of this study limits the conclusions that can be drawn about 
the direction of the relationships found and what factors cause paranoia. It is not possible to 
establish the causal direction between the study variables as the data was all collected at one 
point in time. It is possible to conclude that the data supports the hypothesised mediation 
model and are consistent with the proposed causal model but this is not a robust test of 
causality. It is possible that an alternative model where paranoia causes social anxiety, 
anxiety and theory of mind is more accurate and this cannot be refuted by this study. The 
causal direction of the relationships between factors could be more robustly established in a 
future study where the variables in the model are gathered at different points in time. 
There are other variables that have been linked to the experience of paranoia which 
were not tested in this study. Previous research has found a link between I.Q. and paranoia 
with lower I.Q. predicting higher levels of paranoia in a clinical sample (Ben tall et al., 2008). 
It was hoped that I.Q. could be measured in this study but no brief, well-validated, electronic 
measures of I.Q. could be found. As an alternative, years of education was included as a 
potential confounding variable and this was not found to be associated with paranoia in this 
sample. Future work developing such a measure of I.Q. would be beneficial for future 
studies. Similarly, it was not possible to measure executive functioning. 
Further variables that have been linked to paranoia in some studies include attachment 
style (Pickering, Simpson & Bentall, 2008); life events and/or trauma (Freeman et al., 2002; 
Freeman 2007; Freeman & Freeman 2008; Freeman et al., 2008b); Emotion Regulation 
(Westerman, Kesting & Lincoln, 2012); Insomnia (Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova & Southgate, 
2009); Interpersonal sensitivity (feeling left out/isolated/inferior) (Freeman et al., 2003); 
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Social withdrawal (Fowler et al., 2012); Boredom proneness (von Gemmingen, Sullivan & 
Pomerantz, 2003); Context (Collip et al., 2011) and anomalous experiences (Freeman & 
Freeman, 2008). Future work should attempt to include measures of these other potential 
factors to attempt to understand their relationship with paranoia in the context of the factors 
associated with paranoia in this study. 
A final issue is that although self-esteem was included as a cognitive variable in this 
study, it could be argued that this is an affective variable. Self-esteem relates to the evaluative 
component of self-concept (Grey-Little, Williams & Haddock, 1997) and therefore affects 
how people think about themselves and situations and therefore can be viewed as a bias or 
way of reasoning which is a cognitive factor. However, self-esteem is also closely linked to 
mood (Sowislo & Orth, 2013) and therefore it could be viewed as an affective variable which 
should have been put into the analysis with the other affective variables. This may have 
affected the results of the multiple regression analysis but would have led to the indirect 
effect of self-esteem being overlooked. It may have been informative to include a measure of 
a more distinctly cognitive construct such as negative cognition (negative beliefs about self 
and others) which it has been argued is closely related to paranoia (Fowler et al., 2012). 
Implications of the study 
This study has identified which key cognitive and affective factors are associated with 
the experience of paranoia in the general population. This can help inform our understanding 
of paranoia and the models used to explain it. For example, although it partially supports 
previous models such as the threat anticipation model of paranoia, there is disagreement 
about the nature of the cognitive biases. This study has attempted to overcome the previous 
methodological issues in theory of mind research and has found that theory of mind predicts 
paranoia even when other variables are controlled for. This has an implication for future 
models of paranoia which should include theory of mind. 
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Furthermore, by highlighting key factors related to paranoia, potential areas for 
treatment have been identified. For example, it could be that treatments which have been 
shown to be effective in treating social anxiety (e.g. CBT; NICE, 2013) are also effective in 
treating paranoia, especially lower-level paranoia which seems to be relatively common in 
the general population. Some research has already started in this area and CBT-based 
treatments for anxiety are being developed and adapted for people with paranoia (Freeman, 
2011 ). A further potential area for treatment is to focus on improving theory of mind skills, 
for example teaching strategies used in helping people with autism such as social stories 
(Gray, 2004) which would need to be greatly adapted to suit adults from the general 
population but may help to develop theory of mind skills. Another potential treatment could 
be metacognitive therapy (MCT) which focuses on highlighting and overcoming the 
cognitive biases often found in people with psychosis including poor theory of mind and 
attributional biases (Moritz & Woodward, 2007; Moritz, Veckenstedt, Bohn, K6ther, & 
Woodward, 2013). A modular treatment program has been developed consisting of 8 modules 
on attributions, jumping to conclusions, changing beliefs, empathy, memory, and low mood 
and self-esteem (Moritz et al., 2009) There is some evidence that this MCT program is 
effective and acceptable to people with psychosis (Moritz & Woodward, 2007; Moritz et al., 
2013). This program could be adapted to specifically treat paranoia, and this study would 
suggest focussing on the theory of mind, attributions, and self-esteem modules may be 
beneficial. Further research delivering this method and focussing specifically paranoia is 
needed. 
This study is normalising regarding the experience of paranoia; it supports the theory 
that paranoia is an extreme end of a continuum of experiences and that clinical paranoia and 
paranoia in the general population share similar relationships with other psychological 
factors. 
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Future work 
In addition to the further work highlighted above that is needed to address the 
potential limitations to the study, there are also some other areas that could be addressed. It 
would be beneficial to repeat the study in a larger sample that reflects groups of the 
population that are not well-represented in this sample. This would also mean the model can 
be tested and refined if needed. Further analysis of this data could investigate the individual 
scales of the paranoia checklist to determine whether some factors have relationships with 
specific aspects of paranoia, such as distress caused by the ideas. The nature of the continuum 
paranoia could be further investigated in order to determine how social anxiety is related to 
paranoia and why not everyone who experiences social anxiety experiences paranoia. 
Potential treatments for paranoia, especially focussing on theory of mind, anxiety and social 
anxiety need to be developed and tested widely. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest there is a significant direct relationship 
between theory of mind and paranoia, there is a significant direct relationship between social 
anxiety and paranoia and general anxiety and paranoia, and there is an indirect relationship 
between externalising bias and self-esteem and paranoia, through social anxiety. The findings 
lend some support to the threat anticipation model of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002; 
Freeman 2007; Freeman & Freeman 2008; Freeman et al., 2008b) and builds upon previous 
studies in the clinical population ( e.g. Bentall et al., 2008). 
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Appendix 1 - Recruitment advertisement 
UNIVERSITY 0 
SURREY 
Volunteers needed to participate in an online research study from the University 
of Surrey. 
would you like to take part in an anonymous online study looking at the factors 
associated with feeling paranoid? 
You don't have to feel paranoid to take part - we are looking for people with the whole 
range of paranoid feelings to help us with our research. 
If you decide to take part you will be asked to fill in a number of questionnaires. It will 
take about 45 minutes to answer all the questions. 
You will not be asked to give your name and your answers will be anonymous. 
To find out more about the study and to take part please click on the link below: 
http://www.fahs.surrey.ac.uk/survey/feeling paranoid/ 
For further information please do not hesitate to contact me by email. 
Katie Gulliver 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
This study has received favourable opinion from the University of Surrey Faculty of Arts 
and Human Sciences Ethics committee. 
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Appendix 2 - Letter of favourable ethical opinion 
Dr Adrian Coyle 
Chair: Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee 
University of Surrey 
Katie Gulliver 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
School of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
20th April 2012 
oear Katie 
,suRREY 
Faculty of 
Arts and Human Sciences 
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH UK 
T: 
F: 
www.surrey.ac.uk 
Reference: 739-PSY-12 {with conditions) 
Title of Project: The factors associated with the experience of paranoia In the general 
population 
Thank you for your submission of the above proposal. 
1 am pleased to advise that this proposal has received a favourable ethical opinion from the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences Ethics Committee provided that the following conditions 
are adhered to: 
• In your Coversheet Q16 please specify how long research data will be retained, 
where and by whom. 
• Information Screen: Although you indicate that people should contact their GP if they 
feel concerned after the study you do not inform people of the possible risks of taking 
part. These need to be set out so that people can make an informed decision about 
whether to take part. 
• The Committee does not 'approve' studies so please use the following form of words 
instead: This study has been reviewed and received a favourable ethical opinion from 
the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences at the University of 
Surrey. 
/Continued ............. . 
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• Consent Screen: Some clarifications are required: (a) participants won't know when 
the research will be assessed so you need to provide a date; (b) how will participants 
withdraw submitted data if their participation is anonymous and how would you 
identify them in order to exclude them from the results. (c) would you really be able to 
grant withdrawal up to the point of assessment as this would mean reanalysis of data 
prior to submission? (d) you should clarify when and how participants can withdraw 
their participation (e.g. closing their web browser during taking part). 
• Status questions should be modified to recognise Civil Partnerships/Dissolution. 
• In the consent form, it states that "I have been told about any possible distress which 
taking part in the project may cause me". This is not stated in the information sheet. 
This sentence could be deleted from the consent from, or some more information 
inserted into the information sheet. 
• There are web links missing on the debrief sheet, screen if they do not consent, and 
recruitment advert. It would be good, if possible, to have a university crest on the 
recruitment advert. 
• The online survey changes tasks/tests without introducing them properly. Some have 
new headings (e.g. reading the mind in the eyes) but quite a few do not (the one 
starting "1.lnfo: a woman has an unwanted pregnancy", the one starting "please 
choose the response to indicate the degree to which you feel the statement is 
characteristic", the one starting "I feel that I am a person of worth"). This may be for a 
reason (not highlighting the construct to be tested) but maybe it is good to indicate 
that this is the start of a new test. As this is a long study, if possible, an indicator of 
how long is left would be good (e.g. page x of y). 
• In the strange stories tasks, the first one has a number out of place "Simon is a big 
liar. Simon's brother Jim know this, he knows that (1) Simon never tells the truth, 
please amend. 
If there are any significant changes to your proposal which require further scrutiny, please 
contact the Faculty Ethics Committee before proceeding with your Project. 
Yours sincerely 
or Adrian Coyle 
Chair 
The conditions were met and I received the following email confirming this: 
Dear Katie 
Thank you for sending the relevant amended documents for your proposal. I can confirm that 
you have adhered to the conditions stipulated after ethical review and can now proceed with 
your research with apologies for the delay. 
Kind regards and good luck with your project! 
Julie Earl 
Secretary and Administrator FAHS Ethics Committee 
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Appendix 3 - Information screen 
bSURREY 
Information Screen 
Which factors are linked to feeling paranoid? 
Introduction 
My name is Katie Gulliver and I am a trainee clinical psychologist based in the Psychology 
Department at the University of Surrey, Guildford. This means that I already have a university 
degree in psychology, and am taking my studies further by now studying at post-graduate level for a 
doctorate qualification. As part of my training to become a clinical psychologist I am conducting this 
research under the supervision of Dr Clara Strauss. 
Feeling paranoid is a common experience in the general population. However, it can be a problem 
when feelings of paranoia become more intense or longstanding. I am researching the factors that 
might be related to low and high levels of paranoia in the general population. This will help us to 
better understand why some people feel more paranoid than others and it may help us to find more 
effective ways of helping people when they feel paranoid. 
1 would like to invite you to help me with this by taking part in my study. This study Is open to 
people with a range of paranoid feelings, including people who hardly ever feel paranoid and 
including people who may feel paranoid more often. 
To help you decide if you would like to take part, please read this Information Sheet so that you 
know what you will be asked to do. 
Do I have to take part? 
No, taking part in this study is entirely up to you. To help you decide whether or not to take part, 
you can talk it over with other people. You can also contact me or my supervisor for further 
information and I will be happy to answer any queries. Our contact details are at the end. 
Even if you agree to take part, you can withdraw from the research at any time without giving a 
reason .. 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to complete a number of questions on line. This should take around 45 minutes, so 
please ensure you will not be disturbed for this length of time. Some will be simple multiple choice 
questions, others will ask you to think about a problem or situation and to type In your answer. 
How do I agree to take part? 
The next screen will ask you to consent to take part in the study. 
Does what I say get shared with anyone else? 
Your answers are anonymous. You will not be asked to provide your name or address or any other 
identifying information. 
The anonymous information gathered during this research study will be stored securely on a 
computer at the University of Surrey in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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What happens when the research study is completed? 
When I have finished the study I am hoping to write up the findings for publication In an academic 
journal. If you would like a copy of the study findings please send me an email and I will send you the 
findings when the research has finished in a couple of years' time. 
What are the benefits of taking part in this research? 
The research provides an opportunity for you to contribute to people's knowledge about this subject 
and this may lead to a better understanding of the processes underlying paranoia. While you will not 
see any immediate change or benefit to yourself, you will be contributing to an important piece of 
research that may help to improve the health treatment and services of others in the future. 
Are there any downsides of taking part? 
some of the questions in the survey describe some sensitive Issues which may cause distress If you 
have been affected by them. This includes topics such as unwanted pregnancy and euthanasia. It 
may also be distressing to consider topics such as whether people like you or can be trusted. 
If you feel significantly unsettled after taking part in this study then we advise that you contact 
your GP to discuss your concerns. Alternatively you may wish to contact the Mind helpline (Mind 
Is a charity devoted to supporting people who are experiencing emotional difficulties): 
For confidential advice or support call their infoline on or email 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been treated during the course of 
the research study, then you can contact my supervisor. Her name is Dr Clara Strauss and her 
contact details are at the end. 
Has the research been approved by any committee? 
The study has been reviewed and received favourable ethical opinion from the Ethics Committee of 
the Faculty of Arts & Human Sciences at the University of Surrey. 
I hope I have answered all of your questions about the research study, but please feel to ask me 
anything else that I have not co~ered. My contact details and those of my supervisor are below. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this Information Sheet. 
Research being conducted by: 
Katie Gulliver 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Email-
I will aim to respond to your email within 48 hours. 
~pervised by: 
or Clara Strauss 
Research Team 
psychD Clinical Psychology Programme 
Email-
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Appendix 4 - consent screen 
1 voluntarily agree to take part in the study "Which factors are linked to paranoia?" 
• 1 have read and understood the information on the previous screen about the study . 
• 1 have been given information by the researcher of what I will be expected to do. I have 
been told about any possible distress which taking part in the project may cause me and 
have been offered support should this happen. 
• 1 have been given the opportunity to ask the researcher questions about the research 
and have understood the answers to all of the questions I have asked. 
• 1 understand that all personal data is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and 
in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
• 1 am happy for the researcher to write about my answers and publish this as long as this 
information remains anonymous. 
• 1 understand that I can change my mind about participating in the study at any time 
whilst completing the study and I don't have to give a reason for wanting to do this. I can 
withdraw from the study by closing my web browser at any time whilst taking part. As 
my information will be submitted anonymously I will not be able to withdraw once the 
results are submitted as the researchers will have no way of identifying me. 
• I have read and understood everything written above and have chosen to consent to 
participating in this study. I have been given enough time to think about this and agree 
to comply with the instructions and restrictions of the project. 
I confirm that I have read the information screen about the study and that I have read and agreed to 
the statements above. 
YES/ NO 
If Yes - the participant started the survey 
If No-they were shown the following screen: 
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Screen if they do not consent 
Thank you for your interest 
Your response indicated that you no longer wish to participate in this study. If you 
need to ask us any questions, please email me 
If you would like to try again, please click the following link: 
If you feel distressed in anyway by the content of the questions, you can contact your 
GP or you can contact one of the organisations below: 
NHS Direct 
Only accessible in the UK this telephone line is staffed 24 hours a day by nurses. 
MIND 
www.mind.org.uk 
Mind is the leading UK mental health charity offering advice and support for people 
experiencing emotional distress. For confidential advice or support call their infoline 
on or email · 
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Appendix 5- debriefscreen ' SURREY 
Thank you for participating in this research project! 
Interested in what this study was about? 
Research has found that many people feel paranoid from time to time and that 
feelings of paranoia range from low to high in the general population. This study was 
interested in looking at what makes some people more likely to have paranoid 
thoughts and feelings than others. The questionnaires used in this study all measure 
different factors that have been linked to paranoia in other studies . This study will 
help us to have a better understanding of why some people feel more paranoid than 
others and this may help us to develop more effective therapies for helping people 
when they begin to struggle with intense feelings of paranoia. 
If you are interested in knowing more about the results of this study please email 
and I will email you the results. 
If you feel distressed in anyway by the content of the questions, you can contact your 
GP or you can contact one of the organisations below: 
NHS Direct 0845 46 47 
Only accessible in the UK this telephone line is staffed 24 hours a day by nurses. 
MIND 
WWY'![.mind.org.uk 
Mind is the leading UK mental health charity offering advice and support for people 
experiencing emotional distress. For confidential advice or support call their infoline 
on or email 
If you know anyone who would be interested in participating in this research 
please suggest they visit our website: 
Please feel free to contact my supervisor if you have any concerns about this 
study: 
or Clara Strauss 
Research Team 
psychD Clinical Psychology Programme 
Email-
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Appendix 6 - Measures used in the order presented in the survey 
a) Demographics Questionnaire 
To start, could you tell us your: 
Age: Sex: 
How would you describe yourself (tick one or more): 
o Married 
□ Living with a partner 
D Divorced 
D Widowed 
o Separated 
D Single 
How would you describe yourself (tick one): 
D White 
D Black British 
o Black African 
□ Black Caribbean 
D Indian 
D Pakinstani 
D Bangladeshi 
D Chinese 
D Other 
Are you? 
D Employed 
□ Unemployed seeking work 
o Student 
o Retired 
□ Home manager 
□ On sick leave 
If you are employed, can you please describe your work? 
If you are not employed now, what was your last job? 
What is your highest level of academic achievement? 
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b) Paranoia Checklist 
Many people have thoughts, worries, or suspicions that others may be trying to upset them. 
It is a common experience, just as people can sometimes feel anxious or low in mood. 
Below are listed some of the thoughts that people report. For each one please indicate how 
often you may have the thought, how strongly you believe it, and how upsetting the 
experience is for you. 
I sometimes get the thought that: 
1. 'I need to be on my guard against others.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
2. 'There might be negative comments being circulated about me.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
3. 'People deliberately try to irritate me.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
4.' I might be being observed or followed.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
5. 'People are trying to make me upset.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
6. 'People communicate about me in subtle ways' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
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7. 'Strangers and friends look at me critically.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
8. 'People might be hostile towards me.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
9. 'Bad things are being said about me behind my back.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
1 o. 'Someone I know has bad intentions towards me' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
11. 'I have a suspicion that someone has it in for me.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe It 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
12. 'People would harm me if given an opportunity.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
13. 'Someone I don't know has bad intentions towards me.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
14_ 'There is a possibility of a conspiracy against me.' Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
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Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
15. 'People are laughing at me.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
16. 'I am under threat from others.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
17. 'I can detect coded messages about me in the press/TV/radio' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
18. 'My actions and thoughts might be controlled by others.' 
Rarely Once a month Once a week Several times a week At least once a day 
Do not believe it Believe it a little Believe it somewhat Believe it a lot Absolutely believe it 
Not distressing A little distressing Somewhat distressing Moderately distressing Very 
distressing 
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c) Test of complex social cognition 
1. 
Info: A woman has an unwanted pregnancy. She decides not to have an abortion. 
Question: Why might she decide this? 
Info: She is a Roman Catholic. The Catholic Church strong prohibits abortion. 
Question: What would you advise and how would you feel in this situation if you shared the woman's 
belief that abortion is wrong, and were a friend of hers? 
Question: Do you consider abortion to be morally wrong? 
2. 
Info: Joe, a 14 year old boy, stole some money out of his father's wallet and bought a computer game 
with it. When asked about the money he denied knowing anything about it. . 
Question: Is Joe wrong for taking the money? Why? 
Info: Joe's father had promised that he could buy the computer game if he earned the money himself, 
but later changed his mind and took the money Joe had earned. 
Question: In light of this information, does this change your view about whether Joe is /right or wrong 
for taking the money? Why? 
3. 
Info: A goalkeeper tries to dribble with the ball outside his box when he could have passed it to one of 
his team-mates. An opposing player tackles him, takes the ball and taps it into the empty goal whilst 
mocking the goal-keeper. As a result, the goal-keeper's team fail to win a major tournament. 
Question: What would you have thought and felt if this had happened in your team? What would you 
have wanted to happen to the goalkeeper? 
Info: By the beginning of the next season most of the fans forgave the goalkeeper for this mistake and 
still viewed him as a good member of the team. 
Question: Why do you think the fans forgave him? 
14. 
Info: A man is suffering from a terminal illness and is in a lot of pain and discomfort. He has asked 
his wife to help him die. His wife became very upset and angry and refuses to help her husband. 
Question: Why might she have become upset and angry? Why might she have refused to help? 
Info: The wife is a Christian and believes that only God should end life when He sees fit. 
Question: What would you advise if you shared the woman's belief that the time of death is God-
given and should not be brought forward by human intervention, and you were a friend of hers? What 
would you feel in this situation (if you shared her belief)? 
Question: Do you consider euthanasia to be morally wrong? 
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-d) Social phobia scale 
Please circle the number to indicate the degree to which you feel the statement 
is characteristic or true for you. The rating scale is as follows: 
o = Not at all characteristic or true of me. 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me. 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me. 
3 = Very characteristic or true of me. 
4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me. 
1 I become anxious if I have to write in 
front of other peoole 
2 I become self-conscious when using 
public toilets 
3 I can suddenly become aware of my own 
voice and of others listeninq to me 
4 I get nervous that people are staring at 
me as I walk down the street 
5 I fear I mav blush when I am with others 
6 I feel self-conscious if I have to enter a 
room where others are already seated 
7 I worry about shaking or trembling when 
I'm watched bv other oeople 
8 I would get tense if I had to sit facing 
other people on a bus or a train 
9 I get panicky that others to be faint sick 
or ill 
10 I would find it difficult to drink something 
if in a qroup of oeoPle 
11 It would make me feel self-conscious to 
eat in front of a stranaer at a restaurant 
12 I am worried people will think my 
behaviour odd 
13 I would get tense if I had to carry a tray 
across a crowded cafeteria 
14 I worry I'll lose control of myself in front of 
other people 
15 I worry I might do something to attract 
the attention of others 
16 When in an elevator I am tense if people 
look at me 
17 I can feel conspicuous standing in a 
aueue 
18 I get tense when I speak in front of other 
oeoole 
19 I worry my head will shake or nod in front 
of others 
20 I feel awkward and tense if I know people 
are watchina me 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
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e) Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) 
Instructions: For each item, please circle the number to indicate the degree to 
which you feel the statement is characteristic or true for you. The rating scale is as 
follows: 
O = Not at all characteristic or true of me. 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me. 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me. 
3 = Very characteristic or true of me. 
4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me. 
1. I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority (teacher, boss, etc.). o 1 
234 
2. I have difficulty making eye contact with others. 0 1 2 3 4 
3. 1 become tense if I have to talk about myself or my feelings. O 1 2 3 4 
4. 1 find it difficult to mix comfortably with the people I work with. O 1 2 3 4 
5. I find it easy to make friends my own age. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. I tense up if I meet an acquaintance in the street. 0 1 2 3 4 
7. When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 0 1 2 3 4 
8. 1 feel tense if I am alone with just one other person. 0 1 2 3 4 
9. 1 am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 0 1 2 3 4 
1 o. I have difficulty talking with other people. 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I find it easy to think of things to talk about. 0 1 2 3 4 
12. I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward. 0 1 2 3 4 
13. 1 find it difficult to disagree with another's point of view. 0 1 2 3 4 
14. 1 have difficulty talking to attractive persons of the opposite sex. O 1 2 3 4 
15. 1 find myself worrying that I won't know what to say in social situations. O 1 2 3 4 
16. I am nervous mixing with people I don't know well. 0 1 2 3 4 
17. I feel I'll say something embarrassing when talking. O 1 2 3 4 
18. When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be ignored. O 1 2 3 4 
19. I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
20. I am unsure whether to greet someone I know only slightly. O 1 2 3 4 
Patient Name: 
Date: _______ _ 
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f) Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale 
STATEMENT 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at 
least on an equal plane with others. 
2. I feel that I have a number of good 
qualities .. 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I 
am a failure . 
4. I am able to do things as well as 
most other people. 
5. I feel I do not have much to be 
proud of. 
6. I take a positive attitude toward 
myself. 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself. 
8. I wish I could have more respect for 
myself. 
9. I certainly feel useless at times. 
10. At times I think I am no good at all. 
Scores are calculated as follows : 
• For items 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7: 
Strongly agree= 3 
Agree= 2 
Disagree = 1 
Strongly disagree = 0 
Strongly Agree Disagree Agree 
r r r 
r r r 
r r r 
r r r 
r r r 
r r r 
r r r 
r r r 
r r r 
r r r 
• For items 3, 5, 8, 9, and 10 (which are reversed in valence): 
Strongly agree = 0 
Agree= 1 
Disagree= 2 
Strongly disagree = 3 
Strongly 
Disagree 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
The scale ranges from 0-30. Scores between 15 and 25 are within normal range; core below 
15 suggest low self-esteem. 
187 
g) PH0-8 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any 
Several More Nearly of the following problems? Not at all days than half every 
the days day 
1 Little interest or pleasure in doing things 0 2 3 
2 Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 0 1 2 3 
3 Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much 0 1 2 3 
4 Feeling tired or having little energy 0 1 2 3 
5 Poor appetite or overeating 0 1 2 3 
6 
Feeling bad about yourself - or that you are a failure or have let 0 1 2 3 yourself or your family down 
7 
Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or 0 1 2 watching television 3 
Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed? 
8 Or the opposite - being so fidgety or restless that you have been 0 2 3 
moving around a lot more than usual 
A 11 - PHQ8 total score □ 
h) GAD-7 
over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any 
Several More Nearly of the following problems? Not at all days than half every 
the days day 
1 Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge 0 1 2 3 
2 Not being able to stop or control worrying 0 2 3 
3 Worrying too much about different things 0 2 3 
4 Trouble relaxing 0 2 3 
5 Being so restless that it is hard to sit still 0 2 3 
6 Becoming easily annoyed or irritable 0 2 3 
7 Feeling afraid as if something awful might happen 0 2 3 
A12 - GAD7 total score □ 
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i) Strange Stories 
Simon is a big liar. Simon's brother Jim knows this, he knows that (1) Simon never tells the truth! 
Now yesterday Simon stole Jim's ping-pong paddle, and Jim knows that Simon has hidden it 
somewhere, though he can't find it. He's very cross. So he finds Simon and he says, "Where is my 
ping-pong paddle? You must have hidden it either in the cupboard of under your bed?" Simon tells 
him the paddle is under his bed. 
Q: Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the paddle? 
Scoring key 
2 points - reference to Jim knowing Simon lies 
1 point - reference to fact (that's where it really is, Simon's a big liar) or Simon hiding it without 
reference to implications oflying 
o points - reference to general nonspecific information (because he looked everywhere else) 
Brian is always hungry. Today at school it is his favourite meal - sausages and beans. He is a very 
greedy boy, and he would like to have more sausages than anybody else, even though his mother will 
have made him a lovely meal when he gets home! But everyone is allowed two sausages and not 
more. When it is Brian's tum to be served, he says, "Oh, please can I have four sausages, because I 
won't be having any dinner when I get home!" 
Q: Why does Brian say this? 
Scoring key 
2 points - reference to fact that he's trying to elicit sympathy, being deceptive 
1 point - reference to his state (greedy), outcome (to get more sausages) or factually incorrect 
O points - reference to general nonspecific information 
Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see Mrs. Smith, who had lots of kittens she didn't want. 
Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens, and she wouldn't do anything to harm them, though she couldn't 
keep them all herself. When Jill visited she wasn't sure she wanted one of Mrs. Smiths's kittens, 
since they were all males and she had wanted a female. But Mrs. Smith said, "If no one buys the 
kittens I'll just have to drown them!" 
Q: Why did Mrs. Smith say that? 
Scoring key 
2 points - reference to persuasion, manipulating feelings, trying to induce guilt/pity 
1 point - reference to outcome (to sell them or get rid of them in a way which implies not drowning) 
simple motivation (to make Jill sad) 
o points - reference to general knowledge or dilemma without realisation that the statement 
was not true (she's a horrible woman) 
A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making his getaway. As he is running home, a policeman on 
his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn't know the man is a burglar he just wants to tell him he 
dropped his glove. But when the policeman shouts out to the burglar, "Hey, you! Stop!", the burglar 
tums round, sees the policeman and gives himself up. He puts his hands up and admits that he did the 
break-in at the local shop. 
Q: Why did the burglar do that? 
Scoring key 
2 points -reference to the belief that the policeman knew that he'd burgled the shop 
1 point - reference to something factually correct in story 
o points - factually incorrect/irrelevant answer 
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j) 1.P.S.A.Q. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please read the statements on the following pages. For each statement please try to 
vividly imagine that event happening to you. Then try to decide what was the main 
cause of the event described in each statement. Please write the cause you have 
thought of in the space provided. Then tick the appropriate letter (a,b or c) according to 
whether the cause is : 
a) Something about you 
b) Something about another person (or a group of people) 
c) Something about the situation (circumstances or chance) 
It might be quite difficult to decide which of these options is exactly right. In this case, 
please pick one option, the option which best represents your opinion. Please pick 
only one letter in each case. 
Thank you for your time and co-operation. 
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1. A friend gave you a lift home. 
What caused your friend to give you a lift home? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
• • • • • • • ■ e ■ ■ ■ ■ e ■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I I I ■ I ■■■ I ■ t ■■■ I ■■■• ■ I I ■■■■ t ■ II 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
2. A friend talked about you behind your back. 
What caused your friend to talk about you behind your back? 
(Please write down the one major cause} 
• ■ • ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ O ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■ I I ■■■ I I ■■■■■ I ■■ I ■ I I ■■ I ■ I ■ t I I I I ■■■ I I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
3. A friend said that he(she) has no respect for you. 
4. 
What caused your friend to say that he(she} has no respect for you ? 
(Please write down the one major cause} 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■ I I ■■■■■■■ I ■■■ I I I ■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■ I I I ■ I I I I I ■ I I ■ t ■ ■ ■ ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance}? 
A friend helped you with the gardening. 
What caused your friend to help you with the gardening? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ • ■' ■■■■■■■ I ■■■•■• ■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■ I ■ I I ■■■■■■■ I I I ■■■■ I I I ■ t I I ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
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5. A friend thinks you are trustworthy. 
What caused your friend to think you are trustworthy? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ • ■ • • ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I I I ■■■■■■■■■ I I I I ■ I ■■ I ■ t ■■ I ■■■ I I ■■ I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
6. A friend refused to talk to you. 
What caused your friend to refuse to talk to you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■ I ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
7. A friend thinks you are interesting. 
What caused your friend to think you are interesting? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■ I ■• ■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■ I I ■■■■■■ I I I ■■■■■ I ■■ I I ■■■ I I I I I ■ t ■ II ■ I ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
8. A friend sent you a postcard. 
What caused your friend to send you a postcard? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■ I ■ I ■■■■■■■■ I ■ I ■ I ■■ t ■■■■ It ■■■■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
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9. A friend thinks you are unfriendly. 
What caused your friend to think that you are unfriendly? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
• •. • • • • • • • • • • e • e • e • • e e • • e e • e • e • e e e •. e e ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ f ■■■■■ II ■■ I I ■ I ■■ I ■■ f 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
10. A friend made an insulting remark to you. 
What caused your friend to insult you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■•■ I ■■■■ t ■■■ I ■ I ■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■ I I ■ I I I ■■■■■ t 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
11. A friend bought you a present. 
What caused your friend to buy you a present . 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ f ■■■■■ II ■■ t ■■■ I ■ I ■■■ I ■ t ■■ I It I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
2 A friend picked a fight with you. 1 . 
What caused your friend to fight with you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ • • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ f ■ t ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■ It f ■■ I ■ t I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
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13. A friend thinks you are dishonest. 
What caused your friend to think you are dishonest? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
• ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I I I I ■■■ I ■■ I ■ I ■■ I ■ I ■■ I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
14. A friend spent some time talking to you. 
What caused your friend to spend time talking with you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■•■■■■'■■• ■■• ■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■ I ■■■ I ■ I ■ I ■■■■ I ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
15. A friend thinks you are clever. 
What caused your friend to think you are clever? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ f ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■ I ■■■■■■■ I ■■ I ■■■■ I I ■■■ I I I ■■■ I It ■■ I I ■ I I ■■ I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
6 A friend refused to help you with a job. 1 . 
What caused your friend to refuse to help you with the job? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■ t ■■ II ■■ I ■■■■■■■ I I I ■■ f ■■■ I ■■■■■ I I ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
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17. A friend thinks you are sensible. 
What caused your friend to think that you were sensible? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
e • ■ • ■ ■ f • e e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ■ • ■ ■ • • ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■••• ■■■ I ■■■■ I ■■■■ I It ■ I I ■■■ I I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
18. A friend thinks you are unfair. 
What caused your friend to think that you are unfair? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 0 ■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■ f ■ I ■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■ I ■■■■■ If I ■ I I I ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
19. A friend said that he{she) dislikes you. 
What caused your friend to say that he(she) dislikes you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ o ■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I I I ■ I ■■ I I ■■■■ I I ■ I ■ I ■■ I ■ I ■■ t ■ ■ t ■ ■ ■ t ■ I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
0 A friend rang to enquire about you. 2 . 
What caused your friend to ring to enquire about you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
............................................................................. 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
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21. A friend ignored you 
What caused your friend to ignore you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
• • • e e • •• • • e • • • • • • ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ t ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ t ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■ I. I I I ■ I ■ t t 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
22. A friend said that she(he} admires you. 
What caused your friend to say that she(he) admired you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
• • • • e e ■ ■ e ■ • ■ ■ • • • • • ■ ■ • • • • ■ ■ • • ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ t • ■ I ■• ■■• It t ■ ■ e I ■ I ■■ I I I I ■ I e ■ II I I ■ It I ■ I ■ t 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
23. A friend said that he(she} finds you boring. 
24. 
What caused your friend to say that he(she) finds you boring? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■ I ■■■■ 0 ■■ I ■■■■■■ I ■■■■■ I I I ■■■■ I I ■ I ■ I ■■ I ■■ I I ■ I ■ I I ■ I ■■ I ■ I I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
A friend said that she(he} resents you. 
What caused your friend to say that she(he) resents you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ e ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ t ■■ I I I I ■ I I I I ■ I I ■ t I I I ■■ t ■ I ■■ t I It I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
196 
25. A friend visited you for a friendly chat. 
What caused your friend to visit you for a chat? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ e ■ ■ ■ ■ t ■ ■ • • ■ •'•••■•■ I• ■■• ■•■• ■■••■■• ■ t • ■ t ■■•■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■ I I ■ I ■■■ I I ■■■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
26. A friend believes that you are honest 
What caused your friend to believe that you are honest? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 0 ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■ I I ■■■■■■■ I ■■■ I I I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
7 A friend betrayed the trust you had in her. 2 . 
28. 
What caused your friend to betray your trust? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ t ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■, ■ ■ ■ 1 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ II ■■ I ■ I I ■■■■■ I I ■■■■■■■■ I I ■ I I ■ I I ■ I I ■ t ■ ■ ■ ■ t I ■ I ■ I ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
A friend ordered you to leave. 
What caused your friend to order you to leave? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ o ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■ I ■■ I ■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■ I ■■■■ t ■ 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
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29. A friend said that she(he) respects you. 
What caused your friend to say that she(he) respects you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
• e • e e • • • • • ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ • ■ ■ ■ ■ o ■ ■ ■ • • • ■ 1 ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■ I I ■ I I I ■■■■■ I I ■ I I It It I I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ It I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
30. A friend thinks you are stupid. 
What caused your friend to think that you are stupid? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
I ■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■• ■■■ I ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■ I ■■■ I ■ I ■■■ I I I ■ I ■■■ I I I ■■■ I If ■■■■ I I I I I I ■ I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
31. A friend said that he(she) liked you. 
What caused your friend to say that he(she) liked you? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ 1 ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ II ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ I ■ I I ■ I I I I I I ■■■ I I I ■ I ■ I I I ■■ I I I ■■■■■ I I ■■ I I I I ■ I I I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
32. A neighbour invited you in for a drink. 
What caused your friend to invite you in for a drink? 
(Please write down the one major cause) 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■■■■■ I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ t ■■ I ■■■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I I ■■ I I I I ■■ I If ■ I I If I ■ t ■ ■ t ■■ I I 
Is this: 
a. Something about you ? 
b. Something about the other person or other people ? 
c. Something about the situation (circumstances or chance)? 
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INTERNAL, PERSONAL, AND SITUATIONAL ATTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
SCORING KEY 
Each item describes the action of an actor towards a target person. Subjects have to choose one of 
three possible explanations for each action. 
a. An internal attribution 
b. An external, personal, attribution 
c. An external, situational, attribution 
Positive: 1,4,5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 17,20,22,25,26,29, 31,32 
Negative: 2,3,6,9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19,21,23,24,27,28,30 
k) Beads task 
There are twoj:ars: Amainlyorangejar=nbining 85 o=.gum 5 blackbaads.inda 
mai.nlybl.ackjarconbining 85 black am 5 onngebead .. 
Ma.in.Q· Black 
Jar 
(85 black; 5 orange) 
Ma.in.Q· Or:i.nge 
Ja.r 
(85 orange; 5bl.ack) 
The be.a.els have bae:11 mixm llp in the jar. 
M~-Black 
Jar 
(85 black; 5 orange) 
:&iain\r ·Or:wge 
Jar 
(85 orange; 5bl.ack) 
One of the jars has been chosen at random. Beads will be drawn from th elected jar and 
shown. The beads will always come from the same jar and will be replaced afterward that 
the proportions stay the same. 
It is your job to decide from which jar the beads have come. You may see a maximum of 10 
beads before making a decision. After a bead has been shown to you, you can a k for an thcr 
bead or you can decide that you know which jar has been chosen, and you can click whether 
it is the Mainly Orange Jar or the Mainly Black Jar. Only decide when you ar certain. You 
will now see the first bead. 
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1) Reading the mind in the eyes test 
Adult Eyes Instructions 
For each set of eyes, choose and circle which word best describes what the person in the 
picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is app licable but please 
choose just one word, the word which you consider to be most suitable. Before making your 
choice, make sure that you have read all 4 words. You should try to do the task a quickly a 
possible but you will not be timed. 
Practice Question - example 
jealous panicked 
arrogant hateful 
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m) Optional last questions 
We would now like to ask you some optional questions about your experiences that will 
help with our research. Your responses to these questions are anonymous and you do not 
have to answer them if you don't want to. 
• Have you ever needed to drink a significant amount of alcohol to get you through the 
day? 
Yes 
No 
• If Yes; how often have you felt this way? 
Hardly ever 
Rarely 
Quite frequently 
Most days 
• Have you ever used drugs or inhaled substances to get high, feel elated or get a "buzz"? 
Yes 
No 
• If Yes; how often have you felt this way? 
Hardly ever 
Rarely 
Quite frequently 
Most days 
• Do you have a diagnosis of a mental health condition ( e.g. Depression, Schizophrenia) 
No 
Yes; 
• If yes What is your diagnosis? 
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Appendix 7 - review of existing measures of theory of mind 
"Theory of Mind" (ToM), "mentalizing" or "perspective taking" has been described as the 
everyday ability to attribute thoughts and feelings to others and an understanding of how 
others' behaviours are motivated by their beliefs, thoughts, feelings and intentions (Abell, 
Happe and Frith, 2000; Wellman, 1990; Premack and Woodruff, 1978). The first tests of 
theory of mind abilities were the false belief test, also known as the "Sally-Anne" test (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985). This test can be passed by normally developing 
children by about 4 years of age (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). 
However, typically developing children and adults still show differences in their Theory of 
Mind and social cognitive abilities (e.g. Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley & Tuckey, 2001). Also, 
false belief tests can be passed by people with Asperger syndrome and High Functioning 
Autism yet fail to capture the real-life difficulties faced by people with these disorders (Abell 
et al., 2000). For these reasons several "advanced" tests of theory of mind have been 
developed that try to capture the essence of real-life situations where theory of mind skills 
maybe used. 
Some advanced tests have focused on what has been called "Second-Order" Theory of Mind; 
the ability to reason about what one person thinks about another person's thoughts (Pemcr 
and Wimmer, 1985; Bowler, 1992). Bowler (1992) developed a test of this kind in which the 
participant is told stories involving an everyday scenario and asked a series of questions 
about what has happened. The key question asks the respondent to justify their answer to a 
question about the belief of another person. If they use the form "she doesn't know that he 
knows", a mental state embedded within a mental state, they are judged to have second order 
theory of mind. People with Asperger syndrome and High functioning autism typically pass 
this test but do not use mental states terms in their answers to the justification question. In 
typically developing people this test has ceiling effects and therefore is not sensitive to more 
subtle differences in theory of mind abilities in adults (Kaland, Meller-Nielson, Callesen, 
Mortensen, Gottleib and Smith, 2002). For this reason, more complex tests of theory of mind 
have been developed. 
Other tests of advanced theory of mind skills use stories based on everyday life situations to 
measure theory of mind skills 'in a more naturalistic context (Happe, 1994; Kaland et al., 
2002). These involve story comprehension where key questions were either concerned with 
the protagonist's mental or physical states. Happe's (1994) Strange Stories task consists of 24 
short vignettes with 12 different types of and 2 questions for each story; a comprehension 
question and a test question. The Stories from Everyday Life test (Kaland et al., 2002) is 
modelled on Happe's (1994) Strange Stories but is contextually more complex. It comprises 
of 26 vignettes designed to test participants' abilities to make inferences about physical and 
mental states in a story context (Kaland et al., 2002). It has been found that these tests are 
sensitive to differences in theory of mind abilities in adults (Happe, 1994; Kaland et al., 
2002). The use of naturalistic stories seems to be a useful model to test complex social 
cognition. 
Nevertheless, stories still do not capture the complexity of processing that is required in real-
life situations. To make a test as naturalistic as possible films including the Movie for Social 
Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al., 2006) showing characters in social situations have also 
been developed to approximate the demands of real-life mentalising and have been found to 
be sensitive to differences in mentalising abilities in real-life situations (Heavey, Phillips, 
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Baron-Cohen and Rutter, 2000; Dziobek et al., 2006). The MASC test also allows for the 
quantification of aberrant mentalising strategies like over-mentalising or under-mentalising 
(Montag et al., 2011 ). This test has been used in a clinical sample of people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (Montag et al., 2011) but not to look at the relationship between theory of mind 
and paranoia. 
However, tasks involving story or film comprehension involve quite complex cognitive 
processes and it could be that difficulties on these sorts of tasks reflect general cognitive 
deficits rather than a pure Theory of Mind deficit (Kaland et al., 2002). To overcome this 
problem, tests have been developed that aim to test theory of mind abilities selectively, 
minimising the contribution of other cognitive processes. One such test is Abell, Happe and 
Frith's (2000) animations test which uses animations to elicit participants' attributions of 
actions, interactions and mental states (see also Castelli, Happe, Frith and Frith, 2000; 
Castelli, Frith, Happe and Frith, 2002). The test consists of 33-45s animations showing two 
triangles moving about on a white background; the participant is then asked to say what 
happened in the animation. This test has been found to be sensitive to differences in Theory 
of Mind abilities in the adult populations and in people with Autistic spectrum disorders 
(Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000). It has been used to test differences in brain activity 
when using theory of mind skills (Castelli et al., 2002). 
Another test of"pure" theory of mind has been used by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore and Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright and Hill, 2001; 
Baron-Cohen, 2004). This uses photographs of a person's eyes and requires participants to 
make inferences based on this information alone. A photograph is presented alongside a set 
of four adjectives and the participant has to select the word that best describes the person's 
expression based on the eyes alone. This test is sensitive to subtle theory of mind differences 
in adults and adolescents (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen, 
2004). However, it can be argued that the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test is in fact a 
measure of emotion recognition or emotional empathy rather than theory of mind and it has 
been correlated with measures of empathy (e.g. Vellante et al., 2013). There are very few 
published studies with the psychometric properties for this test meaning it is not clear 
whether it is a "pure" test of theory of mind as described. Furthermore, one study has found a 
relationship between scores on the eye test and verbal IQ suggesting it is not as free from 
contributions of other variables as first suggested (Petersen & Miller, 2012). However, it is 
one of the few tests that is sensitive to differences in adults and because of this it has been 
used in over 250 studies into theory of mind in the general adult population (Petersen & 
Miller, 2012). Information conveyed by eyes is not the only source of differences in theory 
of mind abilities; Kleinman, Marciano and Ault (2001) and Rutherford, Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright (2002) also found differences in determinations of a person's feelings from 
voice intonation. Table one summarises current tests of Theory of Mind. 
Although typically developing people have well developed theory of mind skills by the time 
they reach adulthood, there is substantial variation in the spontaneous use of these theory of 
mind skills to describe, explain and interpret the behaviour of others (Charman & Shmueli-
Goetz, 1998). Large variation in 'mind-mindedness', or the proclivity to treat others as agents 
with thoughts, feelings and beliefs, has been found (Meins et al., 2001). For these reasons, a 
novel test that measures people's use of their theory of mind or perspective taking skills in 
complex social situations and dilemmas would be valuable to research in this field. This is 
what led to the development of the test of social cognition used in this study. 
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It has been suggested that there are several different aspects of theory of mind or types of 
theory of mind which may or may not be related. Many authors have argued, for instance, 
that there is a distinction between cognitive and affective theory of mind (Langdon et al., 
2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). Cognitive Theory of Mind is the ability to think about the 
mental states of others (perspective taking) whereas affective theory of mind is the ability to 
read the emotional states of others more intuitively (more akin to emotional empathy). Some 
authors have argued that these are distinct concepts and one is not necessary for the other 
(Rogers et al., 2007). However it is not clear if such a distinction is valid due to lack of 
supportive research such as factor analyses (Bosco et al., 2009; Badgaiyan, 2009). 
Table 12 - Current tests of Theory of Mind 
Test Method employed Authors Year published 
False Belief Test Acted story Baron-Cohen, Leslie 1985 
Second-Order 
Theory of Mind test 
Strange-stories test 
Stories from 
everyday life 
Hinting Test 
Theory of Mind 
Picture sequencing 
task 
Comic-strip task: 
attribution of 
intentions to others 
Movie for advanced 
social cognition 
(MASC) 
The awkward 
moment test 
Animations test, "Do 
triangles play 
tricks?" 
Social Attribution 
Test Multiple 
Choice (SAT-MC) 
The "Reading the 
mind in the eyes test" 
The Mental state 
voices task (MSVT) 
The Reading the 
Story, read 
and Frith, 
to Bowler, 
participants 
Story vignettes 
Story vignettes 
Story vignettes 
regarding hints 
Cartoon picture 
stories which have to 
be placed in logical 
order plus 
questionnaire 
Happe, 
Kalland et al., 
Corcoran et al.; 
Greig et al 
(American version) 
Brune 
Stories presented m Sarfati et al. 
comic-strip form to 
avoid the use of 
language 
Movie of real people Dziobek et al., 
Movie of real people Heavey et al., 
Animations Abell et al., 
involving triangles Castelli et al., 
Castelli et al., 
Animations of Bell et al. 
geometric shapes 
with multiple choice 
questions about the 
interactions 
Photographs of a Baron-Cohen et al., 
person's eyes 
Recordings of voices Kleinman et al., 
Recordings of voices Rutherford et al., 
1992 
1994 
2002 
1995 
2004 
2005 
1997 
2006 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2002 
2010 
1997 
2001 
2001 
2002 
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mind in the v01ce 
task 
unknown Reproduces "natural 
conversation" 
Open-ended 
questions exploring 
individuals 
Champagne-Lavau et 2009 
al. 
Theory of 
Assessment 
(Th.o.m.a.s) 
Mind 
Scale 
Bosco et al. 2009 
understanding of 
mental states 
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Appendix 8 - Test of Complex Social Cognition Scoring Criteria 
Perspective Taking 
The ability to represent the beliefs, emotions and intentions of others without necessarily 
feeling sympathy of emotionally sharing their predicament. The ability to suggest how they 
would feel in a situation, ability to give suggestions of advice they would give, ability to 
suggest views other than their own. 
Score O for none 
1 for some but not complete ability 
2 for a good example of perspective taking 
Accuracy/Plausibility 
The ability to give an accurate or plausible answer which could realistically explain the 
situation and/or may be a good estimate of how someone might feel. 
Score O for an inaccurate or implausible answer 
1 for a quite accurate or plausible answer but not the most likely 
,, ' 
2 for a good accurate or plausible answer 
Empathy/Emotional Engagement 
The ability to represent the feelings of others, and/or demonstrate sympathy or emotional 
identification with their predicament. The ability to suggest how the protagonists would be 
feeling and how they would feel in the same situation. 
Score O for no mention of feelings whatsoever 
1 for some identification with the characters and the situation but not full engagement 
2 for good identification with the characters and the situation and emotional 
engagement. 
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Appendix 9 - Comparisons between those who dropped out and completed the study 
Table 13 -Mann-Whitney U tests comparing means on paranoia checklist, age, and 
years in education 
Variable Completed Survey Dropped out 
(N = 151) ~N = 104} u p 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Paranoia 49.58 51.93 49.58 42.95 6348.5 0.26 Checklist 
Age 34.70 12.29 32.68 12.86 6767.0 0.06 
Years in 
Education 
16.13 5.17 16.54 7.98 7337.0 0.37 
As shown in table 13, there were no significant differences between those who 
completed the survey and those who dropped out in terms of mean scores on the paranoia 
checklist, mean age and years in education. 
Table 14 - Cross tabulation differences in gender between those who dropped out and 
those who completed the study 
Completed Dropped out Total 
Female Observed 126 79 205 
Expected 121.4 83.6 205 
:Male Observed 25 25 50 
Expected 29.6 20.4 50 
Total 151 104 255 
Pearson's Chi-square= 2.19, df, 1, p = 0.14. Therefore there is no difference in 
gender distribution between those who dropped out and those who completed the survey. 
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Appendix 10 - Table 15 Spearman's rho correlation coefficients between all independent variables 
Variable Age Years in Reading Beads Self- Strange Test of Test of Test of Total External Person PHQ8 GAD7 SPS SIAS 
educatio the task estee Stories Complex Complex Complex Cognitive ising alising 
n Mind in total m Social Social Social Theory of Bias Bias 
the Eyes draws Cognition Cognition Cognition Mind 
accuracy Empathy Perspective scale 
Taking 
Age l 
Years in 0.04 l 
education 
Reading the Mind 0.05 0.14 l 
in the Eyes 
Beads task total -0.15 0.00 0.06 l 
draws 
Self-esteem -0.21 0.17 0.09 -0.05 l 
Strange Stories 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.04 1 
Test of Complex -0.04 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.20 0.37 I 
Social Cognition 
accuracy 
Test of Complex -0.12 0.14 0.04 0.24 0.09 0.22 0.47 1 
Social Cognition 
Empathy 
Test of Complex -0.17 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.18 0.35 0.63 0.67 1 
Social Cognition 
Perspective 
Taking 
Total Cognitive -0.22 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.15 0.59 0.69 0.84 0.84 l 
Theory of Mind 
scale 
Externalising Bias 0.23 0.09 0.17 -0.06 0.45 0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.01 O.QJ l 
Personalising Bias 0.05 -0.09 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 I 
PHQ8 -0.22 -0.15 -.016 0.12 -0.68 0.01 -0.18 -0.15 -0.20 -0.17 -0.35 - 1 
0.09 
GAD7 -0.23 -0.10 -0.22 0.01 -0.52 0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.31 0.07 0.72 1 
SPS -0.26 -0.19 -0.10 0.03 -0.62 -0.04 -0.28 -0.11 -0.23 -0.19 -0.28 0.10 0.70 0.69 l 
SIAS -0.20 -0.16 -0.11 -0.01 -0.67 0.01 -0.24 -0.09 -0.19 -0.15 -0.33 0.09 0.71 0.66 0.82 l 
Significant correlations ofp < 0.05 are shown in bold 
Appendix 11 - how the data meets the assumptions of multiple regression analysi 
This section summarises the assumptions of multiple regression analysis as described by 
Field (2013) and how the data conforms to these. 
• Additivity and linearity- The outcome variable (paranoia) is linearly related to all 
predictor variables 
• Independent errors - The residuals for each data point should be uncorrelated. The 
Durbin-Watson test is used to measure this. The Durbin-Watson statistic should be a 
close to 2 as possible, with scores of below 1 or above 3 being problematic. Durbn-
Watson statistic for this model was 1.99 suggesting the res iduals are uncorrelated. 
• Homoscedasticity-Tbe variance of the residuals should be constant at each level of each 
predictor variable. This was checked for using a scatterplot of the residual aga in t 
standardised predicted values (see figure 11). The graph shou ld look like a random array 
of dots (Field, 2013). This graph shows some funnelling, suggesting some 
heteroscedasticity. Bootstrapping was perfonned to overcome this issue. 
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Figure 11 - scatterplot of the standardised residuals against the standardised predicted values. 
• Normally distributed errors - The residuals should be random, normally distributed 
variables with a mean of zero. Figure 12 shows the di stribution of the res idual which 
suggests they are not normally distributed. However, as bootstrapping was used thi 
assumption can be ignored (Field, 2013). 
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Figure 12 - histogram showing the distribution of the residual 
Mean = -4 .98E-16 
std. Dev ... 0.966 
N = 149 
• Check for cases which may be influencing the model - No mor than 5% of 
standardised residuals should be above 2. In this sample 4/151 (2.6%) were above 2. 
Furthermore no more than 1 % should be above 2.5, in this sample 2/151 ( 1.3%) were 
above 2.5. Cook's distances were all below 1, suggesting no case are over 
influencing the model. 
• No multicollinearity - As stated in the results section the variables were tc tcd for 
multicollinearity and the SPS scale was removed from the model. 
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Appendix 12 - Alternative Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis 
Step 1 - The demographic variables were entered as in previous model (see table 5 in 
results section. 
Step 2 - The affective variables (SIAS, GAD-7) were entered into the model (see table 
14) 
Table 16 - Linear model of predictors of scores on the paranoia checklist, with 95% bias 
corrected and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses. Confidence 
intervals and standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
b SEB p 
Constant 4.03 2.57 24.50 
(-50.06,59.38) 
Age 0.18 -0.02 0.21 
(-0.21,0.54) 
Gender 4.97 -0.51 7.10 
(-7.95,17.14) 
Alcohol use -11.51 -0.31 8.61 
(-28.08, 3.49) 
Drug Use 
-8.73 -0.08 4.80 
(-18.36,0.27) 
Low Mood 
-0.31 0.01 0.64 
(-1.58,0.97) 
Anxiety 3.07 0.00 0.68 
(1.73, 4.49) 
Social Anxiety 1.82 -0.03 0.34 
(1.25,2.36) 
p 
.87 
.40 
.49 
.19 
.08 
.63 
.001 
.001 
Step 3 - The cognitive variables were added to the model and this was the same as in the first 
model (see table 7 in the results section) 
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